Quiet Rebellion? Explaining Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences with Michael Heise by Bowman, Frank O., III & Heise, Michael
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications
Spring 2001
Quiet Rebellion? Explaining Nearly a Decade of
Declining Federal Drug Sentences with Michael
Heise
Frank O. Bowman III
University of Missouri School of Law, bowmanf@missouri.edu
Michael Heise
Cornell Law School, michael.heise@cornell.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/facpubs
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Frank O. Bowman III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining Nearly A Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 Iowa
L. Rev. 1043 (2001)
Quiet Rebellion?
Explaining Nearly a Decade of Declining
Federal Drug Sentences
Frank 0. Bowman, 1M( and Michael Heise"
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 1046
II. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES ........................................................................................ 1050
A. FEDERAL SEEN'CNG BEFORE THE WME ES .............................. 1050
B. DRUGS, THE S m'cN7h.G REFOPR AcT, AND THE FEI iL
SFNTENCING GLDEM ............................................................... 1055
1. A Primer on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ............... 1055
2. Drug Sentencing Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines ............................................................................ 1059
II. THE EFFECr OF FEDERAL SENTENCING REFORMt ON DRUG
SENTENCES .......................................................................................... 1063
A. ThE RISE ............................................................................... 1063
B. ... ANDFALL OF"EDERALDRUG SEVKCFES .................................. 1065
IV. EXPLAINING THE DECLINE IN AVERAGE FEDERAL DRUG SENTENCES ... 1067
A. TiHEEEcTOFNON-DISCRETiONARYF ACTOS ON FEDoERAL DRtG
SENTE CES ................................................................................... 1067
Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law at Indianapolis. Formerly
Special Counsel, U.S. Sentencing Commission (1995-96); Assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern
District of Florida (1989-96); Deputy District Attorney, Denver, Colorado (1983-87); Trial
Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division (1979-82); and sometime defense
attorney. I am grateful to Commissioner John R. Steer, Lou Reedt, Paul Hofer, Michael
Courlander, Christine Kitchens, and Courtney Semisch, all of the United States Sentencing
Commission, for their advice and their generosity in providing access to Commission sources.
Many thanks go, as well, to Daniel Freed, Roger Haines, Marc Miller, Daniel Richman, Douglas
Berman, and Steven Clymer for their sagacious comments, and to my research assistant, Jill
Renee Baniewicz.
" Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. A.B., Stanford University, J.D.,
University of Chicago; Ph.D., Northwestern University. I thank Professors Dan Cole and Dawn
Chutkow for graciously reviewing earlier drafts of this Article.
1043
HeinOnline  -- 86 Iowa L. Rev. 1043 2000-2001
86 IOWA LAWREVIEW
1. Have Statutory Penalties for Narcotics Offenses
D eclined? ............................................................................. 1068
2. Have Guidelines Amendments Reduced Drug
Sentences? ............................................................................ 1074
a. "Super" Acceptance of Responsibility ................................... 1074
b. Eliminating the Top Two Levels of the Drug Quantity
Table ............................................................................... 1076
c. Change in Weight Equivalency for Marijuana Plants ......... 1077
d. Other Guidelines Amendments Reducing Drug Sentences ... 1078
e. Guidelines Amendments that Increased Drug Sentences ....... 1080
i. D- and L-Methamphetamine .......................... 1080
ii. Change in "Mixture or Substance" Rules
for Methamphetamine ................................... 1081
iii. Other Methamphetamine Guideline
Increases ......................................................... 1081
iv. Effect of Methamphetamine Guideline
Increases ......................................................... 1082
3. Have Changes in Case Law Reduced Drug Sentences? ..... 1082
a. Dogs that Never Barked ..................................................... 1083
b. Drugs and Guns ............................................................... 1084
c. The Koon Decision ........................................................... 1086
d. Sum m ary .......................................................................... 1087
4. Have Changes in Type of Case or Type of Defendant
Affected Federal Drug Sentences? ...................................... 1087
a. Changes in Drug Type ...................................................... 1087
b. Changes in Drug Quantity ................................................ 1090
i. Federal Drug Seizures .................................... 1091
ii. Base Offense Levels ........................................ 1092
c. Changes in Defendant's Role in the Offense ........................ 1094
i. The Decrease in Aggravating Role
Adjustments .................................................... 1096
ii. The Increase in Mitigating Role
Adjustments .................................................... 1098
d. Changes in Criminal History Category ............................... 1100
4. Summary: Non-discretionary Factors Affecting Average
Drug Sentence Length ........................................................ 1101
B. THE EFFECT OFDISCRETIONARY CHOICES ONFEDERAL DRUG
SEN'rENCFS ................................................................................... 1103
1. Guilty Plea Rate and "Acceptance of Responsibility". ........ 1103
a. Guilty Plea Rates .............................................................. 1104
b. Acceptance of Responsibility ............................................... 1106
2. Sentencing Within Range and Departures ......................... 1107
a. Sentences Within Range .................................................... 1107
b. D ep artures ........................................................................ 1108
1044 [20011
HeinOnline  -- 86 Iowa L. Rev. 1044 2000-2001
QUIET REBELLION? 1045
i. Upward Departures ........................................ 1108
ii. Substantial Assistance Departures .................. 1110
iii. Non-Substantial Assistance Departures
Under Section 5K2.0 ...................................... 1113
iv. Departures-A Summary ............................... 1116
3. Charge Bargaining ............................................................... 1119
4. Fact Bargaining .................................................................... 1122
5. Discretionary Factors Affecting Average Sentence
Length: A Summary ............................................................. 1124
C. THE COMBINED E1FECT OFDISCRETIONAA"tRY.D No,-
DISCRETIONARYFACTORS ON FEDERAL DRUG S&F vCES ................. 1126
V. Is THISA QUIET REBELLION? .............................................................. 1127
VI. SOM TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS AND A LOOK AHEAD ........................ 1134
A. IPLIcATIONSFOR THE GUIDE ES SisEm ................................... 1134
B. IAMPLICATIONS FOR DRUG SENTENCING POLICI ............................... 1136
HeinOnline  -- 86 Iowa L. Rev. 1045 2000-2001
86 IOWA LAWREVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
The conventional critique of federal drug laws in the academic and
popular press rests on three articles of faith. First, the advent of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) in 1987, in combination with
congressionally-mandated minimum sentences, dramatically increased
sentences for federal drug crimes to historically unprecedented levels.
Second, the Guidelines and mandatory minimums conferred immense
discretionary authority on federal prosecutors who have employed their
power to compel the imposition of draconian sentences on drug offenders.
Third, the Guidelines and mandatory minimums have, at the same time,
handcuffed judges, depriving them of the power to ameliorate harsh
sentences compelled by rigid sentencing rules.'
If all three articles in the canon of conventional wisdom accurately
describe federal narcotics sentencing, one would expect the average
sentence for a federal drug offender to have remained roughly the same, or
perhaps even to have climbed higher, in the years since the Guidelines were
fully implemented following the Supreme Court's affirmation of their
constitutionality in 1989.2 Federal drug sentences did indeed rise sharply
1. For expressions of the common wisdom in law reviews, see Albert W. Alschuler, The
Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. C-Ii. L. REV. 901, 903 (1991)
(noting that the Guidelines have confined the discretion ofjudges and increased the power of
prosecutors, especially in drug crimes where the Guidelines have produced "nonsense rules and
inequalities"); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Your Cheatin' Heart(land): The Long Search for
Administrative Sentencing Justice, 2 BUFF. GRim. L. REV. 723, 726 (1999) (describing the
Guidelines as widely hated, dysfunctional, and one of the great failures of law reform in U.S.
history that has been pouring offenders into federal prisons for longer and longer sentences);
and Kate Stith & Jos6 A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1247, 1248-52 (1997) (arguing thatjudges have been reduced to the role of "accountants"
or "notary publics").
For examples from the popular press, see Michael Brennan, A Case for Discretion: Are
Mandatory Minimum Sentences Destroying Our Sense ofJustice and Compassion?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 13,
1995, at 18 (questioning harshly whether severe drug sentences resulting from the removal of
sentencing discretion from judges and the allocation of a high degree of power to prosecutors
is the American way);John Cloud, A Get-Tough Policy that Failed Mandatory Sentencing Was Once
America's Law-and-Order Panacea. Here's Why It's Not Working, TIME, Feb. 1, 1999, at 48 (describing
how drug policies are failing and drug sentences insult justice when a defendant can get a
longer sentence for selling a neighbor a joint than for sexually abusing her); and Gregg
Easterbrook, Run-on Sentencing, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 26, 1999, at 57-65 (asserting that the
Guidelines sometimes dictate that judges impose lengthy sentences when there is no evidence
that the defendant threatens society and that a considerable number of federal judges want
discretion to reduce such sentences, now allegedly enjoyed by prosecutors, to be restored).
2. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). Prior to Mistretta, a great many federal
district and appellate courts declared the Federal Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional and
declined to apply them. See, e.g., Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1265-67 (9th Cir.
1988), vacated sub nom, United States v. Chavez-Sanchez, 488 U.S. 1036, on remand, 871 F.2d 104
(9th Cir. 1989) (holding Federal Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional on separation of
1046 [20011
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following the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) and the
resultant adoption of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1987. According
to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO), the average
federal drug sentence rose from 65.7 months in 1984 to its all-time high of
95.7 months in 1991.8 However, since roughly 1991-92, the length of federal
prison sentences imposed on drug offenders has been slowly, but quite
steadily, decreasing. According to statistics maintained by the AO, in the eight
years between 1991 and 1999, the average federal prison sentence for a drug
offender decreased from 95.7 months to 74.6 months, a drop of 22%, or
nearly two years, per defendant. 4 United States Sentencing Commission
statistics report a somewhat less precipitous, but still unmistakable, seven-
year decline in the average drug sentence from 88.2 months in 1992 to 75.2
months in 1999, a drop of 14.7%.5
This downward trend had until recently gone unobserved and remains
generally unknown even among federal criminal justice professionals.6
powers grounds). For a comprehensive study of the decision-making processes of the courts
that held the Guidelines unconstitutional, see Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise, & Andrew P.
Morriss, Charting the Influences on the Judidal Mind: An Empirical Study of Judical Reasoning 73
N.Y.U. L REv. 1377 (1998).
3. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), Syracuse University. at
http://trac.syr.edu/tracdea/findings/national/drugpri8l99.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2001)
[hereinafter TRAC study].
4. I &e infra Part III.B fig.1 (representing the decline in average federal drug
sentences). Figures collected independently by the Department of'Justice also Show a decline in
overall average drug sentences from eighty-six months in 1992 to sixty-seven months in 1993, a
22% decline. See TRAC study, supra note 3, at http://tracmsr.eduftracdea./findingst
aboutDEA/newFindings.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2001).
5. The United States Sentencing Commission figures for the years 1992 through 1993
appear in the TRAC study, supra note 3, at hup://trac.s).edu/tracdea/findingsabout
DEA/newfindings.htmal (last visited Feb. 23, 2001). The average drug sentence reported by the
U.S. Sentencing Commission for 1999 comes from the Commission's 1999 SOUR(CnoO:, OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATITcs 32, fig.E (2000) (hereinafter 1999 SOURCEIOO), aral'ak at
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/1999/fig-e.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2001).
These United States Sentencing Commission figures represent the average prison
sentence imposed on federal narcotics offenders who were actually sentenced to prison. Cases
in which probation-only sentences were imposed are not included. The percentage of
probation-only sentences ranged from 8.4% of the total number of defendants convicted on
drug charges in 1993, see 1993 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1993 ANN. REP., 73 tbl.23 [hereinafter
1993 ANNUAL REPORT], to 5.8% in 1999, see 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra, at 28 tbl.12, arailae at
http://%,ww.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/1999/table12.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2001). If probationary
sentences are included in the average as zero months of imprisonment, the yearly averages are
slightly lower. For example, the mean drug sentence in 1999 would be roughly seventy-three
months, i& at 29 thl.13, rather than seventy-five months. But the overall do-nward trend
remains the same.
6. The degree to which federal criminal lawyers, judges, and interested academics
remain unaware of the continued downward movement in drug sentences is not empiricall)
verifiable. Suffice it to say that in the last year one ofus (Bowman) has talked about the subject
to several large groups of judges and sentencing specialists, and discussed it many times in
private conversations, and reactions continue to range from mild surprise to outright
1047
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When it was first pointed out in the spring of 2000, 7 we think it fair to say
that the reaction of most observers, even long-time observers of federal
sentencing, was one of considerable surprise. If the law is rigid, the judges
powerless, and the prosecutors pitiless, how can the length of federal drug
sentences be decreasing year after year? This Article seeks an explanation
for a trend that confounds the expectations of many legal professionals.
The Article begins with an examination of three primarily empirical
questions. First, is the trend real? In other words, is the apparent decrease in
federal drug sentences merely a species of statistical hiccup, a random
fluctuation that could move easily and rapidly in the other direction? Or is
the decline in average drug sentences large enough, and the trend
prolonged enough, that we can safely conclude that something meaningful
is occurring?8
Second, assuming that the decrease in federal drug sentences is real, to
what degree can the decrease be attributed to "non-discretionary factors"?
Non-discretionary factors include changes in statutory or guidelines law,
alterations in the mix of criminal cases brought to the federal system, and
other considerations that are outside of the range of discretionary choice
available to individual federal prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation
officers, and districtjudges who administer federal sentencing law.9
Third, to what degree can the decrease in federal drug sentences be
attributed to "discretionary factors," that is, to evolutionary changes in the
way that prosecutors, defense lawyers, judges, and probation officers
exercise their discretion? More particularly, if discretionary choice is indeed
influencing the downward movement of drug sentences, does the law
sanction the result achieved by the discretionary choices? Or are at least
some discretionary choices by the official actors in the sentencing process
violative of either the letter or spirit of federal sentencing statutes and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines? Put differently, is the decline occurring
despite, rather than because of, the nominal constraints of the law?
The difficulty of answering these questions definitively is obvious.
Courts now sentence some twenty-three thousand defendants annually for
violating federal narcotics statutes.' 0 They are prosecuted in more than
astonishment.
7. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Fear of Law: Thoughts on "Fear ofJudging" and the State of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 299, 352 (2000) [hereinafter Bowman, Fear of
Law] (noting a decline in drug trafficking sentences); Eric Lichtblau &Josh Meyer, Federal Drug
Sentences Are Shrinking Study Finds, LA. TIMEs, March 13, 2000 (reporting results of the TRAC
study).
8. See infra Part III (demonstrating that the decline in average drug sentences is
significant).
9. See infra Part IVA (suggesting effects of non-discretionary factors on declining
sentence lengths).
10. In 1999, 23,082 defendants were sentenced in federal district courts for violations of
drug statutes. 1999 SOURcEBOOK, supra note 5, at 12 tbl.3.
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ninety districts staffed by literally thousands of prosecutors, defense lawyers,
judges, and probation officers. Each district has its own unique mix of
population, cultures, topography, crime types, political identities, and
personalities, all of which do, or at least can, influence what criminal cases
are brought in federal court and how they are handled once brought. This
Article does not attempt to consider these local influences, profound
though they may prove to be in any particular district or region. Rather, our
more modest objective is to identify, so far as possible, those factors
influencing drug sentencing outcomes that are observable on a nationwide
basis. In an upcoming article, we will address, so far as is possible, tie effects
of local or regional factors on the overall trend in federal drug sentences.
Even viewing the problem at a national level, the complications are
daunting. Since the adoption of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1987,
federal sentencing law, the administrative systems created to implement it,
and the world of drug crime have remained in a constant state of change.
Neither the law, nor its enforcers, nor its violators have stood still. Tr)ing to
trace the interactions of changes in statutory and case law, modifications of
prosecutorial policy, and the response of drug traffickers to enforcement
initiatives is often bewilderingly complex.
All this having been said, the available information suggests that four
conclusions are possible. First, the downwrard trend in federal drug
sentences is real. Second, at least some of the decrease is attributable to non-
discretionary causes, such as the passage in 1994 of the so-called "safety
valve" measure that allowed a reduced sentence for certain first-time drug
offenders. Third, the decrease in federal drug sentences since 1991-92
cannot be entirely explained by non-discretionary causes. Rather, the
continuing downward movement in federal drug sentences over nearly the
last decade is, to a significant degree, the product of an array of
discretionary choices by judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and probation
officers. Finally, we conclude, albeit far more tentatively, that the available
evidence suggests these discretionary choices are, at least in part, a product
of a widespread perception among the foot soldiers of the criminal justice
system-the prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation officers, and district
judges-that drug sentences are often too high. Or at the least, numerous
front-line sentencing actors seem to have concluded that drug sentences are
often higher than necessary to achieve their personal or institutional
objectives.
These conclusions have numerous intriguing implications for the
overall federal sentencing debate. First, if the discretionary choices of
frontline sentencing actors-especially members of the judiciary-have been
primarily responsible for the steady decline in average drug sentences, this
would seem to pose difficulties for those who argue that tie Guidelines
represent an intolerable impediment to the exercise of judicial sentencing
discretion. Similarly, for those who harbor the view that the Guidelines are
049
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principally a tool of implacable federal prosecutors bent on securing ever
longer sentences, evidence of the pervasive exercise of prosecutorial
discretion to lower drug sentences suggests a far more complex and
nuanced picture.
Second, if, as our study suggests, many of these discretionary choices
represent evasions of the formal constraints of the Guidelines and federal
sentencing statutes, such evasions might well impair one of the Guidelines'
primary objectives, that of eliminating unjustified sentencing disparity.
Regardless of its effect on disparity, a pervasive disposition toward
discretionary evasions of Guideline and statutory law has important
implications for the ongoing struggle among the courts, the Justice
Department, the Congress, and the Sentencing Commission for control of
sentencing policy.
Finally, if we are correct, if the district courts, probation departments,
defense lawyers, and U.S. Attorney's Offices who do the real work of federal
sentencing have persistently exercised their discretion over nearly the last
decade to reduce drug sentences, their behavior looks very like a form of
quiet rebellion against the severity of drug sentences. Whatever their
motivations, the cumulative effect of their discretionary choices cannot be
ignored in the broader debate over national drug policy.
To appreciate the interplay of the many factors that influence the
length of federal drug sentences, one must first understand the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, as well as the interlocking mandatory sentencing
provisions of federal narcotics statutes. Section II of this Article provides an
explanation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and their interaction with
statutory mandatory minimum sentences in drug cases. In Section III, we
describe the trends in average federal drug sentences between the
implementation of the Guidelines in 1987 and 1999 (the last year for which
data is available). In Section IV, we analyze the mystery of declining federal
drug sentences. In Section V, we consider whether the trends we detail here
can fairly be characterized as a quiet rebellion against current federal drug
sentencing levels. Finally, in Section VI, we venture some tentative
conclusions and a look ahead to the second installment of this Article.
II. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
A. ThDERAL SENTENCING BEFORE Ti GUIDE.ImNS
For most of the twentieth century prior to the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984," the rehabilitative12 or "medical" model13 of sentencing prevailed in
11. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984).
12. See generally FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL (1981)
(discussing the rise and fall of the "rehabilitative ideal").
13. Michigan purportedly was the first state to adopt a sentencing system based at least in
1050 [2001]
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the federal (and state) courts.' 4 Sentencing rested on the assumption that
criminal deviance could be treated like any other disorder through a
combination of deterrence, flowing from fear of incarceration, and personal
renewal spurred by counseling, drug treatment, job training, and the like.
The system recognized, albeit grudgingly, that some defendants were, in
effect, "incurable," and thus had to be quarantined through lengthy
sentences. It also recognized that some crimes were so egregious that the
public demand for retribution outweighed rehabilitative considerations.15
But the dominant paradigm was rehabilitative. Therefore, sentences were
supposed to be "individualized" in the way that medical treatment is
individualized, according to the symptoms and pathology of the offender.'6
Before the Guidelines, federal sentences were also said to be
"indeterminate," a word often used to refer to two different, but related,
ideas in the sentencing context. First, an indeterminate sentencing system is
one in which the judge sentences a defendant to either a specified term or a
range of years (e.g., 5-20), but the number of years the defendant actually
part on a "medical model." United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1207 n.6 (11th Cir. 1959);
see also PAMALA L GRiSEr, DEERMINATE SENTENCING: THE PROMISE AND RF.,%LrIY OF
RErTmuTrwEJusTIcE 11 (1991) (discussing the "rise of the rehabilitative juggernaut" between
1877-1970, and noting that "[a] medical analogue was frequently invoked"); AILEN. supra note
12, at 35 (referring to the "medical model" of sentencing). One anonymous prisoner %%Tote in
1911 that the theory of indeterminate sentencing prescribed that the offender should stay in
prison, "until cured, just a person suffering from a physical disease or infection is sent to a
hospital or asylum, to remain for such a period as may be necessary for his restoration to
health." LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIMEAND PITL SH..ENT INA.M ERIcAN HisrOR" 1G0 (1993).
14. Professor Allen notes that "rehabilitation ... seen as the exdushvjustification of penal
sanctions ... was very nearly the stance of some exuberant American theorists in mid-twentieth
century..." ALLEN, supra note 12, at 3; see also AMERIcAu N FRIENDS SERVIcE Co. .rrrEE,
STRUGGLE FoRJUSTIcE 83 (1971) ("Despite [its] shortcomings the treatment approach receives
nearly unanimous support from those working in the field of criminal justice, even the most
progressive and humanitarian.").
15. For example, both the death penalty and life imprisonment were imposed throughout
the period when the rehabilitative ideal dominated American sentencing, yet no one would
seriously have argued that the purpose of either type of sentence was rehabilitation of the
offender. See Adam Bedau, The Death Penaly in Aria.fi Yesterday and Tedy, 95 Dim,. L REV.
759, 762-64 (1991) (describing widespread use of death penalty in America throughout
twentieth century for crimes including murder, armed robbery, rape, and kidnapping); se also
Dane Archer et al., Homicide and the Death Penalty: A Cross.National Test of a Dtterrene Hvp'hesis,
74J. CRIM. L & CIuMINOLOGY 991, 991-92 (1983) (attributing use of death penalty in part to
disbelief in rehabilitation).
16. "Individualized sentencing" was embraced as the philosophy of federal sentencing in
Williams v. New Yor, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (referring to "[t]oday's philosophy of
individualizing sentences"), and Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932) ('It is necessary
to individualize each case, to give that carefl, humane, and comprehensive consideration to
the particular situation of each offender which would be possible only in the exercide of a broad
discretion.").
17. In the pre-Guidelines era, the district court had three options when imposing a
sentence of imprisonment (a) It could impose a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (repealed
1984), in which case the defendant ims obliged to serve one-third of his sentence before
1051
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serves is then entirely in the hands of an administrative body, such as a
parole board.1 8 For most of the twentieth century prior to the SRA, federal
sentencing was indeterminate in this sense. 0 The United States Parole
Commission, an executive branch agency, not only created its own
guidelines for determining release dates20 but retained discretionary power
to set individual release dates anywhere within the broad parameters
21dictated by those guidelines.
becoming eligible for parole; (b) Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b) (1) (1976) (repealed 1984),
the court could impose a maximum term of imprisonment, but reduce the minimum term
required before parole eligibility to less than one-third of the maximum sentence; (c) The
court could fix a maximum term and specify that "the prisoner may be released on parole at
such time as the [Parole] Commission may determine." 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(2) (repealed
1984). When the court imposed a minimum term under either 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) or 18 U.S.C.
§ 4205(b)(1), the Parole Commission retained control over when the defendant would be
released after he served the minimum and achieved parole eligibility. In the pre-Guidellnes
period, "federal courts normally sentenced adult offenders pursuant to" § 4205(a). United
States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1207 n.7 (11th Cir. 1989). There was one other factor at
work in determining the actual sentence length of federal prisoners, a statutory entitlement to
so-called "good time" credit of up to nearly one-third of the stated sentence. Before tie
enactment of the SRA, this entitlement was codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4161 (1948) (repealed
1984).
18. For a discussion of the historical development of parole in Europe and the United
States, see TODD IR CLEAR & GEORGE F. COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 396-99 (2d ed. 1990);
REID MONTGOMERY, JR. & STEVEN DILLINGHAM, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN PRACTICE 25-32
(1983).
19. In 1910, Congress mandated that each federal prison have its own parole board,
constituted of the superintendent of prisons of the Department ofJustice, the warden, and the
physician of each penitentiary. Act ofJune 25, 1910, ch. 387, 36 Stat. 819 (1910). The parole
board of each prison had the discretionary power to release any prisoner who had served one-
third of his original stated sentence if the board was satisfied that "there is a reasonable
probability that [the prisoner] will live and remain at liberty without violating the laws," and
that release "is not incompatible with the welfare of society." Id. § 3. The United States Board of
Parole, which later became the United States Parole Commission, was created by Congress in
1930. DON M. GoTTFREDSON ET AL., GUIDELINES FOR PAROLE AND SENTENCING 2 (1978). The
legal powers of the Parole Commission as it existed immediately before the adoption of the
sentencing guidelines are set out at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (1976) (repealed 1984). For a
general study of the operation of parole decision-making, see GOTTFREDSON ET AL., supra.
20. The creation of parole guidelines was mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 4203(a)(1) (1976)
(repealed 1984). For a discussion of the federal parole guidelines and their operation, see
GOTTFREDSON ET AL., supra note 19, at 22-37. See also Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of
Sentencing Refon: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 223, 228-29 (1993) (discussing the genesis of the parole guidelines).
21. The breadth of the Parole Commission's discretion is indicated by the language of the
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4206(a) (1976) (repealed 1984), describing its power of parole:
(a) If an eligible prisoner has substantially observed the rules of the institution or
institutions to which he has been confined, and if the Commission, upon
consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the prisoner, determines:
(1) that release would not depreciate the seriousness of his offense or promote
disrespect for the law; and
(2) that release would not jeopardize the public welfare; subject to the provisions
[2001]1052
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Second, the term "indeterminate" is often used (not entirely accurately)
to describe the other central aspect of federal sentencing before the
Guidelines. The judge had virtually unlimited discretion to sentence a
convicted defendant anywhere within the range created by the statutory
maximum and minimum penalties for the offense or offenses of
conviction.a As long as the judge kept within the statutory range, there were
virtually no rules about how he or she made the choice of sentence.2 There
was no limit on the type or quality of information a judge could consider at
sentencing.24 A judge could properly receive and consider evidence about
virtually any factor the judge felt to be important-the defendant's troubled
childhood, emotional instability, arrest record, acquitted charges,
uncharged conduct, rumored conduct, education, family responsibilities,
substance abuse problems, civic activism, and so forth ad infinitum. None of
this information was subject to filtering by the rules of evidence,23 and the
judge was required to make no findings of fact. Moreover, so long as the
final sentence was within statutory limits, it was essentially unreviewable by a
26
court of appeals.
of subsections (b) and (c) of this section, and pursuant to guidelines promulgated
by the Commission pursuant to section 4203(a)(1), such prisoner shall be
released.
22. See David Fisher, Ffth Amendment-Proscutorial Dismition Not Atio!ute: Constitulional
Limits on Decision Not to Fie Substantial Assistance Moliois% 83J. CRM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 744, 743
(1993) ("Prior to the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act, federaljudges enjoyed extremel)
broad discretion in sentencing. Ajudge could impose any sentence she thought %as proper as
long as it did not exceed the statutory maximum."); Steven S. Nemerson, Ccerefe Sentencing, 64
MINN. L. REv. 669, 677 (1980) (referring to then-extant pre-Guidelines sentencing practices
and noting that "the court's [sentencing] discretion remains quite broad under most modern
statutes"); Stanley A. Weigel, The Sentendng Reform Act of 1984: A Pradical Appraisa4 36 UCLA L
REv. 83,89 (1988) (same).
23. For example, federal law prior to the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1934
provided that, as to "any offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment," the court ims
free to suspend the imposition of a sentence of incarceration and place the defendant on
probation, so long as the judge was "satisfied that the ends ofjustice and the best interest of the
public as well as the defendant will be served thereby." 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1948) (repealed
1984).
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1948) ("No limitation shall be placed on the information
concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which
a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an
appropriate sentence."); see also Wlliams v. NewYork, 337 US. 241,249-50 (1949) (stating that
due process allous thejudge broad discretion as to the sources and types of information relied
upon at sentencing).
25. FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3) (noting that Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply at
sentencing). This rule was adopted in 1975 as part of the original Federal Rules of Evidence,
and thus was in effect both before and after the creation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
See Pub. L No. 93-595, § 3, 88 Stat. 1949 (1975); see also Williams, 337 U.S. at 250-51 (1949)
(stating that due process does not require confrontation or cross-examination in sentencing or
passing on probation).
26. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996) ("Before the Guidelines system, a
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The pre-Guidelines federal sentencing system was indeterminate in
both senses of the word, because its objectives were primarily (though never
exclusively) rehabilitative. At the time of sentencing, the system assumed
that judges expert in the law and the social sciences, and seasoned by the
experience of sentencing many offenders, would choose penalties that
27
maximized the rehabilitative chances of offenders. After sentencing, the
assumption was that trained penologists could determine when a prisoner
had been rehabilitated and thus advise the Parole Commission about
release dates2
In the 1970s and 1980s, the rehabilitative model of sentencing fell into
disfavor in state and federal courts for a variety of reasons, 30 including rising
federal criminal sentence within statutory limits was, for all practical purposes, not reviewable
on appeal."); Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974) (reiterating "the general
proposition that once it is determined that a sentence is within the limitations set forth in the
statute under which it is imposed, appellate review is at an end"); see also Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 277, 290 n.16 (1983) ("[Ilt is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment
for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence....");
Herron v. United States, 551 F.2d 62, 64 (5th Cir. 1977) ("The severity of a sentence imposed
within the statutory limits will not be reviewed."); United States v. Cavazos, 530 F.2d 4, 5 (5th
Cir. 1976) (repeating the non-reviewable standard); Fisher, supra note 22, at 745 (noting that
before the SRA, there was no appellate review of sentencing decisions); Stith & Koh, supra note
20, at 226 ("For over two hundred years, there was virtually no appellate review of the trial
judge's discretion."). Although appellate courts lacked the power to review the length of
sentences imposed by district courts, they retained some ability to review the process through
which sentences were determined. The outer limits of the district court's discretion were set by
concepts of due process. See, eg., United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972) (vacating on due
process grounds a sentence that relied on prior uncounseled convictions); Townsend v. Burke,
334 U.S. 736, 740-41 (1948) (holding that a sentence based on erroneous factual information
violated due process); United States v. Clements, 634 F.2d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding
that the court would "not review the severity of a sentence imposed within statutory limits, but
will carefully scrutinize the judicial process by which the punishment was imposed"); United
States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1973) ("[The] discretion [of sentencing judges]
is not, and has never been absolute, and while the appellate courts have little if any power to
review substantively the length of sentences, it is our duty to insure [sic] that rudimentary
notions of fairness are observed in the process at which the sentence is determined." (citation
omitted)).
27. See GRsIET, supra note 13, at 1 (discussing the premises of the "rehabilitative regime"
and noting that it rested on the assumptions that "case-by-case decisionmaking should be
encouraged; that future behavior could be predicted; that criminalijustice practitioners
possessed the expertise required to make individualized sentencing decisions").
28. "The indeterminate sentence... is expressive of the rehabilitation ideal: A convict will
be released from an institution, not at the end of a fixed period, but when someone (a parole
board, a sentencing board) decides he is 'ready' to be released." JAMES Q. WILSON, TlINKING
ABOUT CRIME 171 (1975).
29. For a discussion of how social scientists advising the Parole Commission designed and
tested statistical models in order to generate predictions about the risk of recidivism for
potential parolees, see GOTTFREDSON ETAL, supra note 19, at 41-67.
30. For a more complete discussion of the fall of the rehabilitative model and the rise of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Mut Be
Restrained, and Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L. REV.
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crime,"' mounting evidence that prisoners were not being rehabilitated,"
and increasing concern that indeterminate sentencing produced unjust
disparities between similarly situated offenders.93 The collapse of the
rehabilitative model and a fortuitous alignment of forces from the
congressional right and left produced the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
and, three years later, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.3
B. DRUGS, TIM SETEVCNGREFORM ACT, AM) Th EDERAL S&W7xCx
GULEM s
1. A Primer on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
The Federal Sentencing Guideliness5 are, in a sense, simply a long set of
instructions for one chart-the Sentencing Table. 6 The goal of Guidelines
calculations is to arrive at numbers for the vertical (offense letd) and
horizontal (criminal history category) axes on the Sentencing Table grid, vhich
in turn generate an intersection in the body of the grid. Each such
intersection corresponds to a sentencing range expressed in months. For
679, 686-89 [hereinafter Bowman, Quality of Mercy].
31. Sa Barbara S. Barrett, Sentencing Guidelines: Recommendations far Sentencing R.fon., 57
Mo. L. REv. 1077,1079 (noting that during the 1970s, 'the perception that crime rates wre out
of control led some officials to demand surer and stiffer sanctions against criminals as a means
of preventing crime").
32. See Andrew Von Hirsch, Recent Trends in American Criminal Sentencing T 7eory, 42 MD. L
REV. 6, 11 (1983) ('[N]o serious researcher has been able to claim that rehabilitation routinely
could be made to work for the bulk of offenders coming before the courts."); Nemerson, supra
note 22, at 685-86 ("In part, the massive professional and academic disillusionment iith the
therapeutic model stems from the simple practical inability of the criminal justice s)stem to
reform serious offenders effectively through incarceration."). See generally Michael Vitiello,
ReconsderingRehabilitation, 65 TUL L REV. 1011 (1991) (urging that rehabilitation be revisited
as a dominant rationale for criminal sanctions).
33. One of the first and most influential critics of pre-Guidelines sentencing on the
ground of unjustifiable sentence disparity was judge Marvin E. Frankel. He said of the
indeterminate sentencing system in the federal courts that, "the almost mwholly unchecked and
sweeping powers we give to judges in the fashioning of sentences are terri -ing and intolerable
for a society that professes devotion to the rule of law." M%RVLN E. FmmNKEL. C.UIINA
SENTENCEs: L-W WrrHouT ORDER 5 (1973) [hereinafter FRANKEL, CRImINAL SFTVNc ES]; see
also Marvin E. Frankel, Lawmessess in Sentencing 41 U. CIN. L REv. 1 (1972) (finding sentencing
disparity to be pervasive); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LW ENFORCIE.NT ,ND
ADMINISTRATION OFJUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 23 (1967) (same); NA!TIOAL
ADvISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINALJUSTICE STANDARDS AND GO.As, CoRRTEcroNs 142 (1973)
(same); Peter B. Hoffman & Barbara Stone-Meierhoefer, Application of Guidelines to Sentencing 3
LAW & PSYCHOL REv. 53, 53-56 (1977) (describing criticisms of then-extant sentencing
practices on the ground of "umrranted sentencing disparity"). Peter Hoffman later became
the principal draftsman of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
34. Probably the best historical description of the genesis of the SRA and the Guidelines is
Stith & Koh, supra note 20, passim.
35. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S.G.) (2000).
36. U.S.S.G. ch. 5, Pt. A (2000).
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example, a defendant whose offense level is 26 and whose criminal history
category is I is subject to a sentencing range of 63-78 months. 7
The criminal history category reflected on the horizontal axis of the
Sentencing Table is a rough effort to quantify the defendant's disposition to
criminality as reflected in the number and nature of his prior contacts with
the criminal law.ss The offense level reflected on the vertical axis of the
Sentencing Table is a measurement of the seriousness of the present crime.
The offense level customarily has three components: (1) a "base offense
level," (2) a set of "specific offense characteristics," and (3) additional
adjustments under Chapter Three of the Guidelines. The base offense level
is a seriousness ranking based purely on a conviction for a particular
statutory violation. For example, all fraud convictions carry a base offense
level of 6.39 The "specific offense characteristics" are an effort to categorize
and account for commonly occurring factors that cause us to think of one
crime as worse than another. They "customize" the crime. For example, the
Guidelines differentiate between a fraud in which the victim loses $1,000
and a fraud with a loss of $1,000,000.40 A loss of $1,000 would not increase
the base offense level of 6 for fraud, while a loss of $1,000,000 would add
eleven levels, and thus increase the offense level from 6 to 17.41
Chapter Three of the Guidelines provides for additional adjustments to
the offense level. These include increases in the offense level based on
factors such as the defendant's role in the offense, 2 whether the defendant
obstructed justice,43 the commission of an offense against a government
official44 or a particularly vulnerable victim, 45 and the existence of multiple
37. U.S.S.G., ch. 5, pt. A (2000). By statute, the top end of the range can be no more than
25% higher than the bottom end. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (1984); U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A (2000).
For discussion of the "25% rule," see Bowman, Quality of Mercy, supra note 30, at 691 n.49, 712-
13.
38. See U.S.S.G. ch. 4 (2000), for the rules regarding calculation of criminal history
category. The basic unit of measurement in this calculation is prior sentences imposed for
misdemeanors and felonies.
39. U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 (a) (2000).
40. U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.1 (b) (1) (2000) (reflecting an increase in offense level of two for a theft
of $1,000 and increase of thirteen for a theft of $1,000,000).
41. The amount of the "loss" is not the only specific offense characteristic for fraud
offenses. Section 2Fl.1 also provides adjustments for the specific offense characteristics of
"more than minimal planning," U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 (b) (2) (2000), the use of "sophisticated means"
to commit the fraud, U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 (b)(6) (2000), jeopardizing the soundness of a financial
institution, U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 (b) (8) (2000), and other factors.
42. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 (2000). The defendant's offense level can be enhanced by either two,
three, or four levels depending on the degree of control he exercised over the criminal
enterprise and on the size of that enterprise.
43. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (2000). Obstruction ofjustice includes conduct such as threatening
witnesses, suborning perjury, producing false exculpatory documents, destroying evidence, and
failing to appear as ordered for trial. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n.4 (2000) (listing examples of
such conduct).
44. U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2 (2000).
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counts of conviction.46 There are also possible reductions in offense level
based on a defendant's "mitigating role" in the offense4 7 or so-called
"acceptance of responsibility."4
A unique and controversial aspect of the Guidelines is "relevant
conduct."49 The Guidelines require that a judge calculating the applicable
offense level and any Chapter Three adjustments must consider both the
defendant's own conduct during the commission of the offense, as well as
the foreseeable conduct of his criminal partnerso undertaken as part of the
same transaction or common scheme or plan51 This is true even if the
defendant's own conduct was uncharged, dismissed, or acquitted. 2 The
primary purpose of the relevant conduct provision is to prevent the parties
(and to a lesser degree the court itself) from circumventing the Guidelines
through charge bargaining or manipulation. 3
In contrast to the pre-Guidelines approach of allowing judges nearly
unfettered authority to set the initial sentence, the defining characteristic of
the Guidelines regime is its systematic restraint of judicial sentencing
45. See U.S.S.G. § SAI.1 (2000) (creating an enhancement where a victim as selected
based on "race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual
orientation" and in the case of a victim "unusually vulnerable due to age, ph)sical or mental
condition").
46. U.S.S.G. ch. 3, pt. D (2000).
47. See U.S.S.G. § 3111.2 (2000) (allowing decreases in offense level of two or four levels if
defendant found to be a "minor partidpant" or "minimal participant" in the criminal activity,
or a decrease of three levels if the defendant's level of participation %w between "minor" and
"minimal").
48. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (2000) (alloing reduction of two offense levels where defendant
"clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility," and three offense levels if othenise
applicable offense level is a least 16 and defendant has "assisted authorities in the investigation
or prosecution of his om misconduct" by taking certain steps). Despite the euphemism
.acceptance of responsibility," § 3E1.1 is nothing more nor less than an institutionalized
incentive for guilty pleas. Id.
49. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 (2000). For a thorough discussion of the relevant conduct concept,
see ROGERW. HAINEsJR., FRANK 0. BOWv.MLAN, M &JEx.\tFER C. WoLu, FFDERAL SF-Nm'7!C1NG
GUIDELNES HANDBOOK 102-19 (2000).
50. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 (a) (1) (B) (2000) (including the "reasonably foreseeable acts and
omissions" resulting from jointly undertaken criminal activity in the "relevant conduct7
inquiry).
51. U.S.S.G. § 1Bl.3(a)(2) (2000).
52. Ajudge may consider acquitted conduct if the government proves its occurrence at
sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 149
(1997) (finding that a sentencing court is not barred from considering acquitted conduct by
the jury's verdict because the burden of proof at the sentencing is preponderance of evidence.
rather than the trial standard of beyond a reasonable doubt).
53. See William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R Steer, Rekzant Condud: The Cornerstoe of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. RE. 495,500 (1990) ("[S]entencing guidelines.., have
significantly decreased the impact of charge selection and charge bargaining."). For further
discussion of the use of charge bargaining to circumvent Guidelines rules, see infra notes 907-23
and accompanying text.
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discretion. Once a district court has determined the final offense level on
the vertical axis and the criminal history category on the horizontal axis, the
Sentencing Table designates the sentencing range. The judge retains
effectively unfettered discretion to sentence within that range.5 However, by
design, the SRA and the Guidelines make it very difficult for a judge to
"depart," that is, to impose a sentence higher or lower than the designated
sentencing range. In order to depart, the judge must justify the departure
on the record by reference to factors specified in the Guidelines as
appropriate grounds for departure, 5 or by finding "that there exists an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from
that described." 56 Moreover, except in unusual circumstances, the
Guidelines specifically prohibit a judge from considering traditional
"individualizing" factors such as age, employment record, or family ties for
purposes of departing outside the guideline range.5
Finally, from the point of view of defendants, the most significant
feature of sentencing under the Guidelines is probably not the limitations
placed on the authority of district judges to set initial sentences, but the
elimination of parole and the discretionary authority of correctional officials
and the Parole Commission to shorten the nominal sentence announced by
the judge in court. The Sentencing Reform Act decrees that, absent very
unusual circumstances, a defendant must serve at least 87% of his
announced sentence, with only a 13% reduction possible for good behavior
in prison.58 Before the Guidelines, offenders typically served 40-70% of their
54. See U.S.S.G. § 5l.1(a) (2000) ("A sentence conforms with the guidelines for
imprisonment if it is within the minimum and maximum terms of the applicable guideline
range.").
55. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. K (2000) (detailing the approved grounds for upward or
downward departure).
56. This language appears in the Guidelines' enabling legislation, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)
(2000), and is repeated in the Guidelines themselves, U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (2000).
57. Chapter 5, Part H of the Guidelines lists factors the Commission determined to be
"not ordinarily relevant to the determination of whether a sentence should be outside the
applicable guideline range." These include age, § 5H1.1; educational and vocational skills, §
5H1.2; mental and emotional conditions, § 5HI.3; physical condition, § 5HI.4; history of
substance abuse, § 5H1.4; employment record, § 5HI.5; family or community ties, § 5HI.6;
socio-economic status, § 5HI.10; military record, § 5H1.11; history of charitable good works, §
5H1.11; and "lack of guidance as a youth," § 5HI.12. In theory, most of these factors
nonetheless can justify a departure, but such a departure is permissible only where tie
excluded factor is present to such an unusual degree that the Commission would not have
anticipated its impact and thus did not "adequately [take it] into consideration" when
formulating the guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000).
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (2000) (discussing the maximum number of days credit for
good behavior).
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stated prison term, depending in part on the length of the term originally
imposed.5 9
2. Drug Sentencing Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
The oddity of the political marriage that produced the Sentencing
Reform Act is symbolized by the identity of its principal senatorial
architects-Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, tribune of the
traditional liberal wing of the Democratic Party, and Strom Thurmond, icon
of conservative law-and-order Republicanism." For the left, the SRA was an
opportunity to eliminate through a system of neutral sentencing guidelines
the specter of unjust, perhaps racially discriminatory, disparities in
punishment produced by the unfettered exercise of judicial sentencing
discretion. For the right, the SRA became a means of ensuring that "soft"
federal judges and "lazy" prosecutors did not collude to allow guilty
criminals to evade theirjust punishments.
Conservatives were particularly avid in their determination to increase
sentences for narcotics offenses. Their resolve was embodied in the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (ADAA), passed two years after the SRA.61 The
ADAA had a number of profound effects on drug sentences. First, and most
directly, the ADAA enacted a number of quantity-based mandatory
minimum sentences for drug offenses. For example, the Act imposed
mandatory minimum terms of ten years imprisonment for possession with
intent to distribute one kilogram of heroinc or one hundred grams of
methamphetamine. 6s It also instituted the now notorious 100-to-1 weight
ratio between powder and crack cocaine, whereby possession with intent to
distribute five grams of crack results in the same minimum mandatory five-
year sentence as possession with intent to distribute five hundred grams of
powder cocaine.
59. See PaulJ. Hofer & Courtney Semisch, Examining CManga in Federal Sentencing S&ritY:
1980-1998, 12 FED. SENT. RE'. 12, 13 (1999) (stating that there is a thirteen percent reduction
for good time under the SRA).
60. See Stith & Koh, supra note 20, at 225 (showing, chronologically, Senators Kennedy
and Thurmond, individually and jointly, repeatedly introducing criminal law reform bills,
including provisions for sentencing reform: in 1975 (Kennedy); 1977 (Kennedy and Sen.
McClellan); 1979 (Kennedy and Thurmond); 1981 (Kennedy and Thurmond); 1932
(Thurmond and Sen. Biden co-sponsor criminal justice reform bill uith Kennedy sentencing
reform provisions)); see also, Editorial, The House CpOut on Crime, N.Y. TImES, May 17, 1978, at
A22 (castigating the House of Representatives for rejecting an early Kennedy-Thurmond
criminal law reform package, and impliedly endorsing "political settlements of the kind that
were worked out by such divergent Senators as Kennedy and Thurmond").
61. Pub. L No. 99-570.
62. 21U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A) (i) (1994).
63. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A) (viii) (1994).
64. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (B) (ii) (1994) (imposing minimum mandatory five-year
sentence for possession with intent to distribute 500 grams of a "mixture or substance
containing a detectable amount of" cocaine) with 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (1994)
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Second, the indirect, but no less profound, consequence of the ADAA
was that the Sentencing Commission construed it as a congressional
directive to increase drug sentences above historical norms. In setting
sentencing levels for most non-drug offenses, the Commission looked to pre-
Guidelines practice and, through a process of statistical analysis, attempted
to identify those factors judges had traditionally found significant in setting
sentence lengths for various types of offenses.0 In effect, the Commission
attempted to discover and codify the pre-existing federal common law of
sentencing.66 In the case of drug crimes, however, the Commission felt
bound by the ADAA to raise Guidelines sentences above historical
averages.67 Accordingly, the Commission created a drug sentencing scheme
(imposing minimum mandatory five-year sentence for possession with intent to distribute 5
grams of a "mixture or substance" containing "cocaine base [crack]"). Criticism of the crack-
powder imbalance has been sustained and withering. See, e.g.,Judge John S. Martin, Jr. et at.,
1997 Statement on Powder and Crack Cocaine to the Senate and HouseJudiciay Committees, 10 FED.
SENT. REP. 194, 194-95 (1998) (letter signed by twenty-seven federal judges stating that the
crack/powder sentencing disparity "can not be justified and results in sentences that are unjust
and do not serve society's interests"). It has not, as yet, produced any change in the law. And
some prominent proposals for reducing the disparity would increase the penalties for powder by
lowering the required threshold amounts of powder triggering minimum mandatory sentences,
rather than decreasing the penalties for crack by raising the required amounts of crack. See, e.g.,
Editorial, Cocaine Sentences: Level the Field, LA. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1999, available at 1999 WL
26201418 (describing and decrying a proposal by Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) to reduce the
crack-powder disparity by reducing the amount of powder cocaine necessary to trigger a five-
year minimum mandatory sentence from five hundred grams to fifty grams).
65. The other notable exception to the original Sentencing Commission's effort to make
Guidelines sentences mirror past sentencing practice was white collar crime. See Frank 0.
Bowman, III, Coping With "Loss": A Re-Examination of Sentencing Federal Economic Crimes Under the
Guidelines, 51 VAND. L. REv. 461, 483-84 (1998) [hereinafter Bowman, Coping with Loss], for a
discussion of the Sentencing Commission's decision to increase economic crime penalties over
historical levels.
66. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, § 3 (2000) (describing the Commission's "empirical" and
historical approach to setting sentencing levels). Some scholars have questioned the
Commission's claim that the Guidelines correspond very closely to empirical historical data,
even in those classes of cases in which the Commission did not avowedly raise sentences over
historical norms. See Miller & Wright, supra note 1, at 756-66.
67. In its Introduction to the Guidelines, the original Commission wrote:
The Commission did not simply copy estimates of pre-guidelines practice as
revealed by the data, even though establishing offense values on this basis would
help eliminate disparity because the data represent averages. Rather, it departed
from the data at different points for various important reasons. Congressional
statutes, for example, suggested or required departure, as in the case of the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 that imposed increased and mandatory minimum
sentences.
U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, § 3 (2000).
Likewise, in its Chapter One Policy Statement devoted to "The Guidelines' Resolution
of Major Issues," the Commission found that the ADAA's mandate to increase drug sentences
was so clear that it trumped the SRA's admonition to consider the impact of guidelines
sentences on prison populations, 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (1994). Said the Commission:
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that conformed to the ADAA model in three important ways. First,
Guidelines drug sentences, like the minimum mandatory sentences of the
ADAA, are based largely on drug quantity. Second, where the ADAA
prescribed a minimum mandatory sentence for a particular quantity of drug,
the sentence level set by the Guidelines for that quantity corresponds to the
ADAA minimum mandatory sentence. For example, the sentencing range
under the Guidelines for five hundred grams of powder cocaine, an amount
that triggers a five-year minimum mandatory sentence under the ADAAc3 is
setjust above five years (63-78 months).9 Third, the Commission treated the
ADAA's two-tiered sentencing approach as the basis for proportionately
higher drug quantity sentences. The ADAA prescribes only two quantity-
based minimum mandatory sentences per drug type. For example, the
ADAA sets minimum mandatory sentences of five years for those who
distribute at least five hundred grams of powder cocaine and ten years for
those who distribute at least five kilograms of powder cocaine.a It does not,
however, set specific mandatory sentences for quantities of cocaine less than
five hundred grams, between five hundred grams and five kilograms, or
greater than five kilograms. Thus, the Commission might have treated the
statutory minimum mandatory drug sentences as trumps or plateaus; instead
it viewed them as fixed points in a mathematical progression. Therefore,
Guidelines sentences for amounts greater than those specified in the ADA
are proportionately higher than the ADAA statutory minimums.7 1 Indeed,
The Commission has also examined its sentencing ranges in light of their likely
impact upon prison population. Specific legislation, such as the Anti- Drug Abuse
Act of 1986..., required the Commission to promulgate guidelines that uill lead
to substantial prison population increases. These increases %ill occur irrespective
of the guidelines. The guidelines themselves, insofar as they reflect policy decisions
made by the Commission (rather than legislated mandatory minimum or career
offender sentences), are projected to lead to an increase in prison population that
computer models, produced by the Commission and the Bureau of Prisons in
1987, estimated at approximately 10 percent over a period of ten years.
U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, § 4(g) (2000).
For a discussion of the evolution of the statutory language in the SRA regarding prison
capacity, see Stith & Koh, supra note 20, at 266-68.
68. 21U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (B) (ii) (I) (1994).
69. The base offense level for at least five hundred grams, but less than two kilograms of
powder cocaine is 26. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (c) (7) (2000). For a defendant with no prior criminal
history, the sentencing range at Offense Level 26 is 63-78 months. U.S.SG. § 5A (2000).
70. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (1994).
71. In its background notes to the drug guideline, the Commission commented:
The base offense levels in § 2D1.1 are either provided directly by the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986 or are proportional to the leds establishcd lr statute, and apply to all
unlawfui trafficking. Levels 32 and 26 in the Drug Quantity Table are the
distinctions provided by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act; however, further refinement of
drug amounts is essential to provide a logical sentencing structure for drug
offenses. To determine these finer distinctions, the Commission consulted
numerous experts and practitioners, including authorities at the Drug
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offense level increases based on quantity alone may push a first-time drug
offender's sentence up to a range of 235-293 months, or roughly 20-25
years. 72 Likewise, in setting offense levels for drug amounts below, between,
and above the statutorily designated quantities that trigger mandatory
sentences, the Commission maintained the identical quantity ratios between
drug types specified in the ADAA. For example, the ratio of cocaine to
cocaine base ("crack") for every offense level on the Guidelines Drug
Quantity Table matches the 100-to-1 ratio in the ADAA, and the cocaine to
heroin ratio of 5-to-1 that appears in the ADAA sections triggering
mandatory minimum sentences is the same as that in the Guidelines Drug
Quantity Table.73
Whether the original Sentencing Commission was obliged either by
statute or considerations of sound policy to set drug sentences as high as it
did has been the subject of scholarly commentary. 74 The resolution of that
debate would be important to any future Commission decision to lower drug
sentences. For the present, it suffices to note that the Guidelines are what
they are in significant part because of the original Commission's perceptions
of its legislative mandate in the narcotics field. The Sentencing Commission
implemented what it believed to be dual congressional mandates to
simultaneously eliminate sentencing disparity and increase drug sentences,
The result is a system which, if honestly implemented, requires judges to
impose much longer sentences for drug offenses than had previously been
the norm, and which seeks to restrict the discretion of those judges to
ameliorate the severity of the sentences the law commands.
Enforcement Administration, chemists, attorneys, probation officers, and members
of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, who also advocate the
necessity of these distinctions. Where necessary, this scheme has been modified in
response to specific congressional directives to the Commission.
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, CMt. background (2000) (emphasis added).
72. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (c) (1) (2000) (setting an Offense Level of 38 for drug offenses
involving, e.g., more than 150 kilograms of cocaine); U.S.S.G. § 5A (2000) (providing a
Sentencing Table that prescribes a sentencing range of 235-293 months for defendant with
Offense Level 38 and a Criminal History Category of 1).
73. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1994) (setting minimum mandatory terms of ten years for
drug offenses involving five kilograms of cocaine, one kilogram of heroin, and fifty grams of
crack, and setting minimum mandatory terms of five years for drug offenses involving five
hundred grams of cocaine, one hundred grams of heroin, and five grams of crack), with
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (2000) (specifying base offense levels from 6 to 38, and maintaining
throughout the identical 100-to-20-to-1 cocaine-to-heroin-to-crack quantity ratio found in 21
U.S.C. § 841 (b)).
74. See Michael Tonry, Salvaging the Sentencing Guidelines in Seven Easy Steps, 10 FED. SENT.
REP. 51, 51-55 (1997) (arguing that the Sentencing Guidelines could have been fashioned In a
more moderate way that would reduce sentencing disparities).
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M. THE EFFECT OF FEDERAL SENTENCING REFORM ON DRUG SENTENCES
A. TERISE...
By any standard, the sentencing reform embodied in the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, and the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines produced a marked impact on the federal prison
population. The triple whammy of the SRA, the ADAA, and the Guidelines
produced increases in three areas: the number of federal prisoners serving
time for drug crimes; the length of the sentences imposed on narcotics
offenders by federal judges; and, perhaps most importantly, the amount of
time those offenders actually served in prison. First, the number of persons
serving sentences in the Bureau of Prisons for drug offenses has leapt higher
since 1986, both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the federal
prison population. In 1986, 12,119, or 38%, of the total of 31,831 federal
inmates were serving drug sentences.7 By May 1998, the number of drug
offenders in federal facilities had more than quadrupled to 56,291, or 59%
of the total of 95,522 federal inmates.'6 Meanwhile, the number of convicted
drug offenders who receive a nonincarcerative probationary sentence has
plummeted from 22% in 1986 to 3.7% in 1999.*8
Second, in cases in which a sentence of incarceration was imposed on
federal narcotics offenders, the length of the terms announced by
sentencing judges increased markedly during the years in which the ADAA's
mandatory minimum sentences and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were
being implemented. The average imposed federal felony drug sentence
increased from under sixty months in 1984 to approximately eighty months
in 1990.7
9
75. Barbara Meierhoefer, The S&eeri of Drug Sentences: A Result of Purpoxe or Chance?, 12
FED. SENT. REP. 34, 34 (1999) (citing data from Federal Bureau of Prisons); see also Eric Simon,
The Impact of DrugLaw Sentencing on the Federal Prison Population, 6 FED. SENr. REP. 29, 29-30
(1993) (using the Bureau of Prisons computer model to show that drug sentencing accounted
for the mast majority of the growth of federal prison populations experienced by 1993).
76. Meierhoefer, supra note 75, at 34.
77. Id.
78. 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 28 tbl.12. The Sentencing Commission reported
that, in 1999, 21,862 persons were sentenced for drug trafficking offenses, 395 were sentenced
for drug offenses involving a communication facilit), and 671 were sentenced for simple
possession. Id. Within these groups, 475 drug trafficking defendants, 23 communication facility
defendants, and 361 simple possession defendants received a straight nonincarcerative
probationary sentence. Id. The drop-off in straight probationary sentences wvas not limited to
drug crimes. In 1988, the fiscal year in which the Guidelines were implemented, tie use of
probation for all types of crime %as cut by over halE Hofer & Semisch, supra note 59, at 15. For
white collar crimes, between 1984 and 1991, straight probation declined from over 50% of all
cases to roughly 25%. Id. at 15 fig.4. In 1999, 25.5% of all defendants convicted of larceny,
fraud, embezzlement, counterfeiting, or forgery were sentenced to straight probation. 1939
SOURcEBOOK, supra note 5, at 28 tbl.12.
79. Hofer &= Semisch, supra note 59, at 16 fig.7. Hofer and Semisch chart the nominal
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Third, because of the abolition of parole and the onset of the SRA's
87% rule, the amount of time convicted drug offenders could actually
expect to serve (the "real" sentence) rose even more dramatically than
imposed sentences as mandatory minimums and the Guidelines kicked in.
Although there are some methodological disputes among researchers over
how to measure "real" sentences,80 all reported figures show sharp increases
during the implementation of federal sentencing reform. The Bureau of
Justice Statistics reports that, from 1987 to 1990, the average time expected
to be served by a federal drug defendant increased from thirty-two to fifty-
eight months.8a According to U.S. Sentencing Commission researchers Paul
Hofer and Courtney Semisch, from 1984 to 1992, the average time a
convicted federal drug felon could expect to spend in prison nearly tripled,
from 27.2 months in 1984 to 77.4 months in 1992.82 Hofer and Semisch
observe, "The increases begin the year after enactment of mandatory
minimum penalties in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, and climb
dramatically as the guidelines are implemented in 1988 and upheld in
1989."83 It bears emphasis that, although both imposed and real drug
sentences have decreased significantly since their peak in 1991-92, imposed
and real federal drug sentences remain substantially above their pre-
sentencing-reform levels.84
sentences of felony drug offenders from 1984 through 1990 using data from both the
Administrative Office of the Courts (AO) and the Federal Probation Sentencing and
Supervision Information System (FPSSIS). The AO and FPSSIS figures correspond closely for
the period 1984 to 1990. Id.
80. See i&. at 13-14, 18-19 nn.7, 10, 11 (discussing differences between the methods
employed by Hofer and Semisch to calculate prison time actually served and the method of
researchers at the Bureau ofJustice Statistics).
81. WILLIAMJ. SABOL &JOHN MCGREADY, TIME SERVED IN PRISON BY FEDERAL OFFENDERS,
1986-97, at5 (Bureau ofJustice Statistics, Special Report, NCJ 171682, 1999).
82. These figures are drawn from the statistics underlying the chart in Hofer & Semisch,
supra note 59, at 16 fig.7. The expected sentence for 1984 is a FPSSIS statistic. The expected
sentence data for 1992 was calculated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission. E-mall from
Courtney Semisch, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, to Frank Bowman, Professor of Law, School of
Law Indianopolis (May 24, 2000) (on file with authors). Bureau of Justice Statistics figures for
the period 1986 to 1992 show a similar, though smaller, increase in real sentences for drug
offenders, from 29.7 months in 1986 to 62.7 months in 1992. SABOL & MCGREADY, supra note
81, at 5 tbl.2 (BJS statistics reported in the Sabol and McGready study do not go back to 1984).
83. Hofer & Semisch, supra note 59, at 17.
84. The average imposed federal felony drug sentence in 1986 was around sixty months.
Id. at 16 fig.7. In 1998, the average imposed federal drug trafficking sentence was 76.2 months,
The average time actually served on a federal felony drug sentence in 1986 was roughly thirty
months. Id. In 1998, the average time expected to be served on a federal felony drug sentence
was about 66 months. Id. The 1998 expected term figure of sixty-six months can also be derived
by multiplying the average drug trafficking sentence reported by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, 76.2 months, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1998 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS; 29 tbl.13 (1999) [hereinafter 1998 SOURCEBOOK], by 87%, the
percentage of a sentence required to be served by the SRA. See Hofer & Semisch, supra note 59,
at 13-14 (endorsing this method for calculating actual time to be served under the new law).
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B. . . .AD FALL oFFEDEFAL DRLG S\E'CES
The puzzle we seek to unravel in this Article is why federal drug
sentences began to decline so shortly after the impact of federal sentencing
reform on drug sentences had been fully absorbed. The year in which
federal drug sentences peaked is uncertain. The Administrative Office of tie
Courts reports that the average federal drug sentence imposed topped out
in 1991 at 95.7 months. s The Sentencing Commission's figures reflect the
peak year as 1992, with an average imposed drug sentence of 88.2 months.F
Both the AO and the Commission agree that from 1991-92 omard, the
average federal drug sentence imposed has trended steadily downward. As
noted at the outset of this Article, AO statistics show that during the eight
years between 1991 and 1999, the average imposed federal prison sentence
for a drug offender decreased from 95.7 months to 74.6 months, a drop of
22%, or nearly two years per defendant. 7 Sentencing Commission statistics
report a seven-year decline in the average imposed drug sentence from 88.2
months in 1992 to 75.2 months in 1999, a drop of 14.7%.! The year-by-year
data from the AO and the Commission are set out in Figure 1 below.






1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
AO ----- USSC
85. TRAC study, supra note 3, at http://trac.s)r.edu/tracdea/findings/aboutfl A
newfindings.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2001). The very high average imposed drug sentence
reported by the AO for 1991 appears to be something of an anomaly. It is not matched by
statistics from either the Sentencing Commission or the Bureau ofJustice Statistics. Hofer and
Semisch say of it: "This spike in the AO data has defied our best efforts at explanation. It
appears not only in average sentences for all cases, but also for separate offense types, as well as
in plots of the total number of felony cases sentenced." Hofer & Semisch, supra note 59, at 19
n.13. However, even if one excludes 1991 from consideration, AO data nonetheless show a
marked decline in average drug sentence imposed from 87.8 months in 1992 to 74.6 months in
1999.
86. TRAC study, supra note 3, at http://trac.svT.edu/tracdea,findings/aboutDF-,/
newfindings.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2001).
87. Id
88. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing this trend).
1065
HeinOnline  -- 86 Iowa L. Rev. 1065 2000-2001
86 IOWA LAWREVIEW
In addition, Sentencing Commission researchers Hofer and Semisch
report a corresponding decline in the real (or what they call the "expected")
sentence in drug cases. Their study shows real drug sentences peaked in
1992 at 77.4 months and declined to 68.5 months in 1998.89
Given an annual sample size of 15,000" to 22,0009t drug cases, a
measured decline in imposed sentences of between 11.5% (Sentencing
Commission data) and 22% (AO data) over a six to eight year period, and a
measured decline in real or "expected" sentences of 11.5% between 1992
and 1998, the evidence would seem sufficient to support the reality of the
sentence decrease.92
89. Hofer & Semisch, supra note 59, at 16 fig.7. The figures quoted above are drawn from
the data underlying Figure 7 in the Hofer & Semisch article; the data was provided by Courtney
Semisch and is on file with the authors.
90. 1995 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, ANN. REP. 43 tbl.10 (1996) (hereinafter 1995 ANNUAL
REPORT] (reporting a total of 15,288 sentenced drug defendants in FY 1995).
91. 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 12 tbl.3 (reporting a total of 23,082 sentenced
drug defendants in FY 1999).
92. It must be noted that one other study of federal drug sentences, conducted by two
researchers at the Urban Institute under contract with the Bureau of'Justice Statistics, does not
reflect a decrease in "real" drug sentences between 1991-92 and 1997. Rather, the BJS study,
which relied on data from the Federal Bureau of Prisons, shows an increase in average real
sentences for drug offenders from 61.0 months in 1991 to 69.4 months in 1996, with a decrease
to 66.2 months in 1997. SABOL & McGREADY, supra note 81, at 5 tbl.2. We are unable to entirely
explain the conflict between the results of Sabol and McGready and those of Hofer and
Semisch, and the apparent inconsistency between Sabol and McGready and figures generated
by the Sentencing Commission and the AO. Some part of the explanation may lie in Sabol and
McGready's method of computing what they call "average time to be served by offenders
entering Federal prison." Id. They write:
"Time to be served"is the amount of time that offenders who enter prison on a U.S.
district court commitment in given year serve before their first release from prison,
Time to be served by offenders entering Federal prison is based on a combination of
actual data on time served for offenders who were also released during the study period and
estimates of time to be served for those who had not been released.
Id. at 3 (emphasis added). Using actual release dates for persons already released while using
projected release dates for those still in prison would tend to shorten the average sentence of
entering cohorts in earlier years by comparison with later years for several reasons. First, the
projected release dates are calculated by taking the sentences imposed and reducing them by
an estimated discount for good time credit. The figures for sentences imposed are, in turn,
based on court documents showing the sentence imposed at a defendant's original sentencing.
These documents do not account for sentence reductions based on substantial assistance to the
government awarded after the original sentencing date pursuant to FED. R. CRIM P. 35(b), or
for sentence reductions occurring as a result of remand from a court of appeals pursuant to
FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a). Id. at 5. Second, the Bureau of Prisons retains some limited
administrative authority to grant early release to some prisoners. For example, 18 U.S.C, §
3621(e) (2)(B) permits a one-year reduction in sentence for prisoners who have successfully
completed substance abuse treatment programs in prison.
Sentence reductions under Rule 35, reductions of sentences following appeals, and
any special administrative reductions would be reflected in actual release data but not in
projected release figures. More importantly, more of such reductions would be reflected in the
release data for early years because more persons entering prison in those years would have
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IV. EXPLAINING THE DECLINE IN AVERAGE FEDERAL DRUG SENrENCES
Why have federal drug sentences trended steadily downward for nearly
a decade? Possible causes are legion and complex. For ease of analysis, we
have divided potential causal factors into two broad categories: non-
discretionary and discretionary. Non-discretionary factors are changes in the
sentencing system or environment not subject to the discretionary choices of
front-line actors in the federal criminal sentencing process-district court
judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and probation officers. Such factors
might include changes in federal statutes or in the Guidelines, changes in
federal appellate case law regarding sentencing, or changes in the profile of
the cases themselves (such as a shift in the mix of drug types prosecuted
federally, a change in the average amount of drugs involved in each case, or
a trend toward prosecuting more low level offenders). Discretionary factors
are changes in the sentencing system or environment that result from
discretionary choices made by front-line criminal justice actors during the
processing of individual criminal cases from intake to sentencing. Such
factors might include increases in the number and size of sentencing
departures awarded defendants, an increased tendency to reduce sentences
through charge bargaining, or an increased tendency to reduce sentences
through fact bargaining.
To foreshadow a bit, our research reveals that both discretionary and
non-discretionary factors appear to have influenced the continuing
reduction in drug sentences. However, in our view, discretionary factors
predominate. Where possible, we offer some tentative conclusions about the
relative degree to which each explanatory category has affected the trend, as
well as some suggestions about the discretionary and non-discretionary
components of the sentencing environment have moved in the directions
they have.
A. T-HE.EFECT OFNON-DISCRETIONARYFACTORS ON-bFDERL DRUG S\7ECS
In this section, we consider the effect of seven non-discretionary factors
on average drug sentences: (1) changes in federal sentencing statutes, (2)
received the reductions and actually have been released by the date of the study. In
consequence, because actual time served tends to be less than projected time to be sened, and
because Sabol and McGready's method measures actual time served for more defendants in
early years than later years, their results may distort the real trend by artificially depressing
sentence averages in early years. This explanatory hypothesis draws some support from the fact
that the figures reported by Sabol and McGready begin to converge as the 1990s progress vith
the conclusions of Hofer and Semisch (who based their real sentence calculations for all post-
Guidelines years on Sentencing Commission data less the 13% good time discount provided in
the SRA).
In any event, for our purposes it is not necessary to resolve the question regarding
actual time served raised by Sabol and McGready's study. There is no dispute that average
sentences imposed by courts in drug cases have declined. We are concerned here uith
explaining that undeniable trend.
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changes in the Guidelines, (3) changes in federal case law affecting drug
sentences, (4) changes in the proportion of drug types prosecuted in federal
courts (i.e., changes in the relative percentages of marijuana,
methamphetamine, powder cocaine, crack cocaine, and heroin cases), (5)
changes in drug quantity per defendant, (6) changes in defendant role (i.e.,
whether the government was prosecuting an increasing percentage of low-
level offenders), and (7) changes in the average criminal history category of
defendants (i.e., whether the government was prosecuting an increasing
percentage of first-time offenders). Our results appear to rule out changes
in the proportion of drug types prosecuted, drug quantity per defendant,
and average criminal history category of defendants as causes of the decline
in drug sentences. Put more colloquially, the national average federal drug
sentence is not declining because the Justice Department is indicting an
ever-higher percentage of first-time, dime-bag marijuana dealers. Likewise,
almost all changes in statutes, Guidelines, and case law between 1991 and
1999 were neutral in effect or, all else being equal, tended to increase drug
sentences. The factors in the non-discretionary category most likely to have
lowered drug sentences were the enactment of the statutory and Guidelines
"safety valve" adjustments for first-time offenders, the increasing number of
drug defendants receiving downward role adjustments, the decreasing
number of upward role adjustments, and the Supreme Court's decision in
Koon v. United States.93 Moreover, each of the non-discretionary factors with
the greatest probable effect on decreasing sentences proves on close
inspection to involve the exercise of discretion.
1. Have Statutory Penalties for Narcotics Offenses Declined?
The most obvious explanation for a decline in sentence length for any
criminal offense would be a reduction in the statutory penalties for that
crime. The decline in federal drug sentences began in 1992-93 . Given the
lag between the commission of an offense and sentencing,95 statutory
93. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
94. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (relating that sentence lenghts peaked in
1992 and have declined ever since).
95. In so-called "historical" narcotics cases, that is, cases based on past events that come to
the attention of authorities after the fact through informant information, financial
investigations, or otherwise, there is by definition a gap between commission of the offense and
commencement of the investigation, which can range from days to years. Even in drug cases
arising from the direct involvement of undercover government agents in the purchase or sale of
narcotics, weeks or months may pass between the criminal conduct and closure of the
investigation by arrest. Even in a "reactive" drug case-one in which the police observe a
narcotics transaction in progress and make immediate arrests-the period between arrest,
disposition of the case by trial or plea, and the final sentencing can be many months. For
example, in 1999, the median time from indictment to disposition of a federal criminal case was
5.9 months. LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS:
1999 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 229 tbl.D-6 (2000), available at http://iv.uscourts.
gov/judbusl999/index.html. In 1999, the median time from conviction to sentencing for
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changes with effective dates as far back as 1990 might not have had their full
effect until 1992. Consequently, we searched for any changes in narcotics
sentencing statutes having effective dates on or afterJanuary 1, 1990. With a
single notable exception, since the effective date of the Guidelines in 1987,
every one of the numerous changes in federal statutory law governing
narcotics sentences has either defined more conduct as criminal or lengthened
prescribed terms of imprisonment.95 The lone exception is the so-called
"safety valve."
defendants convicted in federal district court w-as eighty-nine days. Id. at 234 tbi.D-12. Thus, in
1999, the average time between indictment and sentencing was nearly nine months.
96. All the statutory changes in federal drug sentences since 1988 have involved penalty
increases. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-861 (Supp. I 2000). Several of these amendments have
lengthened terms of imprisonment directly. See Comprehensive Methamphetamine Contol Act
of 1996, Pub. L No. 104-237, 110 Stat. 3099 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 841(d) (1996)) (increasing
the sentence of ten years to twenty years for violations involving possession or distribution of
listed chemicals with an intent to manufacture controlled substances); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 100-690,102 Stat. 4181 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1988)) (increasing the
penalties in crack possession offenses, subjecting offenders to terms of imprisonment of not less
than five years or more than twenty years); id. (amending 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1988))
(increasing the minimum terms of imprisonment for first violations of continuing criminal
enterprise from ten years to twenty years, and for subsequent violations from twenty years to
thirty years); id. (amending 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1988)) (providing that any person
convicted of manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, or possessing with the intent to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance "after two or more prior convictions
for a felony drug offense have become final.... shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of life
imprisonment without release... ").
Other changes have decreased the amount of controlled substances necessary to
impose particular sentences. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (amending 21 U.S.C. §
841(b) (1) (A) (viii), (B) (viii) (Supp. 1998)) (reducing the amount of methamphetamine used
in manufacturing or distribution necessary for not less than ten years imprisonment from one
hundred grams to fifty grams, and for a substance containing methamphetamine from one
kilogram to five hundred grams, along with reducing the amount necessary for not less than
five years imprisonment from ten grams to five grams and one hundred grams to fifty grams for
a substance containing methamphetamine); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1998, Pub. L No. 100-690,
102 Stat. 4181 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b) (1)(D) (1988)) (lowering the requirement of one
hundred or more marijuana plants to fifty or more plants for a sentence of not more than five
years imprisonment).
Lastly, other amendments added specific chemicals or entire penalty sections to the
statutes addressing drug violations. Se Drug-Induced Rape Prevention and Punishment Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-305, 110 Stat. 3807 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1995)) (adding the
provision that any person convicted of possessing flunitrazepam shall be imprisoned for not
more than three years); Date-Rape Drug Prohibition Act of 2000, Pub. L No. 105-172, 114 StaL
7 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (Supp. 2000)) (adding the chemical gamma
hydroxybutyric acid to the statute which specifies a penalty of not more than twenty years
imprisonment for the manufacture or distribution of listed controlled substances); &e aho
Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796
(amending 21 U.S.C. § 849 (Supp. 1994)) (creating a penalty of twice the maximum
imprisonment authorized by § 841 for distributing a controlled substance or possessing with
intent to distribute within one thousand feet of a rest stop); Anti-Drug Act of 1998, Pub. L No.
100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 858 (1988)) (adding a provision that the penalty
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In 1994, acting in response to criticisms that quantity-driven federal
minimum mandatory drug sentences over-punished nonviolent first-time
offenders,97 Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 3553 by adding subsection (f),
which provides that a first-time nonviolent drug offender should be
sentenced under the applicable provision of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, even if an otherwise applicable minimum mandatory sentence
would raise his sentence above the bottom of the guideline range. 98 This
statutory "safety valve" became effective for defendants sentenced on or after
September 23, 1994.9 It was not retroactive.'tu In the following year, the
for endangering human life while manufacturing or transporting a controlled substance is a
term of imprisonment of not more than ten years).
97. One senior district courtjudge has argued that the "safety valve" is "a first step toward
eliminating the monumental error of mandatory minimums as an anti-crime weapon." Vincent
L. Broderick, Flexible Sentencing and the Violent Crin Control Act of 1994, 7 FED. SENT. REP. 128
(1994).
98. The full text of the statutory safety valve provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), reads as
follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in the case of an offense under section
401, 404, or 406 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844, 846) or
section 1010 or 1013 of the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21
U.S.C. §§ 961, 963), the court shall impose a sentence pursuant to guidelines
promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission under section 994 of
title 28 without regard to any statutory minimum sentence, if the court finds at
sentencing, after the Government has been afforded the opportunity to make a
recommendation, that-
(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history point, as
determined under the sentencing guidelines;
(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or
possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant
to do so) in connection with the offense;
(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person;
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of
others in the offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines and
was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C.
§ 848; and
(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has
truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the
defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same
course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that tile
defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or that the
Government is already aware of the information shall not preclude a
determination by the court that the defendant has complied with this
requirement.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (1994).
99. Section 80001(c) of Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.1796 provided that: "The
amendment made by subsection (a) [enacting subsec. (f) of this section] shall apply to all
sentences imposed on or after the 10th day beginning after the date of enactment of this Act
[Sept. 13, 1994]." 18 U.S.C § 3553 note (1994) (Effective Date of 1994 Amendment).
100. See United States v. Sanchez, 81 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1996) (concluding that the
amendment is not retroactive); Delgado v. United States, 162 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1998)
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Sentencing Commission followed Congress's lead and enacted a "safety
valve" of its own. The Commission amended the drug guidelines to provide
that a defendant who has an offense level of 26 or greater and who otherwise
meets the requirements of the statutory safety valve receives a two-level
decrease in offense level.10, The new Guidelines safety valve became effective
for cases sentenced on or after November 1, 1995. It applies to all drug
offenses, not merely those listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(0, which carry
minimum mandatory sentences. 0 2
The advent of the statutory § 3553(f) safety valve seems to have had
virtually no immediate impact on drug sentences.0 3 In FY 1995, the first year
following its enactment, the statutory safety valve was applied in 2,610 out of
15,282 drug cases, or 17.07% of all drug cases.1' 4 Yet despite application of
the safety valve to over one-sixth of all drug defendants, sentencing figures
from the AO show an increase in average drug sentence from 1994 to 1995
(from 84.3 to 88.7 months),l°j and Sentencing Commission statistics record
a decrease from 1994 to 1995 of only one month (from 87.6 to 86.6
months),10r However, the Commission's two-level safety valve, effective
November 1, 1995, seems to have effected a more significant reduction. In
1996, the percentage of drug cases receiving either a statutory or Guidelines
safety valve reduction totaled 19.2%.07 And in 1996, AO sentencing figures
(same); United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 63 F.3d 892, 893 (9th Cir. 1995) (-ame). But see
United States v. Clark, 110 F.3d 15, 18 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that safety .alve applies to cases
that were pending on appeal on September 23, 1994).
101. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (b) (4) (1995). The section has subsequently been rearranged so that
subsection (b) (4) is now subsection (b) (6). U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (b) (6) (2000). The Sentencing
Commission is presently considering eliminating the requirement of a minimum base offense
level of 26 as a prerequisite for safety valve eligibility.
102. United States v. Osei, 107 F.Sd 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Mertilus, 111
F.3d 870, 873-74 (11th Cir. 1997).
103. The timing of the adoption of the statutory safety valve allows an unusually accurate
estimate of its overall effect on average drug sentences in the following )ear. The statutory
safety valve became effective on September 23, 1994, and applied to ery drug case sentenced
on or after that date, regardless of when the conduct or the conviction occurred. Moreover,
the effective date fell exactly one week before the commencement of FY 1995 on October 1,
1994. Both the AO and the Commission prepare their statistical reports based on the fiscal year
calendar. See, eg., 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 90, at xai ("This annual report covers fiscal
year 1995 (October 1, 1994, through September 30, 1995).); MEcm., supra note 95, at 14
(noting that data in the Annual Report of the Director of the AO is collected by fiscal year).
Consequently, only one week's worth of cases reported in the 1994 figures by either agency
would have been sentenced under the statutory safety valve, whereas all of the 1995 cases were
subject to it.
104. Telephone conversation with Lou Reedt, U.S. Sentencing Commission (July 2000)
(data derived from U.S. Sentencing Commission datafile MONFY 1995).
105. TRAC study, supra note 3, at http://trac.sr.edu/tracdea/flndings/aboutDkl
newfindings.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2001).
106. Id.
107. U.S. SFNrENCING COMM'N, 1996 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERLL SF. T'NCLNG ST,TLsTCS 54
tbl.39 (1997) [hereinafter 1996 SOURCEBOOK], at'ailabe at http:/[k wofsc.gov/A'NRPT/
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show a dramatic drop in average drug sentence (from 88.7 months in 1995
to 82.5 months in 1996)108 and the Commission reported a two-month
decrease from the preceding year (from 86.6 months in 1995 to 84.3 months
in 1996).'09
As important as the safety valves may be in explaining sentencing trends
from 1994-96, they fail to explain the trend of drug sentences outside that
two-year window in light of three factors. The first and most obvious factor
relates to timing. The overall decline in federal drug sentences began in
1992-93. However, the statutory and Guidelines safety valve provisions had
no measurable effect on drug sentences until FY 1996. Thus, the downward
movement in average drug sentences between 1992-93 and 1995 was not
materially influenced by either the statutory or Guidelines safety valve.
Second, in the years after the Guidelines safety valve provision first
became operative in 1996, the marginal increase in the number of impacted
cases was relatively small. For example, the number of drug cases in which at
least one of the two safety valve provisions applied increased only slightly
from 1996 to 1999 (from 19.2% in 19961" to 23.7% in 1997,"' 24.7% in
1998,112 and 24.9% in 1999"'). The slight increase in the number of safety
valve cases cannot adequately explain the magnitude of the continuing
decline in average drug sentences from 1996 through 1998.
Third, although we have placed the safety valve among the non-
discretionary factors potentially affecting sentence length, there is an
underlying element of discretionary choice at work as well. Application of
both the statutory and Guidelines safety valves is ostensibly mandatory if a
defendant meets all five of the criteria set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and
repeated in U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2.1 4 However, the five qualifying criteria clearly
leave room for hidden or overt exercises of discretion. Most notably, the
statute and the Guidelines require that "not later than the time of the
sentencing hearing, the defendant has truthfully provided to the
Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the
1996.
108. TRAC study, supra note 3, at http://trac.syr.edu/tracdea/findings/aboutDEA/
newfindings.html (lasted visited Feb. 23, 2001).
109. Id.
110. 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 107, at 54 tbl.39.
111. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1997 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 79
tbl.44 (1998) [hereinafter 1997 SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/
1997.
112. 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 84, at 79 tbl.44.
113. 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 79 tbl.44.
114. Title 18 of the United States Code § 3553(f) states that the court "shall" impose a
sentence within the guideline range notwithstanding the applicability of a mandatory minimum
if the five criteria are met. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (5) (Supp. 2000). Section 2D1.1 (b) (6) states flatly
that if the defendant meets the five criteria, the effect on the offense level is to "decrease by 2
levels."
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offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a
common scheme or plan..."1"5 A determination of whether the defendant
has provided truthful and complete disclosure rests largely on a necessarily
imprecise and largely unverifiable assessment by the prosecutor of the
veracity and completeness of a defendant's post-plea-agreement debriefing.
Such debriefings can range from an intense grilling to a perfunctory
conversation undertaken primarily to satisfy the formal requirements of the
safety valve in order that the government can fulfill a negotiated promise to
recommend it. The defendant bears the burden of proving his eligibility for
the safety valve.116 Thus, although the prosecutor's opinion is not binding on
the district court," 7 the prosecutor nonetheless has considerable de facto
discretion either to smooth the path to a safety valve adjustment or to block
it by expressing doubts about the defendant's candor. Likewise, the judge
enjoys de facto discretion to grant or deny the adjustment based on an
ostensibly factualjudgment." 8
Seen in this light, the modest increases in the rate of application of the
safety valve from 1996 to 1999 may represent an increase in the percentage
of defendants who met its factual prerequisites during those years. Or the
increased rate of application could represent a shift in the exercise of
discretion by prosecutors and judges in favor of recommending and
115. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (5) (Supp. 2000); U.S.S.G. § 5CI.2 cmL. n.3 (2000).
116. United States v. Flanagan, 80 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing where the
district court erroneously placed the burden of proof on the government); United States v.
Ramirez, 94 F.3d 1095, 1101 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the burden does not shift to the
government to show that defendant's responses were not truthful or complete); United States V.
Ajugwo, 82 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 1996) (providing that a defendant's bare assertion that she
had provided all relevant information was insufficent for a preponderance of the evidence).
117. See United States v. Espinosa, 172 F.3d 795, 796 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that the
district court had independent responsibility to resolve the dispute between the government
and the defendant about the truthfulness and completeness of his disclosure).
118. The discretionary character of the safety valve decision is further highlighted by a
somewhat peculiar provision in both the statutory and guideline safety valve sections. The
statute requires that the court not make a finding on safety valve eligibility until "after the
Government has been afforded the opportunity to make a recommendation..." IS U.S.C. §
3553(f). The Guidelines reiterate the statutory command: "Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(0, prior to
its determination, the court shall afford the government an opportunity to make a
recommendation." U.S.S.G. § 501.2, cmL. n.8 (2000). The choice of the word
"recommendation," rather than "presentation" or "evidentiary showing," implies the existence
of some discretion on the part of the government and the court both in recommending and
granting the safety valve adjustment.
In addition, to qualify for the safety valve, a defendant must prove to the court that he
was "not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in te offense." 18 U.S.C. §
3553(f)(4); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(4) (2000). What activities qualify a defendant for status as an
organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor is a question open to considerable debate. See IES,
BoWtAN & WoLt, supra note 49, at 754-57 (discussing cases interpreting Guidelines provisions
for role adjustments in drug cases). Therefore, whether a defendant passes this particular
hurdle on the path to safety valve relief uill often depend on vhether the prosecutor and the
judge elect to take a generous view of the defendant's organizational role.
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granting safety valve adjustments to defendants who would not have been
awarded them in previous years. Or it may be some combination of both. We
will return to the question of which explanation is more probable below."19
2. Have Guidelines Amendments Reduced Drug Sentences?
Since, with the exception of the safety valve, statutory penalties for drug
crimes have increased in the last decade the next possible non-discretionary
explanation for the continuing decrease in imposed drug sentences is that
amendments to the Guidelines have reduced the sentences of significant
numbers of drug offenders. The most significant Guidelines amendment was
the 1996 enactment of a Guidelines version of the safety valve just discussed.
However, there have been several other changes with the potential to
increase or decrease substantial numbers of drug sentences.
a. "Super"Acceptance of Responsibility
From the time of their initial adoption in 1987, the Sentencing
Guidelines provided a two-offense-level reduction for "acceptance of
responsibility."12 0 Despite the fancy name given this provision-which
implies a focus on the defendant's mental state, his willingness to express
contrition, and so forth-the true function of the acceptance reduction has
been to serve as a reward for guilty pleas. Indeed, when the Guidelines are
applied as their designers intended, the acceptance of responsibility
reduction is the only benefit a defendant will receive purely for the act of
entering a prompt plea of guilty. 22 Effective November 1, 1992, the
Sentencing Commission amended the acceptance guideline to allow an
additional third level reduction for what is known in the trade as "super"
acceptance of responsibility. 23 A defendant can receive this three-level
reduction if his base offense level is 16 or greater and if, in addition to
.clearly demonstrat[ing] acceptance of responsibility for his offense," he
timely: (a) provides "complete information to the government concerning
his own involvement in the offense," and (b) notifies "authorities of his
intention to enter a plea of guilty....
Commission statistics show that in 1993, the year following the adoption
of the "super acceptance" guideline, 50.8% of all drug trafficking offenders
119. Infra Part V.C.
120. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (2000).
121. See supra note 48.
122. The acceptance of responsibility provision has been repeatedly upheld against claims
that it represents an unconstitutional burden on the right to jury trial. See HAINES, BOWMAN &
WOLL, supra note 49, at 856-57 (discussing constitutional challenges to the acceptance of
responsibility guideline).
123. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 459 (2000) (amended November 1, 1992).
124. U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(b) (2000).
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received the three-level reducton.' Unfortunately, it is impossible to
determine precisely what effect the "super acceptance" amendment had on
the average drug sentence for three reasons. First, because of the structure
of the Guidelines offense table, a one-level reduction in offense level does
not necessarily effect the sentence imposed. Each sentencing range overlaps
with roughly half of the range one level above and one level below. For
example, given the same Criminal History Category of I, the sentencing
range for Level 16 is 21-27 months, the range for Level 15 is 18-24 months,
and the range for Level 17 is 24-30 months.J' Thus, a sentence of twenty-
four months is within all three ranges and could lawfully be imposed on a
defendant at Level 15, 16, or 17.
Second, more than 40% of drug defendants receive some form of
downward departure Because the size of the sentence reduction a% arded
in a departure is almost completely discretionary and bears no necessary
relationship to the sentencing range from which the departure uas taken,' z
the award of the third level reduction for "super acceptance" may have no
effect on the final sentence of a defendant who also receives a departure.
Nonetheless, given the fact that judges sentence the overwhelming majority
of drug offenders sentenced within range to a term at or near the bottom of
that range,'2 a one-offense-level reduction for 50% of all drug defendants
would certainly have affected the overall average drug sentence to some
extent.
Finally, it must be emphasized that, just as with the safety valve, the
effect of the "super acceptance" reduction on actual sentences depends
heavily on the exercise of discretion by judges, prosecutors, and defendants.
This aspect of acceptance adjustments is discussed in greater detail below, t 9
125. 1993 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 90 thl.29. An additional 29.6% of drug
trafficking offenders received the tuo-level acceptance reduction. Id. Thus, a total of 80.A% of
drug trafficking offenders received some acceptance reduction in 1993. Se also id. at 142 tbl.57
(giving more detailed breakdown of acceptance of responsibility reductions in drug cases
during 1993).
126. U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (2000).
127. See 1993 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 165 tbl.57 (showing that in 1993, 33.6% of
all drug trafficking defendants received a substantial assistance departure, and an additional
7.7% received a non-substantial assistance downward departure). For further discutsion of
departure rates, see infra Part IV.B.2.b.
128. See United States v. Khalil, 132 F.3d 897,898 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that the appellate
court has no jurisdiction to review the extent of the substantial assistance departure); United
States v. Correa, 995 F.2d 686, 687 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the court has no jurisdiction
where refusal to depart is an exercise of discretion); United States v. Dickey, 924 F.2d 836, 833
(9th Cir. 1991) (same).
129. For example, in 1993, 42.4% of all drug trafficking defendants received a sentence in
the bottom one-quarter of the applicable guideline range. 1993 AXNLAL REPORT, supra note 5,
at 165 tbl.67 (noting that 41% of all drug trafficking defendants received some form of
downward departure and were sentenced below the othermise applicable guideline range). Id.
130. See infra notes 239-47 and accompanying text.
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but generally the award of a "super acceptance" adjustment can only occur
after the parties have reached agreement on a plea, and the judge, with
substantial input from the government, has decided that the plea was
prompt and the defendant's disclosures to the government were complete.
The discretionary character of both the original and "super" acceptance of
responsibility reductions is emphasized by the fact that the percentage of
drug cases in which either form of acceptance was awarded grew from 80.4%
in 1993131 to 89.7% in 1999,132 while the percentage of cases in which "super
acceptance" was awarded increased steadily from 50.8% of all drug
trafficking offenders in 1993133 to 80.2% of all drug offenders in 1999.13
b. Eliminating the Top Two Levels of the Drug Quantity Table
Effective November 1, 1994, the Commission amended the drug
quantity table, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (c), to eliminate the top two levels (Levels 40
and 42).135 The intent was to preclude imposition of a life sentence or a
sentence in the 292-365 month range for a first-time offender based purely
on drug quantity. The statistical effect of this change seems to have been
negligible. The number of cases affected by the amendment is unlikely to
have exceeded a few hundred of the nearly 17,000 drug defendants
sentenced in 1994.136 Moreover, any effect would have been immediate and
131. 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 90 tbl.29.
132. 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 76 tbl.41.
133. 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 90 tbl.29.
134. 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 76 tbl.41.
135. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 505 (1998) (amended Nov. 1, 1994).
136. In 1993, the year before the top two levels of the Drug Quantity Table were
eliminated, only 628 of all of the 42,107 defendants sentenced for any federal crime were
sentenced at Offense Level 40 or higher. 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 97 tbl.32. Tile
Commission did not publish offense level figures for drug defendants alone for 1993. When
nondrug defendants are eliminated, and when one recognizes that even drug defendants
ultimately sentenced at Offense Level 40 or higher will often have received upward adjustments
for aggravating role, weapon possession, or the like, it is clear that the number of drug
defendants who actually started with quantity-based offense levels of 40 or 42 was quite small. In
1994, 16,870 defendants were sentenced under U.S.S.G. ch. 2, pt. D (Drugs). 1994 US.
SENTENCING COMM'N, ANN. REP. 116 tbl.54 n.1 (1995) [hereinafter 1994 ANNUAL REPORT].
Not only is the absolute number of cases potentially affected by this Guidelines change
quite low, but the number of defendants within this already small category whose sentences
would actually have been lowered is smaller still. The reductions occur at the very top of tire
Sentencing Table. Therefore, some defendants who were the beneficiaries of the reduction in
quantity-based offense level will have been pushed right back up to the top of the Table by
other, non-quantity-related factors such as role in the offense, weapon possession, or criminal
history. Consider, for example, a first-time offender caught with 1500 kilograms of cocaine.
Prior to the amendment, his base offense level would have been 42, with a sentencing range of
360 months to life, exclusive of any other consideration. After the amendment, his base offense
level would be 38 (235-293 months). However, if he were found to be an organizer or leader of
a crime involving five or more participants, he would receive an upward role adjustment of four
levels under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 (a). Before the 1994 amendment, his offense level would have
capped at the Sentencing Table maximum of 43 (mandatory life imprisonment). After the
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should have been visible, if at all, in FY 1995-the very same year that the
statutory safety valve went into effect. Yet, as noted above, in 1995, average
imposed narcotics sentences either increased (according to the AO) or
decreased by an average of only one month (according to the Sentencing
Commission) .13
Perhaps most importantly, as with the safety valve, the effect of the
elimination of the top two quantity-based enhancements in U.S.S.G § 2D1.1
would have been felt in its entirety immediately upon adoption. Any
reduction in the average imposed drug sentence resulting from this
amendment would occur only once. Hence, this Guidelines amendment
provides no explanation for the reductions in average drug sentences after
1995.13s
c. Change in Weight Equivalency for Mauijuana Plants
Prior to 1995, the Guidelines provided that, if fewer than fifty marijuana
plants were seized, each plant should be treated as the equivalent of one
hundred grams of marijuana, unless its actual weight was greater. But if fifty
or more plants were seized, each plant was treated as the equivalent of one
thousand grams, even if the actual weight was much less.9s9 This apparently
odd dichotomy was the Commission's response to the statutory edict in 21
U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (D) that in cases involving fewer than fifty plants, actual
weight should be used, while in cases involving fifty or more plants, each
plant should be considered as weighing one thousand grams for purposes of
determining eligibility for the five and ten year statutory minimum
mandatory sentences imposed for one hundred and one thousand kilograms
of marijuana.'4 Effective November 1, 1995, the Commission amended the
amendment, the four-level role adjustment would put him at Level 42 (360 months to life).
Similarly, if he had a significant criminal history, that fact alone could push the defendant back
up into the 360 months to life range. See U.S.S.G. § 5A (displa)ing the Sentencing Table). The
defendant's offense level would be increased a further two levels-and thus back up to the cap
of Level 43-if a gun was possessed during the offense, § 2DLI(b)(1); if the drugs were
imported on a non-commercial aircraft, § 2D.1 (b) (2) (A); if the defendant was an operations
officer on any vessel used to import the drugs, § 2D1.l(b)(2)(B); if the drugs were to be
distributed in a prison, § 2D1.l (b) (3); if the defendant abused a position of trust or used a
special skill to commit the offense, § 3B1.3; or if the defendant obstructed justice, § 3CI.1. In
short, some number of the defendants affected by the elimination of the top two quantity-based
offense levels would be pushed back to the top of the chart by other factors.
137. Supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
138. Even if the percentage of high-quantity drug cases that would previously have receihed
Level 40 or 42 quantity adjustments increased after 1995, this would not be reflected in any
decrease in average imposed sentence rdative to 1995.
139. See HAINES, BOWMAN & WOLL, supra note 49, at 363-69.
140. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (B) (vii) (setting a minimum mandatory sentence of five years
imprisonment for offenses involving one hundred kilograms or more of marijuana, or one
hundred or more marijuana plants); id. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii) (setting minimum mandatory
sentence of ten years imprisonment for offenses involving one thousand kilograms or more of
marijuana, or one thousandor more marijuana plants).
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Guidelines to provide that all marijuana plants should be treated as
weighing one hundred grams (unless the actual weight was greater),
regardless of the number of plants seized.14 1 It must be emphasized,
however, that despite this Guidelines amendment, for purposes of setting
minimum mandatory sentences under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (B) (vii),
possession of fifty or more marijuana plants still constitutes a weight of one
thousand grams per plant.1
4 2
The effect of this amendment on marijuana sentences, and on the
overall average drug sentence, is unclear. The average marijuana sentence
dropped by one month in 1996, the first year after the effective date of the
amendment, but it had dropped by three months in 1995, the year before
the amendment.
43
d. Other Guidelines Amendments Reducing Drug Sentences
Two other Guidelines amendments passed since 1990 would have
reduced some defendants' sentences. First, in 1993, the Commission
amended the application notes to the drug guidelines to eliminate from the
quantity calculation any nonconsumable portion of the "mixture or
substance" in which a controlled substance is found. 144 Prior to the
amendment, some courts had interpreted the "mixture or substance"
language of the Guidelines and the drug statutes to include material such as
the plastic of a suitcase into which one clever trafficker had chemically
bonded the cocaine he sought to import.
4 5
Second, effective November 1, 1994, the Commission amended the
commentary to the relevant conduct guideline, § 1B1.3, to state that a
"defendant's relevant conduct does not include the conduct of members of
a conspiracy prior to the defendant's joining the conspiracy, even if the
defendant knows of that conduct."4 6 Prior to this amendment, some courts
had held a defendant responsible for narcotics distributed by members of an
ongoing conspiracy before the defendantjoined the group.147
141. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 516 (1998) (amended Nov. 1, 1995) (adding Paragraph 4 of
the "Background" to U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.1)
142. See United States v. Marshall, 95 F.3d 700, 701 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the
marijuana guideline amendment cannot lower a sentence below the mandatory minimum).
143. In 1994, the mean marijuana sentence was 46.5 months. 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 136, at 115 fig.K. In 1995, the mean marijuana sentence was 43.1 months. 1995 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 90, at 110 fig.K. In 1996, the mean marijuana sentence was 42.1 months.
1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 107, at 56 fig.I.
144. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 484 (1998) (amended Nov. 1, 1993) (amending U.S.S.G. §
2D1.1 app. n.1, to state, inter alia, "Mixture or substance does not include materials that must be
separated from the controlled substance before the controlled substance can be used.")
145. See United States v. Mahecha-Onofre, 936 F.2d 623, 624-25 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding
that the suitcase/cocaine "mixture" or "substance" fits the statutory and Guidelines definitions).
146. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 503 (1998) (amended Nov. 1, 1994).
147. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 37 F.3d 1210, 1214-15 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding
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Neither of these two amendments has likely had much statistical impacL
First, although the exact number of cases affected by the changes is
unknown, the number is likely quite small. While intercepts of drug-
impregnated liquor, luggage, and the like are common enough to be
familiar to those who have worked in narcotics enforcement, 43 they are a
pretty rare event in the greater scheme of the drug trade. Similarly, the
number of cases in which the prosecution will have, and seek to use to
enhance a sentence, information about drug transactions prior to a
defendant's entry into the conspiracy for which he was convicted is likely to
be small. Second, the Commission's amendments on both issues resolved
circuit splits, in which the authority was already heavily on the side of the
more lenient interpretation of the Guidelines.4 9 Finally, as with the safety
defendant responsible for amounts distributed b)' the conspiracy two months before he joined
it because of his role in collecting debts for cocaine sold before he joined, and his "extensive
dealings ith two individuals" who joined the conspiracy before him); United States v. Mojica,
984 F.2d 1426, 1446 (7th Cir. 1993) (attributing earlier quantities to defendant who joined in
the middle of conspiracy, but who was an experienced dealer who had associated uith the
conspirators for some time before joining conspiracy).
148. For example, one of us (Bowman), while an Assistant U.S. Attorney in Miami. Florida,
tried a case in which cocaine was smuggled into the United States impregnated like starch into
clothing carried in the luggage of an airline passenger. Although the case was heard before the
1993 amendment darifying the point, the district court did not include the weight of the
clothes in the drug amount used to sentence the defendant.
149. Several courts have addressed the issue of inclusion of nonconsumable components of
a drug mixture. Compare United States v. Eastland, 989 F.2d 760, 767 (5th Cir. 1993) (including
104 pounds of lye water on the surface of which was phenylacetone), and United States v.
Kilion, 7 F.3d 927, 931-32 (10th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the argument that Chapman v. United
Stlates, 500 U.S. 453 (1991), excludes consideration of unusable by-products), and United States
v. Walker, 960 F.2d 409, 412-13 (5th Cir. 1992) (including the weight of toxic liquid waste
products), and United States v. Mahecha-Onofre, 936 F.2d 623, 626 (1st Cir. 1991) (including
the weight of the cocaine with the material in which it was impregnated), with United States v.
Palacios-Molina, 7 F.3d 49, 54 (5th Cir. 1993) (distinguishing the exclusion of liquid used to
transport cocaine from the inclusion of by-products and precursors of mediamphetamine); and
United States v. Salgado-Molina, 967 F.2d 27,28 (2d Cir. 1992) (excluding the weight of liqueur
in a liqueur/cocaine mixture since the cocaine was not usable without a chemical extraction
process), and United States v. Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 999, 1005 (3d Cir. 1992) (excluding boric
acid packaged with cocaine), and United States v. Robins, 967 F.2d 1387, 1389 (9th Cir. 1992)
(excluding 2,700 grams of cornmeal combined with 0.10 grams of cocaine to fool buyers), and
United States v. Bristol, 964 F.2d 1088, 1090 (11th Cir. 1992) (excluding the weight of ine in a
cocaine/wiine mixture), and United States v. Jennings, 945 F.2d 129. 134-37 (6th Cir. 1991)
(finding it was error to base weight on a batch of methamphetamine seized in the process of
"cooking" and containing poisonous chemicals not intended for ingestion).
Courts have also addressed the issue of inclusion of drugs distributed prior to joining a
conspiracy. Compare Philips, 37 F.3d at 1214-15 and Mojia, 984 F.2d at 1446 (including pre-
enlistment drugs), with United States v. Perulena, 146 F.3d 1332, 1336 (11th Cir. 1998)
(excluding a drug shipment imported eleven months before defendant joined conspiracy
because it was beyond the scope of defendant's agreement ith the other conspirators), and
United States v. Carreon, 11 F.3d 1225, 1234-35 (5th Cir. 1994) (summarizing the conflict
among the circuits), and United States v. Okafor, 996 F.2d 116, 121-22 (6th Cir. 1993)
(vacating and remanding for explicit specification of the evidence on which the district court
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valve and the amendment removing the top of the drug quantity chart, any
downward effect would have been a one-time event. The effect of these
amendments should have been felt in the year following their effective
dates-1994 for the mixture-or-substance amendment and 1995 for the
conspiracy amendment. 15  Neither amendment explains the continued
downward movement of drug sentences from 1996 through 1999.
e. Guidelines Amendments that Increased Drug Sentences
Between 1990 and the present, the Guidelines have also been amended
in wvays that increase drug sentences. Five notable examples of such
increases involve methamphetamine.
i. D- and L-Methamphetamine
The first methamphetamine amendment involved the differences in the
types of the drug. Methamphetamine is commonly encountered in several
chemical forms (D-methamphetamine, the relatively nonpsychoactive L-
methamphetamine, and mixtures containing both D- and L-
methamphetamine) and myriad purities.'5 ' Effective November 1, 1992, the
relied to attribute the preparticipation quantities to defendant where district court had simply
stated that a defendant is responsible for all of the quantities dealt in by his conspiracy), and
United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1495-96 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that the defendant was
only a peripheral participant early in the conspiracy, and then took a two-year hiatus before
becoming heavily involved in the conspiracy's activities), and United States v. Edwards, 994 F.2d
417, 423 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding drugs were not attributable to defendant unless he was
directly involved in the conspiracy at the time of their distribution), and United States v. Petty,
982 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding defendant could not have "foreseen" drugs
distributed before he joined conspiracy), and United States v. O'Campo, 973 F.2d 1015, 1023
(1st Cir. 1992) (holding new entrant cannot be held responsible for earlier transactionsjust
because he knew they took place), and United States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 995-97 (3d Cir.
1992) (holding previously undertaken activity normally will not have been committed in
furtherance of the activity defendant agrees to undertake), and United States v. Williams, 977
F.2d 866, 870 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing the argument that defendant had not joined conspiracy
prior to certain activities).
150. Both the "mixture or substance" amendment to § 2D1.1 app. n.1 and the amendment
regarding conspiratorial conduct would have applied immediately to all cases sentenced on or
after their effective dates of November 1, 1993, and November 1, 1994, regardless of when the
offense conduct occurred, because U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 specifies that sentencing courts are to use
the "[Guidelines Manual] in effect at the time the defendant was sentenced." U.S.S.G. § 1BI.10
(2000). Due to the operation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, this rule does not apply to
amendments that increase sentences. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 435-36 (1987) (holding
the Ex Post Facto Clause barred applying retroactively an amendment to Florida state
sentencing guidelines that increased a penalty); United States v. Harotunian, 920 F.2d 1040,
1046 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding the amendment to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 (b), regarding embezzlement,
could not be applied retroactively because it increased the penalty). However, the Ex Post Facto
limitation would not apply to either of the amendments at issue here.
151. For a discussion of the chemical subtleties, see United States v. Carroll, 6 F.3d 735,
747-49 (11th Cir. 1993) (discussing the legal treatment of six chemical variations of
methamphetamine).
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Sentencing Commission amended the Drug Equivalency Table of U.S.S.G. §
2D1.1 to equate one gram of L-methamphetamine with only forty grams of
marijuana, and one gram of D-methamphetamine with ten kilograms of
marijuana. This distinction produced substantial litigation over which kind
of methamphetamine was possessed. The Commission sought to end this
litigation with an amendment, effective November 1, 1995, that deleted the
distinction between D- and L-methamphetamine and punished all forms at
the higher level previously reserved for D-methamphetamine.112
ii. Change in "Mixture or Substance" Rules for Methamphetamine
The second amendment came in response to congressional directives in
the Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act of 1996 (CMCA).
3
Effective November 1, 1997, the Sentencing Commission increased the base
offense level for methamphetamine trafficking offenses by halving the
quantity of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine
corresponding to each offense level on the Drug Quantity Table.M
iii. Other Methamphetamine Guideline Increases
The remaining three amendments were also in response to the
CMCA.' 55 The Commission added a two-level enhancement for importation
of methamphetamine or its precursor chemicals"' and another two-level
enhancement if the offense involved (as methamphetamine manufacturing
often does) the discharge, unlawful transportation, storage, or disposal of
hazardous or toxic chemicals. 57 The Commission also complied ith the
congressional directive to modify the Guidelines to ensure that the base
offense level for possession of precursor chemicals be calculated according
to the amount of controlled substance that could reasonably be
manufactured using the chemicals the defendant possessed. The
152. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 517 (1998) (amended Nov. 1, 1995). For a general discussion
of this sequence of amendments to the methamphetamine guidelines, see HAIN\ES, BOvWN &
WOLL, supra note 49, at 361-64.
153. Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act, Pub. L No. 104-237, § 301, 110 Suit.
3099 (1996).
154. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 555 (1998) (amended Nov. 1, 1997) (amending U.S.S.G. §
2D1.1 (c), Drug Quantity Table). No change was made in the quantities of "methampheamine
(actual)," i.e., pure methamphetamine, that are associated %ith various offense levels and that
trigger minimum mandatory sentences.
155. Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act, Pub. L No. 104-237, §§ 302 & 303,
110 Stat. 3099 (1996). This amendment also raised the base offense level for methampheamine
offenses.
156. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 555 (1998) (amended Nov. 1, 1997) (amending U.SS.G. §
2D1.1(b) to add subsection (4) increasing the methamphetamine trafficking offense levl by
two levels where methamphetamine or its precursor chemicals are imported and the defendant
is not eligible for a mitigating role adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2).
157. Id. (amending U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.1(b) to add subsection (4) increasing the
methamphetamine trafficking offense level by two levels for environmental infractions).
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Commission accomplished this by raising the quantity table for precursor
chemicals in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.11(d) by two levels for List I chemicals.'
iv. Effect of Methamphetamine Guideline Increases
Guidelines amendments increasing sentences affect overall sentencing
statistics more slowly than amendments decreasing sentences because, while
decreases are immediately effective for all cases sentenced on or after the
effective date of the amendment, 59 the Ex Post Facto Clause dictates that
increases can only affect cases in which the conduct occurred or continued
on or after the effective date. 6° The 1995 equalization of D- and L-
methamphetamine had no immediately observable effect on
methamphetamine sentences; the mean methamphetamine sentence
decreased by almost five months from 1995 to 1996. On the other hand, the
1997 amendments of the methamphetamine guidelines in response to the
CMCA may have had some immediate impact-the mean
methamphetamine sentence increased from 95.1 months in 1997 to 96.8
months in 1998. What may be more telling is that the increase in
methamphetamine sentences from 1997 to 1998 was one of only two
occasions when the average sentence for any drug increased between 1995
and 1999.161 With these two exceptions, average sentences for every major
drug type (powder cocaine, crack cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and
marijuana) decreased every year from 1995 to 1999.162
3. Have Changes in Case Law Reduced Drug Sentences?
A third possible non-discretionary explanation for decreasing drug
sentences is changes in case law construing drug statutes or the Sentencing
Guidelines. Given the immense body of decisional law from the district and
appellate courts, one could undoubtedly spend a lifetime tracing the
correlations between particular decisions and sentence lengths in the
districts or circuits in which such decisions were issued. We have not
attempted anything so ambitious here. Rather, we have examined only
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court that had the potential to affect drug
sentences generally.
158. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 541 (1998) (amended May 1, 1997), repromulgated as a
nonemergency amendment effective November 1, 1997.
159. U.S.S.G. § 11I.10 (1998).
160. See supra note 147 (citing decisions in which courts held defedants responsible for
drug activities that occurred prior to their engagement in the conspiracy).
161. The only other annual increase recorded between 1995 and 1999 was the increase in
the average heroin sentence from 58.1 months in 1998 to 61.6 months in 1999. Compare 1998
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 84, at 81 figJ, uith 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 81 figJ.
162. See 1999 SOURCFBOOK, supra note 5, at 83 fig.L (depicting decreases in drug types).
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a. Dogs that NAever Barked
Before considering the very few Supreme Court cases in the last ten
years that would tend to reduce drug sentences, it is important to note the
larger class of decisions in which the Court upheld features of federal drug
sentencing law that tend to keep sentences high. Beginning with Mistretla v.
United States,16 in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of the SRA,
the Court has consistently sustained the major structural components of
federal sentencing reform that increased drug sentences in the first place.
For example, the Court has relied on the relevant conduct concept,"" the
cornerstone of the modified real offense design of the Guidelines, 1 and has
not disputed findings by the courts of appeals upholding the concept's
constitutionality. 166 In United States v. WVatts,16 the Court upheld the
controversial Guidelines rule permitting a court to consider in sentencing
charges of which a defendant has been acquitted. The Court has on several
occasions affirmed the validity of the rule restricting eligibility for substantial
assistance downward departures to cases in which the government moves for
the departure and certifies that the defendant has been of substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another.' C3 More generally,
the Court upheld the power of the Sentencing Commission to constrain
judicial interpretations of the Guidelines by ruling that the Commission's
commentary to the Guidelines is binding on the courts.1G9
163. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
164. See Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 513-14 (1998) (relying on the relevant
conduct section, § 1B1.3, in upholding a sentence based on the offense level for crack, even
though the jury found a conspiracy to sell powder cocaine or crack).
165. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (discussing the "relemant conduct'
factor).
166. See, eg., United States v. Bennett, 928 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that § IB1.3
is not an unconstitutional bill of attainder); United States v. Ebbole, 917 F.2d 1495 (7th Cir.
1990) (holding that the relevant conduct section does not offend due process).
167. 519 U.S. 148 (1997). In addition, all circuits agree that relevant conduct includes
conduct outside the offense of conviction. HAINES, BOwhiM & WOL, supra note 49, at 113
n.604.
168. See Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185 (1992) (stating that both 18 U.S.C. §
3553 (e) and U.S.S.G. § 5K1L.1 give "the Government a power, not a duty, to file a motion when a
defendant has substantially assisted"); Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 129 (1996)
(holding that a government motion under U.S.S.G. § 5Kl.1 is not sufficient to make a
defendant eligible for a departure below a statutory minimum mandatory sentence absent a
separate government motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1994)). For further discussion of
substantial assistance motions and the government monopoly on them, see Frank 0. Bowman,
l, Departing Is Such Sweet Sorw A Year of Judicial Revolt on "Substantial Aisistance" Dpartures
Follows a Decade ofProsecutorial Indiscipline, 29 STETsoN L RE%,. 7 (1999) [hereinafter Bo.man,
Departing] and Frank 0. Bowman, III, Defending Substantial Assistan: An Old Procmu!as
Meditation on Singleton, Sealed Case, and the Maxfidd-Krarmy Rrport, 12 FED. SL\'Ir. REP. 45
(1999) [hereinafter Bowman, DefendingSubstantialAssistanee].
169. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36.47 (1992). The Supreme Court has also ruled on
particular drug-related Guidelines provisions. See eg., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 433,
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In addition to cases directly concerning the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, the Court has handed down decisions in cases originating in
state courts that have had the effect of foreclosing challenges to stiff federal
drug sentences. For example, in Harmelin v. Michigan,70 the Court held that
a state sentence of life imprisonment without parole for a first-time offender
who possessed one-and-one-half pounds of cocaine was not cruel and
unusual punishment.' 7' Relying on Harmelin, the circuit courts have
uniformly rejected Eighth Amendment challenges to long federal drug
sentences.
172
b. Drugs and Guns
Throughout the 1990s, federal law imposed substantial penalties on
those who use, carry, or possess firearms in connection with drug trafficking
offenses. Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 924(c) imposes a mandatory minimum
prison term on any person who "during and in relation to any.., drug
trafficking crime.., uses or carries a firearm." 73 A defendant must be
sentenced to five years, to be served consecutively to any other sentence, for
his first conviction under § 924(c), and to twenty years consecutive "in the
case of his second or subsequent" conviction.' 74 In addition, the Sentencing
Guidelines provide for a two-level offense level enhancement "if a dangerous
weapon (including a firearm) was possessed" in connection with a narcotics
offense.175 This enhancement does not apply if the defendant has been
convicted of a § 924(c) count for the same weapon in the same case.176
In December 1995, the Supreme Court decided in Bailey v. United
States177 that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for "use" of a firearm
during and in relation to a drug crime cannot be sustained unless the
defendant "actively employed" the weapon in relation to the predicate
468 (1991) (holding that 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (1994) requires that the "carrier medium" for
drugs such as LSD (typically blotter paper or sugar cubes) must be included when determining
the weight of the drug for purposes of determining a mandatory minimum sentence).
170. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
171. Id. at 994.
172. See HAINES, BOwMAN & WoaL, supra note 49, at 20 n.51 (listing numerous cases
rejecting Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment challenges to federal drug
sentences).
173. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1994).
174. Id. Moreover, the twenty-year penalty applies even if the defendant suffers his second
or subsequent § 924(c) conviction in the same trial as his first. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S.
129, 137 (1993).
175. U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.1(b) (1) (2000). Application Note 3 to § 2D1.1 goes on to state: "The
adjustment should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the
weapon was connected with the offense."
176. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 app. n.2 (2000). See generally HAINES, BOWMAN & ,VOLL, supra note 49,
at 588-91.
177. 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
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offense.1 8 The Bailey decision produced a wave of litigation from prisoners
convicted of § 924(c) counts, resulting in a substantial number of reversals
of those counts.179 Effective November 13, 1998, Congress enacted a "Bailg.
fix" that broadened the language of § 924(c) to cover anyone who "in
furtherance of any [drug trafficking] crime, possesses a firearm."'F
Nonetheless, between December 1995 and November 1998, Bailey limited to
some degree the number of cases in which a § 924(c) count could
successfully be prosecuted. The precise degree of constraint imposed by
Bailey is necessarily speculative, particularly because the decision did not
purport to limit the "carry" prong of § 924(c).181 Moreover, the effect on
sentence length resulting from a failure to bring or obtain a conviction on a
§ 924(c) count is muddied by the two-offense-level increase under
Guidelines § 2D1.1 (b) (1) for "possession" of a weapon. That is, because a
defendant cannot receive both a § 924(c) conviction and a § 2D1.1(b) (1)
guideline increase, some unknown number of defendants who, prior to
Bailey, would have received five-year consecutive sentences, instead received
two-level increases in their Guidelines range after Bailey.tP
We do know, however, that in 1996, the year following the Bailey
decision, the percentage of drug cases in which a weapon was "involved"
(i.e., in which the defendant was either convicted of a § 924(c) count in
addition to a drug count, or received a weapon enhancement under §
2Dl.1(b) (1)) declined from 17 .1 %1t8 to 14.5%,'m and then stabilized in
1997 through 1999 between 12.1% and 12.3%.185 Although Commission
statistics lump together § 924(c) and § 2DL. (b) (1) cases, rendering precise
calculation of sentence impact impossible, these decreases would certainly
have exerted some downward pressure on the overall average drug sentence
imposed between December 1995 and November 1998. This is true because:
(a) until November 1998, the Sentencing Commission coded (i.e., counted)
178. 1& at 144.
179. For a listing of a representative sample of such cases, see HIduEs, Bo\%.wLk & WOL,
supra note 49, at 234 n.403.
180. Pub. L. No. 105-386, § l(a) (1), 112 Stat. 3469 (1998).
181. In Muscarlo v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 139 (1998), for example, the Supreme
Court held that a gun is "carried" even if it is in a locked glove box or in the trunk of a car.
182. To muddy the picture even further, remember that, depending on the quantity of
drugs involved in the case at issue, the difference in sentence represented by a tmo-level
increase could range from four or five months to more than five years. &w U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(c)
(Drug Quantity Table), 5A (Sentendng Table) (1998) (listing different offense levels
corresponding with the quantities of controlled substances possessed by the comict, and the
convict's criminal history, respectively).
183. 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 107 tbl.43.
184. 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 107, at 50 thl.34.
185. The percentage of cases in which a weapon %vas involved from 1997 through 1999
were: 12.3% in 1997, 1997 SOURcEBOOK, supra note 111, at 74 thl.39; 12.1% in 1998, 1993
SouRcEsoOs, supra note 84, at 74 thl.39; 12.2% in 1999, 1999 SOURcErooF, supra note 5. at 74
thl.39.
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cases with § 924(c) convictions as drug cases so long as the defendant was
also convicted of a drug crime;18 6 (b) the effect of eliminating a § 924(c)
count is large (five or twenty years on a sentence, less a possible two-level
weapon possession enhancement, under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (b) (1));187 and (c)
even a two-level weapon enhancement under § 2Dl.l (b) (1) generates a
potential sentence increase of at least six months to as much as six-and-one-
half years."SS
Determining the effect of Bailey is rendered still more complicated
because, even more so than with the safety valve, there is a substantial
element of prosecutorial discretion involved in whether a defendant will
receive either a § 924(c) conviction or a § 2D1.1(b) (1) weapon possession
enhancement. Prosecutors have absolute discretion on the question of
whether to include a § 924(c) count in an indictment, as well as absolute
discretion on whether to dismiss such a count in any plea agreement. Even
the application of the Guidelines enhancement under § 2D1.1(b) (1)
involves considerable government discretion either to press hard for the
enhancement or to remain silent on the point. Thus, we cannot know
whether the decrease in "weapon involvement" during 1996-99 is due to
Bailey, to a change in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in cases where
weapons were found, or even to a real decrease in the number of drug
traffickers who carry guns.
c. The Koon Decision
Almost without question, the Supreme Court case decided within the
last ten years with the most potential downward impact on drug sentences is
Koon v. United States. 1 9 However, because Koon addressed the degree of
discretion possessed by district court judges to depart from the otherwise
applicable guideline sentence, we will consider its effect below in the section
on discretionary explanations for the drug sentence decrease. 90
186. Telephone interview by Frank 0. Bowman, III with Louis W. Reedt, Acting Director of
Policy Analysis, U.S. Sentencing Commission (June 2000).
187. Telephone interview by Frank 0. Bowman, III with Louis NV. Reedt, Acting Director of
Policy Analysis, U.S. Sentencing Commission (May 2000).
188. This is so because: (1) the Guidelines Sentencing Table, U.S.S.G. § 5A (1998), is
designed with overlapping ranges such that the top of each range is the bottom of the range
two levels above it; and (2) the minimum width of a sentencing range is six months, while the
maximum width is over eighty-one months. The increase in sentence generated by a two-level
base offense level increase is only "potential" because a sentence at the high end of range Xwill
be identical to a sentence at the low end of range X+2. Therefore, a judge could impose
identical sentences on a defendant with or without a two-level § 2D1.1(b) (1) weapon
enhancement.
189. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
190. Infra notes 282-91, 340 and accompanying text.
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d. Summary
In sum, with the exception of the unquantifiable effect of Bailey on
cases involving firearms and the encouragement of departures given by
Koon, Supreme Court case law seems to have exerted little or no dowmard
pressure on the length of federal narcotic sentences.
4. Have Changes in Type of Case or Type of Defendant Affected Federal
Drug Sentences?
The fourth non-discretionary factor that might reduce average drug
sentences is the change in the type of cases or defendants prosecuted under
federal drug statutes. We consider four primary variables: (1) changes in
drug type, (2) changes in the drug amounts, (3) changes in the defendant's
role in the offense, and (4) changes in average criminal history category of
the defendant.
a. Changes in Drug Type
Federal drug prosecutions involve five major drug types: powder
cocaine, crack cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana.
Although federal law criminalizes possession or trafficking in many other
drugs (e.g., LSD, PCP, steroids, etc.),191 these five types account for over 97%
192of all federal narcotics cases. The average sentence imposed for each of
the five primary drug types differs significantly. For example, in 1999, the
mean sentences for powder cocaine, crack cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and
methamphetamine were, respectively, 79.1 months, 120.3 months, 61.6
months, 33.7 months, and 88.8 months.193 The task of this Article is to
explain the downward movement in the average federal drug sentence
between 1992-93 and 1999. Given the substantial difference in the average
sentence imposed for each major drug type, a change in the proportion of
drug types for which drug offenders as a whole are prosecuted might
significantly affect the overall average national drug sentence. For example,
if during the study period the number of crack offenders (average sentence
120.3 months) had dramatically decreased, while the number of marijuana
offenders (average sentence 33.7 months) dramatically increased, and the
number of offenders sentenced for the other three drugs remained
constant, the change would push the overall average sentence down. The
question for this part is whether there were any changes in the relative
191. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A) (iv) (1994) (prescribing a mandatory minimum penalty
for offenses involving one hundred grams or more of phencyclidine (PCP)); id. §
841(b) (1) (A) (v) (1994) (prescribing a mandatory minimum penalty for offenses invohing ten
grams or more of LSD).
192. 1999 SouRcEBooK, supra note 5, at 69 thl.34 (showing that of 22j440 defendants
sentenced for drug offenses in 1999, only 405, or 1.8%, were sentenced for drugs other than
cocaine (powder or crack), heroin, marijuana, or methamphetamine).
193. Id at 81 fig.J.
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number of offenders for each drug type over the period at issue, and if so,
what effect did such changes have?
Figure 2 presents data on the number of drug offenders between 1993
and 1999 and reveals several general trends. Speaking broadly, the number
of powder cocaine offenders decreased markedly between 1993 and 1995
and then leveled off. The number of crack cocaine and methamphetamine
offenders increased steadily. The number of marijuana offenders decreased
between 1993 and 1995, and then increased markedly between 1995 and
1999. The number of heroin offenders remained relatively constant during
these years.
FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF DRUG OFFENDERS, BYYEAR' 94
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Just as important as the raw number of offenders is the percentage of
offenders for each drug type relative to the overall pool of drug offenders.
This is especially true given the changes in the raw number of drug
offenders by drug type over the years. The trends depicted in Figures 2 and
3 augur against the proposition that changes in drug type account for the
decrease in drug sentences. As a relative share of the overall drug offender
pool, crack cocaine (the drug type with the highest average sentence)
increased from 20% of all drug cases in 1993 to 23.9% in 1999. Traffickers in
methamphetamine-the drug with the second highest average sentence-
more than doubled as a relative share of all drug defendants (from 5.3% to
12.8%). The percentage of heroin cases, which carry the second lowest
average sentence among the big five, declined from 10.4% in 1993 to 8.1%
194. The data underlying Figure 2 for the period 1993-98 is drawn from the following
sources: 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 144 fig.G; 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136,
at 115 fig.K 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 110 fig.K; 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note
107, at 56 fig.I; 1997 SOURcEBOOK, supra note 111, at 81 fig.J; 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 84,
at 84 figJ; 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 81 fig.J.
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in 1999. Moreover, although the relative share of the lowest average
sentence drug-marijuana-increased from 25.6% in 1993 to 30.3% in
1999, that increase occurred entirely betwveen 1997 and 1999. For a
depiction of the relative share of total drug offenders by drug type, see
Figure 3 below.
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Another more refined look at the data suggests that the change in mix
of drug types over time has not been the primary determinant in the
persistent downward trend in drug sentences. Consistent with the observed
overall decline in average drug sentences, illustrated in Figure 1, data on
average sentences within each drug type between 1993 and 1999, presented in
Figure 4, reveal two important trends. First, the average sentence length for
all five major drug types was lower in 1999 than in 1993.193 Second, wvith the
exception of methamphetamine sentences (which fluctuated throughout
195. The data underlying Figure 3 for the period 1993-99 is dram from the folloing
sources: 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 144 fig.G; 1994 ANNLUL REPORT, supra note 186,
at 115 fig.K; 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 110 fig.K; 1996 SOURCEBoOK, supra note
107, at 56 fig.I; 1997 SOURcEBOOK, supra note 111, at 81 fig.J; 1998 SOURCEi ooK, supra note 84,
at 84 fig.J; 1999 SOURcEBOOK, supra note 5, at 81 fig.J.
196. The average (mean) sentence for powder cocaine declined from 96.5 months in 1993
to 79.1 months in 1999. The average (mean) sentence for crack cocaine was 123.1 months in
1993, increased to 133.4 months in 1994, and declined steadily to 120.3 months in 1999. The
average (mean) sentence for heroin was 72.3 months in 1993, which increased to 76.2 months
in 1994, declined steadily thereafter to 58.1 months in 1998, but increased to 61.6 months in
1999. The average (mean) sentence for marijuana was 45.4 months in 1993, which increased to
46.5 months in 1994, and then decreased steadily thereafter to 33.7 months in 1999. The
average (mean) sentence for methamphetamine was 106.0 months in 1993, and 88.8 months in
1998.1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 144 fig.G; 1994 ANUAL REPORT, supra note 186, at
115 fig.K; 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 84, at 81 fig.J; 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 81
fig.J.
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the period in response to statutory changes) 97 and a single uptick in heroin
sentences from 1998 to 1999, the average sentence for all major drug types
declined every year between 1994 and 1999. For a depiction of sentencing by
drug type, see Figure 4 below.
FIGURE 4: AVERAGE PRISON SENTENCE, BY DRUG TPE (MONTHS) 193
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Thus, on balance, it is unlikely that changes in the percentage of
offenders convicted of possessing or selling each drug type can account for
much-if any-of the steady decline in average drug sentences between
1993 and 1999.
b. Changes in Drug Quantity
Because federal drug sentences are so heavily driven by drug quantity,
average sentences should decrease when the average amount of drugs per
defendant decreases. Unfortunately, data on drug quantity per defendant
are not readily available. However, data on federal drug seizures and on base
offense levels are available. Individually and collectively, these data sources
serve as a crude proxy for drug quantity. Taken together, federal drug
seizure and base offense level data suggest that drug quantity is increasing. A
more conservative interpretation of the data is that drug quantity is not
decreasing. Consequently, it is unlikely that changes in drug quantity can
explain the decrease in the length of federal drug sentences between 1992
and 1999.
197. Supra notes 151-62 and accompanying text.
198. The data underlying Figure 4 for the period 1993-98 is drawn from the following
sources: 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 144 fig.G; 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136,
at 115 fig.K; 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 110 fig.K; 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note
107, at 56 fig.I; 1997 SOURcEBOOK, supra note 111, at 81 figJ; 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 84,
at 81 fig.J; 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 81 figJ.
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i. Federal Drug Seizures
Data from the White House Office on Drug Policy, presented in Figure
5 below, illustrate a 140% increase in the amount of drugs seized by federal
law enforcement agencies between 1992 and 1999. During the same period,
the number of federal drug defendants increased by only 31%, from 17,251
offenders in 1993199 to 22,682 in 1999. "0 There is, at best, an imperfect
correlation between the amount of drugs seized and the amount that makes
its way into pre-sentence reports as the basis for a Guidelines sentence. Not
every drug seizure becomes the basis for a criminal prosecution. The total
quantity of drugs seized is not distributed evenly among all federal drug
defendants. Not all the drugs actually seized in connection with a case may
be reported to the court. And in so-called "reverse" cases, when the
government offers to sell nonexistent drugs, the basis for a defendant's
sentence is the amount of drugs that he or she agrees to buy. Nonetheless,
during a period in which the amount of real narcotics reported seized
increased more than four times faster than the number of drug defendants
sentenced, one can reasonably infer that drug quantity per defendant
increased during these same years. In any event, it is decidedly less plausible
to infer that drug quantity levels per defendant fell during this period.








1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
199. 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 56 tN..
200. 1999 SOuRCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 67 fig.I n.1.
201. 1999 SOURCEBOOK OF CRMINALJUsTICE STATISTICS, aVaila!e at hup://vw,.albay.
edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t437.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2000) (data drawn from U.S. Dept.
Justice, Drug Enforcement Admin., Federal-Wide Drug Seizure System).
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ii. Base Offense Levels
A second source of data also bears on drug quantity. In theory, base
offense levels (BOL) should correspond well with drug quantity levels.20 2 As
noted above, drug sentences under the Guidelines are largely determined by
drug quantity.203 The type and amount of drugs attributable to the
defendant pursuant to the relevant conduct rules determine his base offense
level.2 04 The higher the drug quantity, the higher the BOL, and
consequently, the higher the BOL, the higher the resultant sentence.
As Figure 6 illustrates, between 1992 and 1999 the overall blended BOL
average increased by almost 4% (from a BOL of 26.31 in 1992 to a BOL of
27.33 in 1999). That is, during these years the average BOL increased by just
over one full level. A closer look at the data reveals interesting changes.
Between 1992 and 1996, the average BOL increased by almost two full levels.
Such an increase almost assuredly reflects some increase in drug quantity.
Moreover, this trend should lead to higher average sentences. Some of the
increases realized between 1992 and 1996 have eroded since then. Between
1996 and 1999, the average BOL decreased from 28.24 to 27.33, or almost
one full level. Despite the drop between 1996 and 1999, it is important to
note that there was still a net increase in BOL between 1992 and 1999.






1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
202. Indeed, the close nexus between BOL and drug quantity is underscored by the U.S.
Sentencing Commission's use of BOL as a proxy for drug quantity in its own reports through
1996. See, e.g., 1995 ANNUAL Report, supra note 90, at 113-16.
203. See supra notes 60-84 and accompanying text (describing the Federal sentencing
guidelines).
204. See U.S.S.G. § 2DI.1(c) (2000) (displaying a drug quantity table).
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Another perspective is provided by base offense level averages for each
of the five major drug types. Figure 7 illustrates that the annual movement
of BOLs for each of those drug types is minimal and, with the exception of
marijuana, BOLs for all drug types increased between 1992 and 1999.
FIGURE 7: AVERAGE BASE OFFENSE LEVEL, BY DRUG 'TYPE AND YEAR
35
30




1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
- - -Powder - - - Crack ----- Hcroin
- Marijuana Methamphetamnine
Finally, when examining the averages in Figures 6 and 7, above, it is
helpful to know whether any substantial changes took place at either end of
the distribution. Specifically, might the increase in the overall BOL average
reflect dramatic increases in the percentage of sentences at either the low or
high BOLs? To explore this possibility we divided BOLs into three groups:
sentences below level 26 (the level corresponding roughly to the quantity of
drugs necessary to trigger a minimum mandatory five-year sentence),
sentences above level 34 (the level corresponding roughly to the quantity of
drugs necessary to trigger a minimum mandatory ten-year sentence), and
those sentences residing in between. Figure 8 presents these findings.
Clearly the overall increase in the average base offense level from 1992 to
1999 flows from neither a dramatic increase in sentences at the high BOLs
nor a dramatic decrease in sentences at the low BOLs. Rather, the slight
increase appears to flow from a systematic increase in BOLs throughout the
range of levels.
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In summary, both the drug seizure and base offense level data suggest
that average drug quantity per sentenced defendant did not decrease
between 1992 and 1999. Rather, the most likely inference from this data is
that average drug quantity per defendant increased. Assuming that drug
quantity levels did indeed rise between 1992 and 1999, we would expect to
find a corresponding increase in average sentence length. That we found
the opposite is surprising to say the least.
c. Changes in Defendant's Role in the Offense
Although drug quantity sets the base offense level for drug offenses,
both reductions and increases in offense level are possible depending on a
defendant's role in the offense. Section 3B1.1 of the Guidelines provides for
increases of two, three, or four offense levels for a defendant's "aggravating
role" in cases of group criminality.2°  The number of levels added depends
on the size and complexity of the criminal organization and the defendant's
position in it.2°6 Conversely, § 3B1.2 provides that defendants in cases
involving groups may receive decreases of two, three, or four offense levels
for their "mitigating roles."20 7 Consequently, average drug sentences could
205. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 (2000).
206. For example, four offense levels are added if "the defendant was an organizer or
leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive,"
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 (a) (2000), while only three levels are added if "the defendant was a manager
or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more
participants or was otherwise extensive." U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 (b) (2000).
207. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 (2000) (describing the decreases in the offensive level, depending on
defendant's role in the offense).
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decrease if the average amount of additional time imposed on defendants as
a result of upward adjustments for aggravating role decreased over time, or
the average amount of sentence reduction received by defendants as a result
of downward adjustments for mitigating role increased over time.
We phrase the alternatives in this somewhat strained fashion because
each contains two components. A decrease in the average upward
adjustment for aggravating role could be the result of either a decrease in
the total number of defendants receiving aggravating role enhancements or
a change in the distribution of aggravating role enhancements (such that a
higher percentage of the total number of recipients of role increases
receives the smaller two- or three-level increases, as opposed to the
maximum four-level increase), or both. Likewise, an increase in the average
downward adjustment for mitigating role could be the result of either an
increase in the total number of defendants receiving mitigating role
enhancements or a change in the distribution of mitigating role
enhancements (such that a higher percentage of the total number of
recipients of role decreases receive the larger three- or four-level decreases,
as opposed to the minimum two-level decrease), or both.








1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
- Mitigating - - - -Aggravating
As Figure 9 indicates, the percentage of downward mitigating role
adjustments has increased every year since 1993 (from 16.3% in 1993 to
26.2% in 1999), while the percentage of upward aggravating role
adjustments has decreased every year since 1994 (from 9.3% in 1994 to
6.7%. in 1999).209 Because we are unable to obtain precise data on the
208. The data underlying Figure 9 for the period 1993-98 is dram from the folloing
sources: 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 141 tbL56; 1994 ANI.AL REPORT, supra note
136, at 112 tbl.51; 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 108 thl.44; 1996 SOURCEaOOK, supra
note 107, at 51 tbl.35; 1997 SOURcEBOOK, supra note 111, at 75 tl.40; 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 84, at 75 tbl.40; 1999 SOURcEBOOK, supra note 5, at 75 tbl.40.
209. Supra note 208.
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number of levels of decrease or increase received by defendants in the
mitigating and aggravating categories (i.e., two, three, or four levels up or
down), we are unable to quantify the precise effect of this trend on average
drug sentences. However, the simultaneous decrease in upward adjustments
and increase in downward adjustments undoubtedly influenced sentence
averages. The difficulty is in trying to assess the influence with precision.
It is also difficult to assign a precise cause for the observed trends in
upward and downward role adjustments. One possible explanation is that
the nature of the drug cases prosecuted by U.S. Attorneys has changed since
1993. In other words, it is possible that fewer aggravating role adjustments
are imposed each year because federal agents and prosecutors are
apprehending fewer drug conspiracies that involve "five or more
participants or are otherwise extensive."2 10 It also may be that more
mitigating role adjustments are awarded each year because federal
authorities are electing to indict more minor or minimal participants in the
drug conspiracies they prosecute. It is, however, also possible that the
paradigm of drug crimes prosecuted in the federal system and the
distribution of aggravating and mitigating roles of defendants have changed
not at all, and that, instead, prosecutors and judges have progressively
changed the way they assess the eligibility of defendants for aggravating and
mitigating role adjustments. In other words, this trend may not represent a
change in the population of defendants on which the Guidelines are
operating but may instead reflect a progressive change in the way judges and
prosecutors make the partly discretionary choices about who deserves
aggravating or mitigating role adjustments.
It is impossible to determine with certainty whether the discretionary or
non-discretionary hypothesis is the correct one, and there may be elements
of both at work. However, on balance, the available evidence suggests that
an increasingly lenient exercise of discretion is a more plausible explanation
than are changes in the cases and defendants themselves.
i. The Decrease in Aggravating Role Adjustments
Because the number of participants in the crime is key to imposing an
aggravating role adjustment on one or more members of a criminal group
and the number of defendants eligible for aggravating role adjustments was
declining from 1993 through 1998, one would expect to see a progressive
decline in multidefendant drug prosecutions during this period. We have, to
date, been unable to find any data reporting on an annual basis the number
of multidefendant prosecutions, or reflecting the average number of
defendants per federal drug case. The best rough approximation we could
devise was a comparison of the number of drug cases filed annually with the
number of defendants sentenced annually to produce a ratio of defendants
210. U.S.S.G. § 3BL.I (a) (2000).
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to filed cases. Because there is a time lag (averaging roughly nine months)
between case filing and sentencing,211 we calculated the ratio of defendants
to cases by dividing the number of defendants sentenced in one year by the
number of cases filed the year before. Using this concededly rough
yardstick, it appears that the number of multidefendant prosecutions
increased between 1993 and 1996 and then declined to nearly its 1993-94
level in 1999. Thus, to the extent our rough yardstick reflects at least the
gross trends in numbers of multidefendant drug cases, the fluctuations in
the numbers of such cases do not appear to have any observable causal
relationship to the number of upward adjustments for aggravating role.
TABLE 1: DRUG CASES FILED AND NUMBER OF DEFEND.ANTS
Case Def.'s
Filed212  Sentenced&- s  (Ratio)
1993 12,329 1994: 16,700 1.35
1994 11,356 1995:15,288 1.35
1995 11,304 1996:17,261 1.53
1996 12,068 1997:19,089 1.58
1997 13,121 1998: 20,618 1.57
1998 16,281 1999: 23,082 1.41
211. See supra note 95 (noting that the average time lag in 1999 was nearly nine months).
212. Data on case filings for 1993-97 in this column are from the AD.MIN. OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, FEDERALJuDICiAL CASELOAD: A FE-YEAR RETROSPECTE 16 (1998), araitace at
http:f/w v.uscourts.gov/Caseload.pdf [hereinafter Cs-LOAD RETROSPECrIvE]. The figure for
drug case filings in 1998 is drawn from LEONIDAS RALPH MECHA.M, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNrrE STATES COURTS: 1998 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 212 thLD-2 (1999), arailaMe at
http://w.uscourts.gov/dirrpt98/d2sep98.pdE There are some small discrepancies between
the number of drug case filings reported for 1994-97 in the two sources. These discrepancies
would affect the ratios, but not the trend, reported in the right-hand column of Table 1.
213. Data for the sentence column in Table 1 comes from the following sources: 1994
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136, at 39 thl.12; 1995 ANNAL. REPORT, supra note 90. at 43 tbl.10;
1996 SOURcEBooK, supra note 107, at 7 tbl.3; 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 111. at 12 tbl.3;
1998 SOURcEBOOK, supra note 84, at 12 tbl.3; 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 12 thl.3.
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ii. The Increase in Mitigating Role Adjustments
In evaluating the increase in mitigating role adjustments, it is important
to note that the award of a mitigating role adjustment involves both a
comparative and an absolute measurement of culpability. First, the court
must make a judgment about a defendant's relative culpability within the
particular criminal group whose activities led to his conviction. 4 Second,
even if a defendant is relatively less culpable than the other members of his
group, his culpability must be measured against the elements of the
offense.2 5 That is, merely being less culpable than others in a successful
criminal group does not qualify a defendant for a mitigating role adjustment
if the defendant's conduct was nonetheless significant and important to the
success of the venture.1 6
The comparative element in the mitigating role determination means
that, as a general rule, only defendants prosecuted jointly with other
coconspirators to whom their culpability may be compared will be eligible
for the adjustment.21 For example, the sole defendant in a street corner
buy-bust will not ordinarily be eligible for a downward role adjustment.
Thus, one possible explanation for the increase in mitigating role
adjustments would be an increase in the percentage of drug defendants
prosecuted in multidefendant cases. If the government were prosecuting
more groups, there might be more low-level defendants in the system
eligible for role reductions. There are two objections to this explanation.
214. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. n.1 (2000) ("Subsection (a) [(minimal participant
adjustment)] ... is intended to cover defendants who are plainly among the least culpable of
those involved in the conduct of a group."); U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt, n.3 (2000) ("For purposes of
§ 3B1.2(b), a minor participant means any participant who is less culpable than most other
participants.").
215. See, eg., United States v. Caruth, 930 F.2d 811, 815 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Ocasio, 914 F.2d 330, 333 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Daughtrey, 874 F.2d 213, 216-17 (4th
Cir. 1989).
216. See, e.g. United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 880 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that
defendant was not entitled to a reduction merely because he was less culpable than his co-
defendants); United States v. Pena, 33 F.3d 2, 3 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting the argument that the
focus should be only on a comparison of defendant to his cohorts); United States v. Zaccardl,
924 F.2d 201, 203 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that fact that the defendant may have been the
least culpable did not show that his role in the conspiracy was minor).
217. Sometimes a defendant who is actually part of a group might be prosecuted alone. For
example, a defendant apprehended with drugs might be prosecuted in a separate case where
other known members of his conspiracy had already been prosecuted or had not yet been
apprehended. In such cases, the defendant might be eligible for a mitigating role adjustment,
particularly if his relevant conduct was determined in whole or in part based on the conduct of
other members of the group. See, e.g., United States v. James, 157 F.3d 1218, 1220 (10th Cir.
1998) (rejecting role reduction where the sentence was based only on the drugs defendant
himself distributed); United States v. Caballero, 936 F.2d 1292, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding
that defendant must show (1) that there was more than one participant in the relevant conduct
and (2) that defendant's culpability for the relevant conduct was relatively minor compared to
the other participants).
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First, as noted above, there does not appear to be any sustained trend
toward a higher percentage of multidefendant prosecutions. Second, if
there were a higher percentage of multidefendant prosecutions, one wvould
expect to see a corresponding increase in upward aggravating role
adjustments. Yet, as already observed, the trend is moving in the opposite
direction.218
Alternatively, mitigating role adjustments might increase over time if
the government adopted a policy of prosecuting low-level members of
criminal groups whom it would not previously have prosecuted, either
because of evidentiary deficiencies or due to the relative culpability of the
defendants in question. However, this explanation seems improbable. In the
first place, it presumes that, prior to 1993, in cases that were actually
prosecuted, there existed a substantial pool of additional potential
defendants whom the government elected not to prosecute even though it
had (or could easily have obtained) sufficient evidence to bring charges and
prove them beyond a reasonable doubt. It further presumes that, beginning
in 1993, the government began a sustained nationwide effort to prosecute
more of these guilty, but previously unprosecuted, offenders and that this
effort produced a steady linear yearly increase in such prosecutions, as
reflected in the increase in mitigating role adjustments between 1993 and
1998.
We think it unlikely that there ever was a statistically significant number
of potential defendants in cases the government was going to prosecute
anyway whom the government elected to throw back like fish too small for
the fry pan. If there was in these hypothetical cases, as by hypothesis there
must have been, enough evidence to prosecute the defendants, we can think
of no reason why prosecutors would systematically elect to decline
prosecution. Nor are we aware of any government initiative to begin
prosecuting members of this hypothetically excluded group.2t 9 Even if such a
prosecution-eligible, but unprosecuted, group existed, and the government
had undertaken to prosecute them, we think it improbable that the results
of such an effort would have been reflected in a steady, linear, yearly
increase in such prosecutions mirrored by a steady, linear, yearly increase in
the percentage of mitigating role adjustments between 1993 and 1999.
The explanation for the steady increase in downward role adjustments
more likely resides in the application of the objective prong of the test for
mitigating role. In the early 1990s, appellate courts set the bar for satisf)ing
the objective prong quite high. For example, courts nationide held that
218. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (noting that § 3B1.1 of the Guidelines
provides differing levels of offense severity); supra fig.9 (relating the statistics on this decrease).
219. As noted, one of us (Bowman) was an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern District
of Florida (Miami) from 1989-96. He is una-are of any nationwide initiative to cast the net of
conspiratorial liability in drug cases wider and is extremely skeptical that any such initiative
occurred or could have been implemented on a nationwide basis.
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moving drugs across borders and from place to place within the country is
an indispensable part of the illegal narcotics trade and therefore, that
merely being a drug courier did not necessarily qualify a defendant for a
mitigating role adjustment.220 It is likely that prosecutors in the early 1990s
adopted a correspondingly tough policy and recommended mitigating role
adjustments infrequently in drug cases and hardly ever simply because a
defendant was a courier. The 50% increase in mitigating role adjustments
between 1993 and 1998-from 16.3% to 24.7%-is difficult to explain in the
absence of significant alterations in judicial and prosecutorial attitudes over
this period. One manifestation of this attitudinal shift may be observable in a
series of recent appellate cases adopting a markedly more liberal attitude
toward mitigating role adjustments for drug couriers. For example, several
courts have held that a courier can have a minor role even if charged only
with the drugs he carried. 2'
d. Changes in Criminal History Category
To this point, we have focused exclusively on factors that might affect
the sentences of federal drug defendants by raising or lowering their offense
level, which is measured on the vertical axis of the Guidelines Sentencing
222Table. However, a defendant's sentence is also affected, albeit less
dramatically, by his position on the horizontal axis of the Sentencing Table,
which is determined by his placement in one of six Criminal History
Categories. Persons in Criminal History Category I have essentially no prior
criminal record, while those in Criminal History Categories II through VI
have increasingly seriously records of recidivism. An increase in the criminal
history category generates a corresponding increase in sentencing range.
220, See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Gil, 965 F.2d 1124, 1131 (1st Cir. 1992) (affirming the
denial of minor role); United States v. Rossy, 953 F.2d 321, 326 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); United
States v. Cacho, 951 F.2d 308, 309-10 (11th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Garcia, 920 F.2d
153, 155 (2d Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Zweber, 913 F.2d 705, 710 (9th Cir. 1990)
(same); United States v. Williams, 890 F.2d 102, 104 (8th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v.
White, 875 F.2d 427, 434 (4th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Buenrostro, 868 F.2d 135, 138
(5th Cir. 1989) (same); see also United States v. Caballero, 936 F.2d 1292, 1299-1300 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (remanding because the sentence was adjusted solely because of courier status).
221. See, e.g., United States v. Harfst, 168 F.3d 398, 402-03 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding courier
eligible for a reduction even when he is only held accountable for the drugs he actually
carried); United States v. Isaza-Zapata, 148 F.3d 236, 242 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that courier
can have a minor role even if only charged with drugs he actually carried); see also United States
v. Campbell, 139 F.3d 820, 822 (11th Cir. 1998) (reversing where the district court apparently
denied a role reduction solely because defendant was a courier); United States v. DeVaron, 136
F.3d 740, 746 (11th Cir. 1998) (reversing where the district court came close to stating
incorrectly that couriers are ineligible for role adjustments as a matter of law); United States v.
Soto, 132 F.3d 56, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding counsel ineffective in failing to seek role
reductions for courier where it was hard to "imagine a defendant better suited for serious
consideration").
222. U.S.S.G. § 5A (1998).
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For example, a defendant with an offense level of 28 would have a
sentencing range of 78-97 months if he were a first-time offender in
Criminal History Category I, but would be sentenced within a range of 97-
121 months if he had several prior convictions placing him in Criminal
History Category 11 1 .22 Thus, average drug sentences might decline if, over
time, the government prosecuted an increasing percentage of first-time
offenders, or more generally, a population of defendants vith a
progressively decreasing average criminal history score.
This does not appear to have been the case. Indeed, the trend has been
in the opposite direction. From 1993 through 1999, the percentage of
convicted Criminal History Category I drug defendants (first-time offenders)
decreased from 62.5% to 55.6%. 4 Likewise, from 1993 to 1999, the average
Criminal History Category (and thus the average severity of drug
defendants' prior criminal records) increased from 1.87 to 2.12. "' All else
being equal, this trend in criminal history category would tend to have
increased, rather than decreased, the average sentence of narcotics
defendants between 1993 and 1999.
4. Summary- Non-Discretionary Factors Affecting Average Drug Sentence
Length
The non-discretionary factors we have been able to identify do not
appear to provide an adequate explanation for the decline in average
federal drug sentence length since 1991-92. Moreover, those non-
discretionary factors that have had the greatest probable effect prove, on
closer examination, to have a significant discretionary component.
First, statutory penalties for federal drug offenses have, xith a single
exception, increased since 1988.2-6 The sole exception im.s the statutory
223. Id.
224. The percentages of sentenced federal drug defendants in Criminal History Category I
from 1993 through 1998 were as follows: 62.5% in 1993, 1993 ANnAi REPORT, supra note 5, at
139 thl.54; 59.0% in 1994, 1994 ANNULTAL REPORT, supra note 136, at 109 thlAS; 57.8% in 1995,
1995 ANNTUAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 106 tbl.41; 55.8% in 1996, 1996 SoucrnOK supra
note 107, at 49 tbl.32; 57.1% in 1997, 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 111, at 72 tbl.37; 56.7% in
1998, 1998 SouRcEBooK, supra note 84, at 72 tbl.37; 55.6% in 1999, 1999 SOt:RcEBOOK, supra
note 5, at 72 thl.37.
225. These figures were determined by multiplying the percentage of defendants in each
criminal history category by that category's numerical value (e.g., if 7.4% of the drug
defendants sentenced in 1998 fell into Criminal History Category VI, the product of these
values uas 7.4 x 6), adding the resulting products from all six criminal history categories, and
dividing by one hundred. The average criminal history category from 1993 through 1998 was as
follows: 1.87 in 1993, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 139 tbl.54; 1.98 in 1994, 1994
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 135, at 109 thlA8; 2.02 in 1995, 1995 ANNUtL REPORT. supra note
90, at 106 tbl.41; 2.10 in 1996, 1996 SOURcEBOOK, supra note 106, at 49 thl.32; 2.06 in 1997,
1997 SouRcEaooK,, supra note 110, at 72 thl.37; 2.08 in 1998, 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 84,
at 72 tbl.37; 2.12 in 1999, 1999 SOURCEB1OOK, supra note 5, at 72 thl.37.
226. Supra notes 94-119 and accompanying text.
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safety valve passed in 1994 which, standing alone, had no immediate227
observable downward effect on drug sentences. However, the Sentencing
Commission's passage of a Guidelines safety valve provision in 1995 was
followed immediately in 1996 by a decrease in drug sentences. 2 8
Nonetheless, the very modest increases in percentage of cases to which the
statutory and Guidelines safety valves were applied in 1997 through 1999
make it unlikely that the safety valve was a significant factor in the reductions
229in average sentence that occurred in those years.
Second, between 1991 and 1999, the Sentencing Commission adopted a
number of amendments to the Guidelines, some of which increased and
some of which decreased drug sentences. We are unable to quantify the net
effect of these amendments on average drug sentences. However, it is fair to
conclude that, taken as a group, these amendments have only a weak
explanatory connection to the continuing decline in drug sentences. Most of
the amendments lowering sentences would have affected only a small
number of cases. Each amendment would have had its greatest effect on the
overall average drug sentence in the year following its adoption, with little
measurable impact on the overall average in ensuing years. Yet all the
amendments we have identified with a potential to push average sentences
down were enacted from 1993-95, and would have taken effect no later than
1996. Thus, these amendments cannot help explain the continuing decline
in average sentences in 1997-99. Finally, the downward pressure exerted by
some Guidelines amendments would have been counteracted by other
amendments (particularly those involving methamphetamine, enacted
between 1995 and 1997)230 that increased drug sentences.
Third, there have been only two Supreme Court decisions altering case
law in ways that would tend to reduce federal drug sentences: the 1995 Bailey
decision interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 231 and the 1996 Koon decision on
232departures. There was a marked decrease in cases with "weapon
involvement" in the two years following Bailey, but the decline leveled off in
1998. 233 Whatever effect Bailey may have had on the overall average federal
drug sentence, it cannot explain the decline between 1991-92 and 1995, and
can have, at best, a tenuous connection to the continued decline between
1997 and 1999. Moreover, the decline in cases with sentences involving
weapon enhancements may be partially attributable to discretionary
prosecutorial choices during the charging and plea bargaining phases of the
process. The effect of the Koon decision is more properly considered in the
227. Supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text.
228. Supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
229. Supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
230. Supra notes 151-62 and accompanying text.
231. Supra notes 177-88 and accompanying text.
232. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
233. Supra notes 173-88 and accompanying text.
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next section, because its essence was an encouragement of discretionary
choices to depart.
Fourth, we conclude, with a high degree of confidence, that the change
in the mix of drug types for which defendants were sentenced during the
period 1993-98 did not contribute to the decline in average federal narcotics
sentence.2m
Fifth, to the extent we have been able to determine it, the average
quantity of drugs per sentenced defendant has, if anything, increased from
1993 to 1999. More conservatively, there is no evidence that the average
quantity of drugs per sentenced defendant decreased.25 Thus, there is no
evidence that changes in drug quantity caused the decrease in average drug
sentences.
Sixth, the steady rise in the percentage of mitigating role adjustments
from 1992 to 1999, combined with the steady decline in the percentage of
aggravating role adjustments in the same period, certainly contributed to
the overall decrease in average drug sentence. However, our research
suggests that these complementary trends are more likely to have been the
result of evolutionary changes in discretionary judicial and prosecutorial
behavior than of real changes in the population of defendants upon whom
the Guidelines were operating.
Seventh, the number of first-time offenders prosecuted for federal drug
crimes decreased and the seriousness of the prior criminal records of federal
drug defendants grew progressively worse between 1993 and 1999. If
anything, this trend would have increased average narcotics sentences.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, all of the non-discretionary
factors with the largest probable downward effect on overall sentence
average have markedly discretionary components. The implementation of
the statutory and Guidelines safety valves, the award of two and three-level
acceptance of responsibility offense level reductions, the choice of whether
to file and pursue gun charges and enhancements, and the steady alteration
in role adjustments (aggravating role down, mitigating role up) all contain
significant discretionary choices by judges, prosecutors, and defendants.
And, as noted, the Koon decision is an invitation to increased exercise of
judicial sentencing discretion.
B. THE E E"T OFDISCRETIONARY CHOICES ONFEDEJMIL DRUG SEVCES
1. Guilty Plea Rate and "Acceptance of Responsibility"
Most discretionary methods of influencing sentencing outcomes can
only be employed (or at the least are more likely to be employed) in the
context of a plea bargain. For example, a "charge bargain" in which the
234. Supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
235. Supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
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government agrees to dismiss or not file a charge carrying enhanced
penalties (such as a weapons count under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)) only occurs as
part of a negotiated plea. Likewise, "fact bargains'-agreements between the
prosecution and defense as to the facts relevant to sentencing which will be
urged upon the probation department and the court-can, by definition, be
reached only in plea negotiations. Similarly, the government only rarely
agrees to recommend a substantial assistance departure for cooperation in
the prosecution of others for a defendant who has put the government to its
proof at trial.236 Even a non-substantial assistance departure, for which a
government motion is not a prerequisite, is more likely to be granted in the
case of a defendant who has admitted guilt and exhibited some measure of
contrition by entering a plea than for a defendant who faces sentencing
after vigorously denying guilt in a hotly contested trial.
a. Guilty Plea Rates
Consequently, if prosecutors, defendants, and judges were, to an
increasing extent, employing discretionary means of circumventing strict
application of the Guidelines, one would expect to see a steadily increasing
percentage of cases resolved by plea rather than trial. And indeed, that is
exactly what has happened. As Table 2 below illustrates, the guilty plea rate
for drug trafficking offenses climbed steadily from 82% in 1992 to 94.2% in
1999.
236. There are certainly exceptions to this rule. Occasionally, the government will need the
testimony of a defendant badly enough to be willing to try and convict him, and then use the
leverage of the impending sentence to make a cooperation agreement. Nonetheless, such
situations are rare exceptions to the general practice of conferring substantial assistance
motions only on those who plead guilty and cooperate freely.
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The rise in the guilty plea rate is merely an indicator of an increase in
the exercise of other discretionary choices by judges and prosecutors. The
decision by the parties to enter into a plea agreement and the judge's
acceptance of such an agreement are discretionary choices. Prosecutors are
not obliged to make plea agreements or to acquiesce in sentencing
concessions to induce a plea. Defendants have a right to insist on a trial.
Judges are not obliged to accept plea agreements.23
237. The data underlying the "Guilty Plea Rates" column of Table 2 for the period 1993-99
is drawm from the following sources: 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 140 tbl.55; 1994
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136, at 111 tbl.50; 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 113;
1996 SOURcEOOK, supra note 107, at 50 thl.33; 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 111, at 73 tbl.40;
1998 SOURCEBOOY, supra note 84, at 73 thl.38; 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 73 tbl.3s.
The figure for 1992 comes from the 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 113.
238. The data underlying the "Accept. Respon. Rates" column of Table 2 for the period
1993-99 is drawn from the folloing sources: 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 150 tbl.60;
1994 ANNTuAL REPORT, supra note 136, at 118 tbl.55; 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 90, at
120; 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 107, at 51 tbl.35; 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 11, at 76
tbL.41; 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 84, at 76 tbl.41; 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 73
tbl.38. The figure for 1992 is from 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 120.
239. See FE. R. lCRI P. 11(e)(3), (4) (describing the procedure when ajudge accepts or
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b. Acceptance of Responsibility
As discussed above, under the Sentencing Guidelines, the discretionary
choices of the government and defendant to make, and the court to accept,
a plea agreement have a direct effect on sentence length because the
Guidelines provide a two- or three-level reduction in offense level for
"acceptance of responsibility." 240  Not every defendant who pleads guilty
receives an acceptance of responsibility credit, and not every defendant who
goes to trial is denied one. Nonetheless, as Table 2 suggests, a link exists
between pleading guilty and receiving an acceptance of responsibility
adjustment. Between 1992 and 1999, the guilty plea rate for drug offenses
stayed in a tight band, four to six percent above the acceptance of
responsibility rate. Consequently, the steady rise in the guilty plea rate for
drug offenses between 1993 and 1999 should, in itself and exclusive of any
other factor, have caused some reduction in average sentence length.
An even more telling indicator of the role of discretion in the plea
process and in the progressive decrease in drug sentences is the rise in
three-level "super" acceptance of responsibility adjustments under U.S.S.G. §
3El.1(b). While the two-level acceptance adjustment has always been a
nearly automatic benefit of a guilty plea, the award of the third level is
contingent on satisfaction of additional criteria, each requiring the exercise
of multiple discretionary judgments. The first prerequisite for receiving the
extra level is an early decision to plead guilty, one made, as the Guidelines
say, sufficiently soon to permit "the government to avoid preparing for trial"
and "the court to allocate its resources efficiently."242 Although the
government need not offer a plea agreement, if it chooses to do so, only the
defendant can decide whether and when to accept the offer and plead
guilty. The second prerequisite for "super acceptance" is that the defendant
"timely" provide "complete information to the government concerning his
own involvement in the offense." 24 3 In determining whether this condition
has been met, the sentencing judge necessarily relies heavily on the
rejects a plea agreement).
240. U.S.S.G. § 3El (1998) (providing a two-level reduction where "the defendant clearly
demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense" and a three-level reduction for
defendants whose base offense level is 16 or higher and who (a) timely provide complete
information to the government about their own involvement in the offense, and (b) timely
notify authorities of their intention to plead guilty "thereby permitting the government to avoid
preparing for trial, and permitting the court to allocate its resources efficiently"). For a
discussion of the 1992 Guidelines amendment adding U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(b), providing an
additional third level of reduction for acceptance, see supra notes 123-34 and accompanying
text.
241. In addition to the data reported in Table 2, see 1996 SOURCEBOOK, upra note 107, at
62 fig.S (showing, in a bar graph, that acceptance of responsibility rates increased in every drug
type from 1992 through 1996).
242. U.S.S.G. § 3El.l (b) (2) (1998).
243. U.S.S.G. § 3El.1(b)(1) (1998).
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assessment of government counsel. That assessment has a significant
discretionary element. Finally, although the award of the third level is
mandatory once the judge has found that the defendant has mfct the factual
prerequisites,244 the reality is that a judge has tremendous de facto discretion
to award or withhold the adjustment. Whether a defendant has truly
"accepted responsibility," has "timely" notified the prosecution of his intent
to plead guilty, and has given "complete" disclosure to the government are
all highly subjective, and thus partly discretionary, judgments.
While the percentage of drug cases in which either form of "acceptance
of responsibility" was awarded grew from 80.9% in 1993 (the first year "super
acceptance" was available) 24 to 89.7% in 199946j and paralleled almost
exactly the increase in the guilty plea rate for that period, the proportion of
drug cases in which "super acceptance" was awarded increased by more than
haf, from 49.1% in 1993247 to 80.2% in 1999.248
2. Sentencing Within Range and Departures
The Guidelines have frequently been criticized for restricting judicial
sentencing discretion. Two areas in which judges retain substantial and
unambiguous discretion are the power to depart from the otherwise
applicable guideline range and, in cases where no departure will be granted,
the power to set a sentence within the applicable guideline range. We will
consider these in reverse order.
a. Sentences Within Range
Each intersection on the grid of the Guidelines Sentencing Table-"9 is a
range of months, the top of which is 25% higher than the bottom.2° As
noted in the opening summary of the salient features of the Guidelines, the
judge retains effectively unfettered discretion to sentence within this
range.25' Two aspects of judicial sentencing behavior for ithin-range drug
sentences are worthy of note. First, throughout the Guidelines period,
judges have sentenced the overwhelming majority of drug defendants
sentenced within range at or near the bottom of the range." 2 Second,
244. SeeHAINEs, BOIMAN & WOLL, supra note 49, at 864 (stating that, It] he extra one-level
reduction... is not discretionary if the required showing is made" and collecting cases in
support of that proposition).
245. 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 150 tbl.60.
246. 1999 SOURcEBOOK, supra note 5, at 76 tbl.41.
247. 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 150 thl.60.
248. 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 76 tbl.
249. U.S.S.G. § 5A (2000).
250. This ratio is set by statute in 28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (2) (1994).
251. Supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing sentencing discretion).
252. For example, in 1993, 72.7% of all drug defendants were sentenced within the lo-west
one-quarter of the applicable guideline range. 1993 A,'uL,% REPORT, supra note 5. at 165 thl.67.
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although the Sentencing Commission changed its way of reporting statistics
on within-range sentences in 1997,s and therefore it is difficult to be
precise, the available evidence suggests that from 1993 through 1999 judges
sentenced a steadily increasing percentage of drug defendants to the low
end of the applicable guideline range. From 1993 to 1996, the number of
drug trafficking defendants sentenced within the lowest quartile of the
applicable sentencing range increased from 72.7% to 74.8%.254 From 1997
to 1999, the number of drug trafficking defendants sentenced to the
minimum possible sentence within the applicable range increased from
65.9% to 71.2%.255
b. Departures
The most obvious arena for the operation of discretionary sentencing
authority is the departure power. There are three main categories of
departures-upward departures, downward departures for substantial
assistance to the government, and non-substantial assistance downward
departures.
i. Upward Departures
Data on upward departures are presented in Table 3 below. It is
important to note that the number of upward departures for all types of
In 1999, 71.2% of drug trafficking defendants were sentenced at the absolute bottom of the
applicable range, and 81.2% were sentenced below the midpoint in the range. 1999
SOURcEBOOR, supra note 5, at 59 tbl.29 (The Sentencing Commission changed its method of
reporting sentences within range in 1997. See infra note 253.). See also Alex Kosinski, Carthage
Must BeDestoyed, 12 FED. SENT. REP. 67, 67 (1999), for a discussion in which Judge Kosinski of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit describes his experiences as a trial
judge as follows: "Once I have figured out the range, I always sentence at the very bottom .... "
253. From 1993-96, the Sentencing Commission reported the percentage of defendants
sentenced within each quartile of the sentencing range. See, e.g., 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 5, at 165 tbl.67 (depicting such figures in tabular form for 1993). Beginning in 1997, the
Commission stopped providing figures by quartile, and instead reported the percentage of
defendants sentenced to: (a) the minimum possible sentence within the range, (b) betveen the
minimum and the midpoint in the range, (c) the midpoint in the range, (d) between the
midpoint and the maximum possible sentence in the range, and (e) the maximum possible
sentence within the range. See, e.g., 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 110, at 59 tbl.29 (showing the
data divided into these five categories for 1997).
254. The percentage of drug trafficking defendants sentenced within the lowest quartile of
the applicable sentencing range from 1993 to 1996 was as follows: 72.7% in 1993, 1993 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 5, at 165 tbl.67; 72.9% in 1994, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136, at 87
tbl.34; 74.5% in 1995, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 92 tbl.32; 78.4% in 1996, 1996
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 107, at 44 tbl.27. The figures in the Commission reports for this
period are expressed as percentages of the entire group of drug trafficking defendants
sentenced within the reporting year, rather than as a percentage of defendants sentenced
within range. However, the conversion to percentage of all defendants sentenced ithin range
and within a given quartile is easily accomplished.
255. 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 111, at 59 tbl.29; 1998 SOURCEDOOK, supra note 84, at
59 tbl.29; 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 59 tbl.29.
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crimes sentenced under the Guidelines has alwa)s been very small. For
example, in 1990, only 2.3% of all defendants received up-ard
departures.25 By 1999, the overall upward departure rate declined to a mere
0.6% of all defendants.2 7 Upward departures in drug cases are scarcer still.
In 1990, the upward departure rate for drug offenses was 0.8 %,2 3 a figure
that declined steadily to 0.2% in 1999.2 9 To put this figure in perspective, in
1999, only thirty-eight out of 21,942 drug defendants, or one in every 577
persons sentenced for drug crimes, received an upward departure.='





















256. 1990 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, ANN. REP. 74 tbl.S (1991) [hereinafter 1990 AN..%%L
REPORT].
257. 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 51 fig.G.
258. 1990 ANNUIAL REPORT, supra note 256, at 74 thl.S.
259. 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 80 tbl.45.
260. I&
261. The data in the "Upward Depart. (All Cases) (%)" column of Table 3 for the period
1993-97 is drawn from the 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 111, at 51 fig.G. The 1993 data is from
the 1998 SOLRCEBOOK, supra note 84, at 51 fig.G.
262. The data in the "Upward Depart. (Drug Cases) (%)" column of Table S for the period
1993-98 is drawn from the following sources: 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 143 tbl.5S;
1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136, at 113 tbl.53; 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 109
tbl.46; 1996 SOURcEBOOK, supra note 107, at 55 tbl.40; 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 111, at 80
thl.45; 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 84, at 80 tbl.45; 1999 SOURCEBOOK supra note 5, at 80
tbl.45. The figure for 1992 is from 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 120.
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ii. Substantial Assistance Departures
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 directed the Sentencing
Commission to ensure
that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing
a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed, including a
sentence that is lower than that established by statute as a
minimum sentence, to take into account a defendant's substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has
263
committed an offense.
Before the Guidelines went into effect, Congress enacted the Anti Drug
Abuse Act of 1986, which added subsection (e) to 18 U.S.C. § 3553.
Section 3553(e) authorized departures below statutory minimum sentences
in a narrowly circumscribed situation: "Upon motion of the government, the
court shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a level established
by statute as minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant's substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an
offense."265 The Guidelines promulgated by the Sentencing Commission and
approved by Congress in 1987 contained § 5K1.1, which mirrored § 3553(e)
in permitting downward departures from the otherwise applicable
Guidelines sentence based on cooperation and conditioned on a motion by
the government. When we speak of "substantial assistance departures" we
include both departures from the statutory minimum mandatory sentence
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553, and to departures below the otherwise
applicable guideline range pursuant to § 5KI.1.
The number of substantial assistance departures granted in drug cases
is very high, both in absolute terms and relative to the percentage of
substantial assistance departures awarded in all other categories of crime. As
Table 4 illustrates, since 1994, roughly one in every three federal drug
defendants has received a substantial assistance departure.,6 Even more
263. 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (1994) (emphasis added).
264. Anti-DrugAbuse Act of 1986 § 1007(b), Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207.
265. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1994) (emphasis added).
266. The percentages in Table 4 understate the frequency of substantial assistance
reductions because, although the Sentencing Commission only counts substantial assistance
reductions accomplished at the time of the original sentencing through § 5K1.1 motions, a
number of districts commonly grant these reductions only after sentencing under FED. R. CRIM.
P. 35. See Linda Drazga Maxfield & John H. Kramer, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION
SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE: AN EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK GAUGING EQUITY IN CURRENT FEDERAL
POLICY AND PRACTICE 5 n.11 (Jan. 1998) (noting that Rule 35(b) data is not collected, but
estimating that Rule 35(b) motions occur in roughly five hundred cases per year). For example,
if Maxfield and Kramer are correct and an additional five hundred defendants received Rule
35(b) substantial assistance motions in 1998, the total percentage of drug defendants receiving
substantial assistance motions for that year would rise from 30.1% to 32.7%. See 1998
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 84, at 80 tbl.45. Based on anecdotal reports and personal experience
as an Assistant U.S. Attorney, Bowman suspects that the five hundred cases per year estimate
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strikingly, the rate of substantial assistance departures in drug cases is triple
that for all other crimes.























The very high percentage of substantial assistance departures in
narcotics cases has undoubtedly been a significant factor in holding down
understates the prevalence of Rule 35 motions. &e also Stanley Marcus, Substantial isistanee
Motions: 117u Is Really Happening? 6 FED. SENT. REP. 6, 6 (1993) (questioning the accuracy of
Sentencing Commission departure data because information about Rule 35(b) motions not
collected).
267. The data in the "Sub. Assist. Depart. (Non-Drug Cases)" column of Table 4 for the
period 1993-98 is drawn from the following sources: 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5. at 161
tbl.66, 143 tbl.58; 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136, at 83 tbl.33, 113 tbl.53; 1995 AN.'u.
REPORT, supra note 90, at 89 tbl.31, 109 tbl.46; 1996 SOLTRCEBOO., supra note 107, at 41 tbl.26,
55 tbl.40; 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 111, at 56 tbl.27; 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 84, at
56 tbl.27; 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 56 tbl.27.
268. The data in the "Sub. Assist. Depart. (Drug Cases)" column of Table 4 for the period
1993-98 is drawn from the following sources: 1993 ANNUAL RErORT, supra note 5, at 143, tbl.58;
1994 ANNuAL REFORT, supra note 136, at 113 tbl.53; 1995 ANNUL REPORT, supra note 90. at 109
tblA6; 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 107, at 55 tbl.40; 1997 SOURCE OOK. supra note 111. at 80,
tbl.45; 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 84, at 80 tbl.45; 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 56










HeinOnline  -- 86 Iowa L. Rev. 1111 2000-2001
86 IOWA LAWREVIEW
average drug sentences throughout the period 1992-99. In addition, the
7.7% increase in drug substantial assistance departures from, 24% of all
269 270drug defendants in 1992 to 31.7% in 1994, was likely a contributing
factor in the decline in average drug sentences in that two-year period.
Nonetheless, substantial assistance departures do not appear to have
contributed to the continuing decrease in average drug sentences after
1994. First, the percentage of defendants who receive substantial assistance
departures has not increased. Indeed, between 1994 and 1999, the
proportion of drug defendants to whom substantial assistance motions were
awarded actually fell from 31.7% in 1994271 to 28.5% in 1999.272 Second, the
average size of substantial assistance departures also decreased.273 According
to Sentencing Commission figures, in 1993, the median substantial
assistance departure for drug trafficking cases was forty-eight months
(53.2%) below the minimum of the applicable Guidelines range. The size of
substantial assistance departures increased over the next two years to fifty
months in 1994 and fifty-one months in 1995, but it took a pronounced
downward turn soon after. In 1996, the median drug substantial assistance
departure declined to forty-six months (50.0%) below the bottom of the
applicable Guidelines range. 274 In 1997, the average substantial assistance
departure dropped dramatically to thirty-seven months (49.6%) below the
Guidelines minimum. 5 In 1998, the median departure held steady at thirty-
seven months, but declined as a percentage of the Guidelines minimum.Y
In 1999, the median substantial assistance departure increased slightly to
269. 1995 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 120.
270. 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136, at 113 tbl.53.
271. Id.
272. 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 80 tbl.45.
273. We have no definitive explanation for the apparent decrease in the average size of
substantial assistance departures in drug cases. However, the apparent trend is consistent with
anecdotal information suggesting that U.S. Attorney's Offices and district judges are
increasingly adopting standardized local practices regarding the size of substantial assistance
departures. Such local practices tend to create customary discounts for substantial assistance,
expressed as a percentage of the bottom of the otherwise applicable guideline range, see, e.g.,
United States v. Cosgrove, 73 F.3d 297,301, 303 (1lth Cir. 1996) (approving the districtjudge's
announced practice of awarding a standard substantial assistance reduction of one-third off the
low end of the applicable guideline range), or as a standard number of levels off the low end of
the applicable range. See, e.g.,. United States v. King, 53 F.3d 589, 591-92 (3d Cir. 1995)
(describing the district court's practice of reducing the sentence of cooperators under § 5KI.1
by three levels by analogy to acceptance of responsibility reduction).
274. Figures on the degree of substantial assistance departure from 1993 to 1996 are taken
from Sentencing Commission figures provided in a fax to Frank Bowman from Courtney
Semisch, U.S. Sentencing Commission (Apr. 18, 2000) (on file with author).
275. 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 111, at 61 tbl.30.
276. 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 84, at 61 tbl.30.
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thirty-eight months, but continued to decline as a percentage of the
Guideline minimum.2
iii. Non-Substantial Assistance Departures Under Section 512.0
"Non-substantial assistance" departures are those awarded pursuant to §
5K2.0 of the Guidelines.2 78 Ajudge may depart either upward or downward
from the otherwise applicable guideline range if the court finds "'that there
exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree,
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines .... 2 Ajudge's power to depart pursuant to §
5K2.0 is both more and less constrained than in the case of departures for
substantial assistance. On the one hand, no government motion is required
for a § 5K2.0 departure. On the other hand, unlike substantial assistance
departures awarded in response to a government motion under section 18
U.S.C. § 3553, the judge may not invoke § 5K2.0 to depart below a statutory
minimum mandatory sentence.
In contrast to substantial assistance departures, the percentage of
downward departures in drug cases pursuant to Guidelines § 5K12.0, as
illustrated in Table 5, has steadily increased since 1992. Also in contrast to
substantial assistance departures, the proportion of § 5K2.0 departures in
drug cases is virtually identical in drug cases and cases generally.
277. 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 61 tbl.3.
278. U.S.S.G. § 51(2.0 (2000).
279. Id (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994)).
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One event that may have influenced the rate of non-substantial
assistance downward departures was the decision in Koon v. United States.
2 82
In this 1996 case, the Supreme Court considered the sentencing appeal of
Stacey Koon, one of the Los Angeles police officers convicted of civil rights
violations for his part in the infamous Rodney King beating.283 In sentencing
Koon, the district court departed downward from the Guidelines sentencing
range of 70-87 months and imposed a sentence of thirty months.284 The
280. The data in the "Down. Depart. Sec. 5IK2.0 (Drug Cases)" column of Table 5 for the
period 1993-98 is drawn from the following sources: 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 143
tbl.58; 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136, at 113 tbl.53; 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 90,
at 109 tbl.46; 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 107, at 55 tbl.40; 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note
111, at 80 tbl.45; 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 84, at 80 tbl.45; 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note
5, at 80 thl.5. The figure for 1992 is from 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 120.
281. The data in the "Down. Depart. Sec. 5K2.0 (All Cases)" column of Table 5 for tile
period 1993-98 is drawn from the 1998 SOURcEBOOK, supra note 84, at 51 fig.G. The figure for
1999 is from 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 80 tbl.5. The figure for 1992 is from 1995
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 86 fig.H.
282. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
283. See id. at 86-88 (explaining Koon's role in the beating).
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judge gave five reasons for the departure, only one of which (that the
victim's "wrongful conduct contributed significantly to provoking the
offense behavior") was a reason specifically sanctioned by the Guidelines.Y
The Ninth Circuit held that none of the district court's five reasons for
departure were proper grounds for departure in this case,- but the
Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that the standard of appellate
review for departures outside the otherwise applicable guideline range is
"abuse of discretion,"287 and that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in relying on victim provocation and two of the other four
grounds for departure unmentioned in the Guidelines.2
The Koon Court created a multitiered analytical structure for evaluating
whether a sentencing judge abused his discretion in relying on a particular
departure factor:
If the special [departure] factor is a forbidden factor, the sentencing
court cannot use it as a basis for departure. If the special factor is
an encouraged factor, the court is authorized to depart if the
applicable Guideline does not already take it into account. If the
special factor is a discouraged factor, or an encouraged factor already
taken into account by the applicable Guideline, the court should depart
only if the factor is present to an exceptional degree or in some
other way makes the case different from the ordinary case where
the factor is present. If the factor is unmentioned in the Guidelines,
the court must, after considering the "structure and theory of both
relevant individual guidelines and the Guidelines taken as a
whole," decide whether it is sufficient to take the case out of the
Guideline's heartland. The court must bear in mind the
Commission's expectation that departures based on grounds not
mentioned in the Guidelines will be "highly infrequent." 3
285. The five reasons were: (1) "'the victim's Tongfi conduct contributed significantly to
provoking the offense behavior,' § 5K2.10"; (2) because of the "idespread publicity and
emotional outrage which have surrounded this case," Koon and his co-defendant Powell were
"particularly likely to be targets of abuse" in prison; (3) Koon would lose his job as a police
officer and suffer "anguish and disgrace"; (4) Koon had been "significantly burdened" by
successive state and federal prosecutions; and (5) Koon was not "violent, dangerous, or likely to
engage in future criminal conduct" so there %as no need to impose a sentence to protect the
public from any future criminality. IL at 89-90.
286. Id- at 90; see also United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1461 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting
the district court's holding), affd inpar4 revd in par, 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
287. Koon, 518 U.S. at 99-100.
288. The Supreme Court found that neither petitioners' career loss nor the low likelihood
of recidivism was an appropriate departure factor. Id. at 110.11. However, the Court sustained
the district court's reliance on the unusual susceptibility of Koon and Powell to abuse in prison.
as well its reliance on the fact that petitioners were subjected to successive prosecutions in state
and federal court. Id. at 112.
289. Id. at 95-96 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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The Koon decision is subject to a number of criticisms.2 90 Not least
among these is that the division of permitted departure factors into
"discouraged," "encouraged," and "unmentioned" categories proves
singularly unhelpful in practice because the Court never explained how the
exercise of a sentencing court's discretion differs among the categories.
Read carefully, the Court's opinion says nothing more than what the
Guidelines themselves say-departure is permitted if the judge finds that any
factor, whether discouraged, encouraged, or unmentioned, is of a type or
degree that takes the case outside the "heartland" of cases considered by the
291Commission in creating the Guidelines.
Whatever its analytical deficiencies, Koon was clearly intended as a signal
to district court judges across the country that they should be more open to
the possibility of using their departure power. It was also a signal to appellate
courts to be less restrictive in reviewing departures. District court judges
seem to have heeded the signal. As shown in Table 5 above, in 1997, the year
following Koon, non-substantial assistance departures increased by 2.9% in
drug cases, and by 1.8% for all cases. The rate continued to rise in 1998,
increasing by 0.8% in drug cases, and by 1.5% for cases generally; and again
in 1999, it increased by 2.5% in drug cases, and by 2.2% for cases generally.
Nonetheless, while Koon may have acted as a stimulus for departures in 1997-
98, the increase in § 5K2.0 downward departures in those years was only a
continuation of an uninterrupted trend throughout the 1992-99 period.
iv. Departures-A Summary
The overall rate of downward departures in drug cases (including both
substantial assistance and non-substantial assistance departures) has
increased steadily from 30.9% in 1992 2 to 43.8% in 1999.213 In drug
trafficking cases (a category that excludes possession cases and convictions
for use of a communications facility to commit a narcotics crime), the
290. See, e.g., Barry L. Johnson, Discretion and the Rule of Law in Federal Guidelines Sentencing:
Developing Departure Jurisprudence in the Wake of Koon v. United States, 58 OHIO ST. LJ. 1697,
1713-45 (1998) (arguing, inter alia, that the Court's choice of an "abuse of discretion" standard
of departure review was unjustified); Frank 0. Bowman, III, Places in the Heartland: Departure
Jurisprudence after Koon, 9 FED. SENT. REP. 19, 19-22 (1996) [hereinafter Bowman, Places in the
Heartland] (arguing that the Koon decision rests on an unsupportable reading of Sentencing
Reform Act and a misunderstanding of factual data regarding the relative institutional
competence of appellate and district court judges to evaluate guideline sentencing departures);
Kate Stith, The Hegmny of the Sentencing Commission, 9 FED. SENT. REP. 14, 14-18 (1996) (calling
the Koon opinion "puzzling" and contending that it does not permit a "meaningful exercise of
discretion by district courts).
291. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (describing grounds for departure generally).
292. 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 120.
293. 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 80 tbl.45; see also id. at 56 tbl.27 (showing an overall
departure rate for drug trafficking cases of 45.1%, a substantial assistance departure rate of
29.3%, a non-substantial assistance departure rate of 15.6%, and an upward departure rate in
such cases of 0.2%).
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percentage is higher still---44.2%.-"9 In 1999, 29.3% of all drug traffickers
nationvide received sentence reductions for substantial assistance to the
government,295 and judges found an additional 15.6% to have demonstrated
mitigating circumstances so unusual that they fell outside the heartland of
cases contemplated by the Sentencing Commission in creating the drug
guidelines.2' 5 In sum, only just over half of all drug trafficking defendants
are now sentenced within or above the guideline range. These figures
strongly suggest that judges and prosecutors are using the discretionary
powers granted by the departure provisions of the SRA and the Guidelines
for purposes other than those for which those departure provisions were
intended.
Substantial assistance departures exist based on the hardheaded
utilitarian calculation that offering sentence reductions in return for
testimony is sometimes necessary to detect and successfully prosecute certain
crimes. Hence, both § 3553 and Guidelines § 5K1.1 restrict such departures
to those who have provided truly "substantial" aid to the project of
convicting some other guilty person. Implicit in the idea of substantiality is
at least some degree of real governmental need for the proffered help, as
well as proof that the assistance materially advanced the prosecutorial
enterprise. We suggest that the government does not need to make
cooperation agreements with one-third of the drug trafficking defendants in
America to successfully prosecute drug crime. 7 Nor do one-third of all drug
trafficking defendants actually provide genuinely "substantial" assistance in
the prosecution of one or more other persons.
We recognize that these two claims cannot be proven empiricallyc-
Nonetheless, we make them confident that they will not be seriously
contested by any experienced federal criminal practitioner. Our confidence
rests in part on Professor Bowman's long personal experience as a federal
and state prosecutor and defense attorney. It is bolstered by the fact that,
despite the profligate national use of substantial assistance motions, many
districts, including some with the largest volume of difficult drug cases, have
294. See id at 56 tbl.27 (showing an overall departure rate for drug trafficking cases of
45.1%, a substantial assistance departure rate of 29.3%, a non-substantial assistance departure
rate of 15.6%, and an upward departure rate in such cases of 0.2%).
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. We say "one-third" because the reported figures on substantial assistance departures
show that 31.1% of drug trafficking defendants receive such departures at sentencing, id., while
an unknown additional number receive such departures after the initial sentencing under FED.
R. CRBi. P. Rule 35(b), supra note 266.
298. And conversely, as David Sklansky has pointed out, there is no empirical proof that
cooperation agreements are necessary to the successful prosecution of any class of cases, even
though the felt necessity of such agreements has been "conventional wisdom for generations."
David A- Sklansky, Starr, Singleton, and Le Proseuor Ro% 26 FORDwt.s URB. LJ. 509, 526
(1999).
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substantial assistance rates a fraction of the national average yet prosecute
drug crimes with immense success. The prime example is the home of
"Miami Vice" itself, the Southern District of Florida. In 1999, South Florida
ranked fourth among the ninety-four federal judicial districts in volume of
drug convictions.2 It is also a jurisdiction in which complex,
multidefendant, multinational drug prosecutions are commonplace.
Nonetheless, in 1999 it had a substantial assistance departure rate of
13.3%.300 Similarly, the Western District of Texas, which ranked first in
number of drug convictions, had a substantial assistance departure rate of
7.8%,3°1 and the Central District of California (Los Angeles) has a substantial
assistance departure rate of 8.4%.oi Thus, we think it fair to conclude that,
in some unknown but significant proportion of substantial assistance cases,
the government (with the cooperation of the courts) is using substantial
assistance not to build cases against others, but as a caseload management
tool and/or as a means to circumvent the Guidelines in cases where they are
perceived to be unreasonably high. °5
Carefully considered, the national 15.6% non-substantial assistance
departure rate for drug cases is equally striking. Since 29.3% of all drug
offenders now receive § 5KI.1 substantial assistance departures, to say that
another 15.6% of all drug offenders get § 5K2.0 departures means that 22%
of those who do not get § 5Kl.1 departures do get § 5K2.0 departures. That
is, nationwide, more than one in five drug defendants who do not get a
substantial assistance reduction are granted a downward departure
nonetheless because judges find that their cases present facts "of a kind, or
to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the Guidelines."'04 If one considers the entire
population of drug offenders, and subtracts from that population the one-
third who receive substantial assistance departures, it seems implausible at
best that more than one-fifth of the remainder are so extraordinary or
atypical that a downward departure would be warranted under a fair reading
of the Guidelines as written.
299. 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at app. B.
300. Id. In addition, South Florida had a non-substantial assistance departure rate of 7.3%,
id., roughly half the national average, confirming that it was not keeping substantial assistance
motions low by acceding promiscuously to other departures.
301. Id. The Western District of Texas has a non-substantial assistance departure rate of
15.7%, right at the national average. Id.
302. Id. The Central District of California also has a non-substantial assistance departure
rate of 9.6%, well below the national average. Id.
303. For more extended discussions of the proposition that prosecutors are using
substantial assistance motions more often than necessary to achieve the ostensible goals of such
motions, see Bowman, Departing, supra note 168, at 57-58, 62-63; Bowman, Defending Substantial
Assistance, supra note 168, at 48.
304. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (2000).
305. There is, of course, considerable debate about when a departure is appropriate, much
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3. Charge Bargaining
Another discretionary method of reducing sentences is charge
bargaining. Charge bargaining can take the form of charging or accepting a
plea to an offense less serious than the defendant's conduct would support.
It may also involve the prosecution charging fewer counts than the
government could actually prove, in theory subjecting a defendant to
liability for only a limited subset of all his criminal conduct. The Guidelines
do not explicitly prohibit charge bargaining. However, the relevant conduct
feature of the Guidelines is designed to nullify the effect of such bargains.>"
Pursuant to § 1B1.3, the sentencing judge is required to take into account in
setting the base offense level and all adjustments "all acts and omissions
committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or
willfully caused by the defendant,"s0 7 as well as all the foreseeable acts of his
coconspirators,0 that occurred in relation to the offense of conviction or as
part of "the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of
conviction."0 9 As a result, the judge is to sentence each defendant for
everything he actually did in relation to the course of criminal conduct that
led to his conviction, regardless of the specific offense to which he pled
guilty. The judge is to include both uncharged and acquitted conduct, if
proven at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence ° As a general
rule, if the sentencing judge has full information about the case, i.e., all the
facts about the entire course of conduct that resulted in the defendant's
conviction, charge bargaining can only influence the sentence if the
statutory maximum sentence for the bargained-for offense of conviction is
less than the sentence the Guidelines would dictate for the same course of
conduct. For example, if the conduct of a wire fraud defendant would
ordinarily generate a guideline sentence in excess of five years, a charge
bargain could limit his sentencing exposure by permitting him to plead
guilty to a only single count of wire fraud with a statutory maximum
sentence of five years?"1 In drug cases, again assuming that the judge has full
of it centering on whether given facts fall ithin the Guidelines "heartland" and on what the
term "heartland" means in Guidelines parlance. See, eg., Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 95-
96 (1996); Bowanan, Places in the Hartland, supra note 290 at 19; Miller and Wright, Your
Cheatin'Heart(land), supra note I at 1. Resolution of the fine points of this debate is unnece-ssry
to the point made in the text. All of the commentators would agree that the term heartland
refers in some sense to the ordinary or tpical Guidelines case.
306. Wilkins and Steer, supra note 53, at 499-500.
307. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 (a) (1) (A) (2000).
308. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a) (1) (B) (2000).
309. U.S.S.G. § IBI.3(a) (2) (2000) (emphasis added).
310. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (holding that rele-ant conduct
includes acquitted conduct proven by a preponderance of evidence at sentencing); HU.S,
BOWiMAN & WOLL, supra note 49, at 114 ("All circuits agree that relevant conduct includes
uncharged conduct outside the offense of conviction.").
311. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1999) (stating sentencing guidelines for uire fraud).
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information, charge bargaining often will not help very much. If the
defendant sold one kilogram of cocaine to Buyer X the first week of the
month, and then sold five kilograms to the same buyer each of the
remaining three weeks in the month, the government could choose to
charge him with only one count of distribution of one kilogram. But the
judge still would be obliged to calculate the defendant's offense level based
on all sixteen kilograms because the entire month's transactions were plainly
part of the "same course of conduct or common scheme or plan."3 2 The
Guidelines dictate a sentence of at least 151-188 months (about twelve to
fifteen years) for distribution of sixteen kilograms of cocaine. Therefore,
because the statutory maximum sentence for a single count of cocaine
distribution is twenty years,313 a plea to a single count will not cap the
sentence below the guideline range.
There are, nonetheless, a variety of ways a prosecutor can employ
charge bargains to reduce a drug sentence, even if the judge has full
information. For example, a prosecutor may agree to dismiss (or not
charge) a weapon count under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), thus sparing the
defendant a five-year extension of his sentence. 14 Likewise, a prosecutor
might agree not to file a "second offender information." The narcotics
statutes provide for doubled penalties when a defendant has been convicted
of a prior felony drug offense,3 5 but such penalties cannot be imposed
unless the government files an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851 (a)
advising the defendant of its intention to seek the enhanced sentence and of
the convictions upon which it intends to rely. Similarly, a prosecutor could
agree to dismiss or not file a charge of engaging in a "continuing criminal
enterprise" (CCE), under 21 U.S.C. § 848,16 which carries a minimum
mandatory penalty of twenty years imprisonment, in lieu of a plea to another
drug offense with a lower penalty. It is indisputable that prosecutors make
charge bargains of these and other types. No lawyer who has ever practiced
federal criminal law would deny it. The insuperable difficulties lie in
quantifying the frequency of such bargains, and still worse, in determining
whether they have become more or less common over time. There is no
central repository of information about the details of plea bargains. The
312. U.S.S.G. § 1BI.3(a) (2) (B) (2000).
313. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b) (1)(C) (1994).
314. For discussion of the operation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1994), see supra notes 17M.82
and accompanying text.
315. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (A) (1994) (imposing a minimum of ten years for a
single narcotics violation, and twenty years for a violation after a conviction).
316. A defendant commits the crime of "engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise"
when: (a) he commits a felony narcotics crime in violation of Title 21, United States Code, (b)
that violation is part of a "continuing series of violations" undertaken by the defendant in
concert with at least five other persons and he occupies an organizational, managerial, or
supervisory position, and (c) the defendant "obtains substantial income or resources" from the
enterprise. Id § 848(c) (1994).
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Department of Justice keeps no such records, and the Sentencing
Commission gathers information, not about what defendants are charged
with, but about what they were sentenced for. The best one can do is glean
some hints from the statistics that are reported.
For example, reported statistics show that the government commonly
agrees or unilaterally elects not to file second offender informations. In any
case where a defendant is found responsible for a quantity of drugs
generating a minimum mandatory sentence of ten years, a second offender
status would double that mandatory minimum. Yet in 1998, only 459 of
7,362 defendants with minimum mandatory sentences of greater than ten
years actually received sentences of at least ten years 17 Roughly fifteen of
these defendants were convicted of CCE.318 Some additional number may
have received enhanced minimum mandatory sentences for committing
drug offenses that involved bodily harm to others.st9 Thus, it is fair to
estimate that roughly 425, or less than 6%, of the over seven thousand
defendants who dealt in drug quantities large enough to generate a ten-year
mandatory sentence had their sentences enhanced for prior drug
convictions. Given that in 1999 more than 31% of all drug defendants had
criminal history categories of m or higher,s2" indicating multiple prior
criminal convictions, it seems improbable that only 6% of those convicted of
the most serious federal drug crimes had a prior felony drug conviction. The
far more probable explanation for the tiny percentage of minimum
mandatory sentences over ten years is that prosecutors routinely agree not to
seek this enhancement.
Another method of charge bargaining detectable from an examination
of national statistics is the defendant's plea of guilty to use of a
communication facility to carry out a drug trafficking offense under 21
U.S.C. § 843(b), known in the trade as a "phone count." Anyone guilty of a
phone count is also, by definition, guilty of a substantive drug offense or of
conspiracy to commit one. 2 1 But any defendant who pleads guilty only to a
phone count is likely to have received an immense break because the
statutory maximum sentence for this offense is four years, a term that AMl
317. 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 78 tbl,43 n.3.
318. Id. at 67.
319. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b) (1) (A) (1994) (imposing a minimum mandatory sentence of not
less than twenty years for trafficking in certain quantities of narcotics where death or serious
bodily injury results from use of the substance).
320. 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 72 tbl.37.
321. Section 843(b) makes it a crime "for any person knowingly or intentionally to use any
communication facility in committing or in causing or facilitating the commission of any act or
acts constituting a felony" under the proxisions of the remainder of Title 21. Thus, any
defendant who violates § 843(b) must commit, or cause or facilitate the commission of, another
drug felony, in which case he is also guilty of the other felony as a principal, a co-conspirator
under 21 U.S.C. § 846 or 21 U.S.C. § 963, or on an aiding and abetting theory under 18 U.S.,. §
2.
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often be years less than the guideline sentence to which the defendant
would be subject if charged with a trafficking crime. The fact that such cases
are almost always Guidelines-evading plea bargains is buttressed by a striking
statistical comparison. In 1999, seven out of ten phone count cases were
sentenced at the absolute top of the guideline range, while seven out of ten
drug trafficking defendants were sentenced at the absolute bottom of the
applicable guideline range, and only 9.4% were sentenced to the top of the
range. 22 In the phone cases, prosecutors almost certainly made deals (to
which judges acquiesced) to allow the defendant to plead guilty to a phone
count and be sentenced at the top of the range in return for dismissal of (or
an agreement not to file) drug trafficking charges.323
While one can reliably infer the existence of some kinds of charge
bargains from available statistical information, there is insufficient data to
draw conclusions about trends in these practices.324
4. Fact Bargaining
The most direct, if disingenuous, method of evading a fact-driven real
offense sentencing system is for the parties to conceal (or for the court to
turn a blind eye to) facts that would increase the sentence beyond the
agreed-upon level.3 25 No serious observer doubts that fact bargaining occurs.
322. 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 59 tbl,29. In 1999, of all cases sentenced under the
"Communications Facility--Drugs" category, 68.3% were sentenced at the top of the guideline
range. Id. This is more than four times the rate for all crimes (14.3%), and more than half
again higher than the percentage for any other type of crime, the next highest being 44.2% for
arson, roughly 42% for murder and manslaughter, and 31.7% for racketeering/extortion, Id. In
contrast, only 9.4% of drug trafficking cases were sentenced at the top of the range, and 71.2%
were sentenced at the absolute bottom. Id. The same pattern appeared in 1998, when 68.3% of
phone count cases were sentenced at the top of the applicable guideline range, while only
10.1% of drug trafficking cases were sentenced at the guidelines maximum. 1998 SOURcEBOOK,
supra note 84, at 59 tbl.29. Likewise, in 1997, 69.8% of phone count cases were sentenced at the
top of the applicable guideline range, while only 10.8% of drug trafficking cases were sentenced
at the guidelines maximum. 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 111, at 59 tbl.29.
323. Roger Groot has reminded me of another method of limiting sentencing exposure in
a drug case: plead guilty to a conspiracy to commit "an offense against the United States"
(drugs) under the general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994). Such a plea would
limit the defendant's sentence to five years, the statutory maximum under § 371.
324. For example, the numbers and percentages of defendants receiving drug mandatory
minimum sentences greater than ten years from 1997-99 vary as follows: 1997 - 498 (7.67% of
those with ten-year-or-greater drug minimum mandatories), 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 111,
at 78 tbl.43 n.3.; 1998 - 417 (5.76%), 1998 SOURCBOOK, supra note 84, at 78 tbl.43 n.3.; and
1999 - 459 (6.23%). 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 78 tbl.43 n.3. However, the Commission
did not collect data on such sentences prior to 1997, and thus the time frame within which
statistics are available is too short, and the data too uneven, to draw reliable conclusions about
any trend. Likewise, although the Commission did collect data on "phone count" cases
throughout 1993-98, it did so for only just over half of an already small sample, and also
changed the reporting format in 1997, with the result that no conclusions about trends can be
reached.
325. See, e.g., David Yellen, Probation Officers Look at Plea Bargaining and Do Not Like What
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The debate is over whether it happens a lot or occurs relatively rarely. The
debate is peculiarly difficult to resolve because fact bargains are entered into
for the express purpose of keeping facts from the probation department and
the sentencing judge, and thus out of the record. The Sentencing
Guidelines are a self-contained system. That is, if a sentencing judge finds
that Fact A exists, and if the Guidelines dictate certain sentencing
consequences upon a finding of Fact A, then those consequences must
follow; both Fact A and its consequences will appear in the record to be
tabulated by Sentencing Commission researchers. Conversely, if Fact A
exists, but is suppressed by the parties pursuant to a plea agreement, its
existence will be reflected nowhere except the files of the prosecutor. Thus,
if prosecutors in a particular district were to adopt a practice of entering
plea agreements in which the amount of drugs possessed by defendants wNas
routinely under-reported to the probation department, there would be no
mechanism for determining either the existence or frequency of the
practice, or the degree to which it affected sentences imposed.
In 1996, writing in response to a survey of probation officers that
suggested prosecutors across the country commonly withheld facts from the
probation department (and thus from the sentencing judge) "to protect a
plea agreement,"326 Professor Bowman was skeptical that the phenomenon
was a very common one.327 Five years on, although there is no more
conclusive data, there is reason to suspect that this view was unduly
328
sanguine.
Anecdotal information and conversations with lawyers and judges across
the country suggest a creeping increase in the willingness by all parties,
lawyers and judges alike, to fudge the facts a little to achieve desired
sentencing outcomes. As but one example, at dinner before a January 2000
symposium on sentencing at St. Louis University,s2 a district judge
mentioned that judges in her district formerly spent a good deal of time
resolving disputes between what the parties claimed the facts to be and the
They Se4 8 FED. SENT. REP. 339, 340 (1996) (describing 'fact bargaining and guideline-factor
bargaining" as "the surest way to influence the sentence of a defendant who pled guilty").
326. Probation Officers Advisoiy Group Sun, e' 8 FED. SF-\xT. REP. 303 (1996) (citing Francesca
Bow-nan's letter to Judge Richard P. Conaboy, which summarized the survey's results). Ms.
Bowman is no relation to either of the authors of this Article.
327. Frank 0. Bowman, II, To Tell the Trutl 7he Proben of Proscutorial "'Itanipulatim' of
SentencingFacls, 8 FED. SENT. REP. 324 (1996) [hereinafter Bowman, To Tell the Truth].
328. To some degree, Professor Boman's thinking on this subject is undoubtedly
influenced by having spent seven years as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of
Florida, a district in which the U.S. Attorney's Office has historically been among the strictest in
insisting that its prosecutors enforce the Sentencing Guidelines as written. He still does not
believe that prosecutors across the country are routinely giing aay the store in the form of
outrageous fact bargains, but does think that the Southern District of Florida ws and is at one
end of a spectrum that includes at its other end offices which are very flexible indeed.
329. The proceedings of the Saint Louis University Sentencing S)mposium are collected in
44 ST. Louis U. LJ. (2000).
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version of the facts presented by the probation officer in the pre-sentence
report based on the officer's own investigation. The judge said that this
problem was solved by adopting a local practice of having the parties to plea
agreements stipulate to all the facts necessary to Guidelines calculations.
The story is revealing at both ends. It tells us that, under the old system in
this judge's district, probation officers often thought the parties were
manipulating the facts, while under the new system, the judicial branch,
probation officers and judges alike, have simply abdicated any responsibility
for policing the accuracy of the parties' claims about the facts of the case.
From an empirical perspective, the most that can be said is that some
fact bargaining undoubtedly occurs in federal drug cases and that the effect
of such bargains is to reduce some sentences. It is, however, impossible to
quantify the frequency of this practice or the magnitude of the effect on
average drug sentences. Nor is it possible to determine whether fact
bargaining has become more or less common over time.
5. Discretionary Factors Affecting Average Sentence Length: A Summary
In the aggregate, the discretionary factors discussed here have exerted a
powerful downward influence on average drug sentences in the years since
1992.
First, the increase in the percentage of federal drug cases disposed of by
plea from 82% in 1992 to 94.2% in 1999330 would, in itself, have tended to
reduce average sentence length because virtually all defendants who plead
guilty receive a two- or three-level reduction for "acceptance of
responsibility" under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. 331 Moreover, a negotiated plea is a
necessary precondition for the exercise of other discretionary choices by
prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges that can produce far larger
sentence reductions. The consistent increase in pleas is, at the very least,
suggestive of an environment increasingly hospitable to such exercises of
discretion.
Second, the dramatic rise in so-called "super acceptance of
responsibility" adjustments33 2 from 49.1% in 1993 to 80.2% in 1999 would
likely have reduced the average length of drug sentences and is strongly
indicative of an increasingly lenient exercise of discretion by prosecutors
and judges.
Third, although the data is not conclusive, our research strongly
suggests that between 1993 and 1999 judges sentenced an increasing
330. Supra tbl. 2.
331. Supra notes 48, 240-48 and accompanying text.
332. "Super acceptance of responsibility" adjustments allow the subtraction of a third
offense level for those defendants receiving the regular acceptance reduction who also plead
guilty early and provide full information about their crime. Supra notes 120-34 and
accompanying text.
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percentage of drug defendants to the low end of the applicable guideline
333
range.
Fourth, the number of upward departures in drug cases, negligible to
begin with, decreased throughout the period 1993-99. s"
Fifth, throughout the period 1992-99, the rate at which prosecutors
recommended and judges awarded substantial assistance departures in drug
cases was extraordinarily high. The rate was significantly higher than all
other types of cases3 3 5 and sufficiently high to support an inference that such
departures were commonly being used, not to secure needed evidence, but
as tools of case management or sentence manipulation. However, although
the rate of substantial assistance departures increased markedly between
1992 and 1994-rising from 24% to 31.7%-it then leveled off.Y - Indeed,
the drug case substantial assistance rate actually declined slightly from 1994
to 1999, dropping from 31.7% to 28.5%. "37 Betveen 1993 and 1995, the
evidence suggests that the size of substantial assistance departures increased;
however, from 1995 to 1999 the size of such departures decreased, both in
number of months and as a percentage of the otherwise applicable
guideline minimum.338 Accordingly, the continuing high percentage of
substantial assistance departures kept average drug sentences down
throughout the study period, and the increase in the number of substantial
assistance departures between 1992 and 1994, and in the size of such
departures from 1993 through 1995, probably contributed to the decline in
average drug sentence in those periods. We nonetheless conclude,
somewhat to our surprise, that substantial assistance has no observable
causal connection to the relative decrease in average drug sentences
between 1995 and 1999.
Sixth, by contrast, non-substantial assistance departures under U.S.S.G.
§ 5K2.0 more than doubled in drug cases from 6.3% in 1992 to 15.3% in
1998.1' 9 This increase was doubtless encouraged by the Supreme Court's
1996 decision in Koon v. United States~s" but the trend substantially predates
Koon. The marked increase in use of non-substantial assistance dowmward
departures was purely discretionary in character and undoubtedly
contributed to the reduction in average drug sentences.
Finally, our study supports the conclusion that prosecutors employ both
charge and fact bargaining to confer sentencing discounts on some
333. Supra note 252 and accompanying text.
334. Supra notes 258-59 and accompanying text.
335. Supra notes 266-70 and accompanying text.
336. IR
337. Supra text accompanying notes 271-72.
338. Supra notes 273-77 and accompanying text.
339. Supra tbl. 5.
340. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
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defendants. 34' However, despite the prevalence of anecdotal information, 342
there is insufficient data to determine empirically whether the incidence of
charge and fact bargaining increased between 1992 and 1999.
C. THE COMBINED EFFECT OFDIscRETIONARYAND NON-DISCRETIONARYFAcTORS
ON FEDERAL DRUG SENTENCES
In summary, the foregoing examination of both non-discretionary and
discretionary factors affecting sentence length leads to the following
conclusions. First, some non-discretionary factors operative between 1992
and 1999 undoubtedly had some causal relationship to the continuing
decline in average drug sentences. However, such non-discretionary factors
were too few in number and too weak in probable effect to explain fully
either the size or the persistence of the observed decline in sentence length.
Several non-discretionary factors-notably the change in mix of drug types
for which defendants were convicted, the apparent increase in average
quantity of drugs per defendant, and drug defendants' rising average
criminal history score-would, all else being equal, have increased average
sentence length. Moreover, those supposedly non-discretionary factors with
the greatest likely downward impact on sentence length-the rates of
application of safety valve and acceptance of responsibility adjustments, the
percentage of gun charges or enhancements, and the rates of aggravating
and mitigating role adjustments-prove on inspection to depend heavily on
discretionary choices by parties and judges.
Second, the statistical evidence reveals a series of purely or primarily
discretionary factors-plea bargain rates, "super acceptance of
responsibility" rates, position of sentences within guideline ranges, the
decline of the already minuscule rate of upward departures, the high
substantial assistance departure rate, the doubled non-substantial assistance
departure rate, and charge and fact bargaining-all of which appear to have
a strong causal connection to the persistent decline in the length of federal
drug sentences.
Although we are unable to perform a regression analysis that would
quantify precisely the relative effect of each of the various factors, viewed in
the aggregate, the evidence we have reviewed shows the following: (1) at
virtually every point in the Guidelines sentencing process where prosecutors
and judges can exercise discretionary authority to reduce drug sentences,
they have done so; and (2) where we can measure trends, the trend since
roughly 1992 has always been toward exercising discretion in favor of
leniency with increasing frequency.
341. See supra text accompanying notes 306-29 (discussing in detail the charge and fact
bargaining methods).
342. See supra text accompanying note 329 (recounting, as an example, one anecdote from
the St. Louis University Sentencing Symposium).
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V. Is THIS A QUIET REBELLION?
If we are correct, for the better part of a decade the front-line actors in
the federal criminal justice system have employed their discretionary powers
persistently and progressively to produce ever-lower average drug sentences.
The question remains: Why? The answer to this question is not susceptible
of empirical proof. Moreover, we are particularly loath to make any
definitive pronouncements before concluding the analysis of regional and
local data that will form the basis of the next Article in this two-part project.
Nonetheless, we can posit some possible causes for the observed behavior.
One might posit, for example, that the decline in drug sentences has
been the product of pressure on prosecutors to settle cases because of an
increasing number of drug cases being handled by a decreasing number of
government lawyers. However, although it is true that from 1993 to 1999 the
number of convicted federal drug defendants increased from 18,4524 to
23,082,344 the size of United States Attorney's Offices has grown as well,
albeit by a lower percentage, from 8,362 authorized positions in 1993 to
9,044 authorized positions in 1999Y ' Nevertheless, the number of federal
criminal cases, narcotic and non-narcotic, is hardly so large as to create an
overwhelming caseload pressure on Assistant United States Attorneys
(AUSA). In 1999, a total of 55,408 personss" were convicted of federal
crimes, 23,082 of them for drug offenses. M 7 Given that there were roughly
five thousand AUSAs working in 1999, the average annual criminal caseload
for an AUSA was only eleven casesO s While this overall average
oversimplifies the matter by glossing over regional differences and ignoring
the fact that federal cases are often so complex that a single case will occupy
one or more prosecutors for months or even years, the fact remains that
federal prosecutors, as a class, operate under very little caseload pressure.34
The imperative to move an omnipresent backlog of cases through the
343. 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 56 tbl.13.
344. 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 12 tbl.3.
345. 2000 EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR U.S. ATrOmm's, FY BUDGET REPORT 107. These figures
include attorney and nonattorney personnel.
346. 1999 SouRcEBooK, supra note 5 app. B (national data).
347. i. at 12 tbl.3.
348. 2000 EXECUTrVE OFFICE FOR U.S. ATrOrNEYS, FYBUDGETREORT (2000).
349. There are a variety of reasons for the relatively low federal criminal caseload, but
principal among them is the fact that most federal offenses are also violations of state law.
Hence, U.S. Attorney's Offices have the luxury of picking and choosing among the cases
presented to them, secure in the knowledge that a case declined for prosecution at the federal
level will not necessarily go unprosecuted. Instead, if the case is provable, but relatively
insignificant by federal standards, it will be handled by local authorities.
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system, so common in state prosecutors' offices,5 ° is rarely a consideration
among United States Attorney's Offices. 3- '
Another indication that changes in the overall number of federal
prosecutors lacks a strong correlation to drug sentencing length may be
gleaned by comparing the twenty-three month period between April 1993
and December 1994, when hiring for AUSA positions was frozen, and the
period following the hiring freeze. As noted above, the average federal
drug sentence actually increased slightly from 1993 to 1994. 13 Yet once the
hiring freeze ended and U.S. Attorney staffing began to increase, average
drug sentences resumed the decline begun in 1 9 9 2 -9 3
.3
Alternatively, one might posit that increases in judicial workload
between 1992 and 1999 created pressures to resolve drug cases
expeditiously, and thus for prosecutors to enter into and judges to ratify
increasingly lenient plea bargains. While this hypothesis deserves further
study, a review of existing data is, at best, inconclusive. For example, the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts has issued a study of the federal
judicial caseload between 1993 and 1997.3 5 During that period, the number
of authorized federal judgeships remained static.356 From 1993 to 1995, the
overall number of federal criminal case filings decreased by 3% . 7 The
number of drug case filings also decreased from 1993-95, and, although the
number of drug cases increased from 1995 to 1996, the total number of
350. By way of comparison, when Bowman was a Deputy District Attorney in Denver in the
early 1980s, his average felony caseload was several hundred cases annually.
351. One potentially important exception to this generalization may exist in a handful of
very busy border jurisdictions, notably the Southern District of California, Arizona, New
Mexico, and the Southern and Western Districts of Texas. Between 1993 and 1999, the total
number of narcotics defendants convicted in these districts more than doubled, from 3276 to
6605. Compare 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5 app. B, with 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5
app. B. We know that the size of the U.S. Attorney's Offices in these districts increased, but we
do not as yet know whether the increase approximated the percentage of the increase in drug
cases. If not, one might expect to find a greater-than-average decline in drug sentences in these
districts in response to case pressure. The average drug sentence did decrease markedly In
Arizona, the Southern District of California, and the two Texas districts (Ariz.: 49.6 months in
1993, 28.2 months in 1999; S.D. Cal.: 54.7 months in 1993, 22.4 months in 1999; S.D. Tex.: 78.7
months in 1993, 50.7 months in 1999; W.D. Tex.: 78.1 months in 1993, 38.6 months in 1999).
Id. However, in New Mexico, the average drug sentence actually increased (N.M.:32.4 months
in 1993 and 41.3 months in 1999). Id. Given that roughly 30% of all drug cases nationwide now
arise in these five jurisdictions, what happens there has the potential for disproportionate
impact on national drug statistics. We are in the midst of making a more detailed study of these
and other regional phenomena for publication in a subsequent article.
352. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD: A FIVE-YEAR
RETROSPECrIVE 9 (1998).
353. Supra fig.9 and accompanying text (noting decline in drug sentences).
354. Id.
355. See CASELOAD RETROsPECTIvE, supra note 212, at 16.
356. Id. at 1.
357. Id. at 9.
[200111128
HeinOnline  -- 86 Iowa L. Rev. 1128 2000-2001
QUIET REBELUON?
drug cases filed in 1996 was still lower than it had been in 1993.5" Only in
1997 did drug case filings finally rise above their 1993 level.' 9 Moreover, by
1997 the criminal caseload generally was only 6.7% greater than it had been
in 1993.m Thus, in 1993-97, the federal judicial caseload in criminal cases
generally, and drug cases in particular, declined for two years, then rose
modestly for two years. In the same period, according to Sentencing
Commission data, the average federal drug sentence rose slightly from 1993
to 1994, then declined steadily from 1994 to 1997.-r Using the slightly
different figures from the AO, average drug sentences rose slightly from
1993 through 1995, then declined from 1995 through 1997." Whether the
modest fluctuations in judicial caseload from 1993-97 had any causal
relationship to the movement of average drug sentences seems doubtful.
A third possible explanation for the changing discretionary behavior
documented in this Article is politics, or more precisely, the fact that the
onset of the national decline in average drug sentences coincided with the
inauguration of the first Clinton Administration and the transition from
twelve years of Republican control of the executive branch to eight years of
Democratic ascendancy. In theory, a change in political party could have a
marked effect on criminal justice policy, and in turn on sentencing
outcomes. United States Attorneys appointed by the newly ascendant party
could be the instruments of conscious, centrally-mandated changes in
prosecutorial policy, or they could collectively manifest a general change in
attitude or philosophy that would work systemic change over time. Likewise,
the judicial nominees of the new party might tend, as a group, to bring a
different sentencing philosophy to criminal cases.
At this point, we have no way of determining empirically whether the
identities and philosophies of the prosecutors and judges placed in office by
the Clinton Administration had any influence on the trend ve are
examining.63 We can say with some assurance that there were no formal
changes in policy on the part of the Clinton Justice Department favoring
more lenient sentences for drug offenders. Indeed, the available evidence is
to the contrary. For example, opposition from the Clinton Justice
Department was in significant part responsible for scuttling the Sentencing
Commission's effort to equalize the treatment of crack and powder cocaine,
358. Id.
359. I&
360. CASELOAD REROSPECrT, supra note 212, at 16.
361. TRAC study, supra note 3, at http://trac.r.edu/tracdea/findings/boutDEA,/
newFindings.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2001).
362. Id.
363. We are considering whether it may be possible to study the impact of the changed
composition of the district court bench during the Clinton years had any measurable impact on
sentencing outcomes. If so, the results of this study will be included in our subsequent paper.
1129
HeinOnline  -- 86 Iowa L. Rev. 1129 2000-2001
86 IOWA LAWREVIEW
which would have had the effect of lowering crack sentences.?6 Indeed, if a
wholly nonempirical observation may be permitted, criminal justice
policymaking in the Clinton years often seemed driven by a settled
determination never to be outflanked to the right. Of course, one primary
conclusion of this study is that the decisions that produce real sentences for
real defendants are often invisible and not consonant with the ostensibly
binding rules governing those decisions. Consequently, we cannot rule out
some influence on drug sentences from the presence of a Democratic
administration, Democratic United States Attorneys, and a rising percentage
of Democrat-appointed judges.
Nonetheless, if prosecutorial or judicial workload, or a Democratic
Administration, were the cause of drug sentence decline, one would expect
to see a decrease in sentences for all types of crime. However, there has been
no across-the-board decline in federal criminal sentences. Sentences for
some non-drug crimes have declined since 1993 .3 However, the average
sentences for immigration and fraud offenses, the second and third most
common categories of federal offenses after narcotics, have actually
increased since 1993.m Likewise, the average sentences for tax offenses,
bribery, burglary, and auto theft have all increased during the same period
367that drug sentences have steadily declined. Factors such as the political
orientations ofjudges and U.S. Attorneys or increased caseload pressures on
judges and prosecutors, either nationally or regionally, may have some
causal relation to the decline in drug sentences. However, based on our
review of the data, it seems improbable that either politics or increased
caseloads are the primary cause of declining drug sentences.
At the end of the day, we incline to the view that the ever-increasing
exercise of discretion to lower federal drug sentences cannot be entirely
explained without reference to the one thing that distinguishes drug cases-
and the perception of drug cases in the eyes of those who adjudicate them-
364. Statement of Jo Ann Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Criminal Division, U.S. Dept. ofJustice
before Subcomm. on Crime, Comm. on theJudiciary, U.S. House of Rep., June 29, 1995, 1995
WL 421247 (F.D.C.H.) (opposing Sentencing Commission proposal to equalize penalties for
trafficking in powder and crack cocaine).
365. For example, the average robbery sentence has declined slightly from 113.7 months in
1993 to 106.9 months in 1999. Compare 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 76 tbl.24, with
1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 30 tbl.14.
366. In 1993, the average immigration sentence was 18.9 months; in 1999, it was 28.4
months. In 1993, the average fraud sentence was 17.2 months; in 1999, it wvas 18.7 months.
Compare 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 76 tbl.4, with 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at
30 tbl.14. Moreover, the number of fraud and immigration cases has increased, as well.
Sentenced fraud defendants have increased from 5,528 in 1993 to 6,199 in 1999. Compare 1993
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5 app. B, with 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5 app. B. The number
of sentenced immigration defendants more than quintupled in the same period, from 1,824 to
9,669. I.
367. Compare 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 76 tbl.24, with 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 5, at30 tbl.14.
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from most other sorts of crimes. Federal drug sentences, even after nearly a
decade of incremental decline, are simply, undeniably, very long.
For example, in 1999, the average sentence length for crack cocaine
offenses was over ten years.ms The average sentence for methamphetamine
offenses was over eight years39 and the average sentence for powder cocaine
offenses was more than six-and-one-half years.3s 0 Given that more than
23,000 persons are now sentenced annually for federal drug crimes, 7
literally thousands of defendants each year receive sentences higher, and
sometimes far higher, than these averages. Moreover, it may be worth noting





These sentences are long in comparison to sentences customarily meted
out for other crimes of equal or greater seriousness. For example, in 1999,
the average sentence for robbery, 111.5 months, was less than the 120.3-
month average sentence for crack offenses3s 3 In 1998, the average sentence
for methamphetamine cases was higher than the average sentence for sexual
abuse, nine months longer than the average sentence for arson, more than
double the average sentence for assault, and nearly four times the average
sentence for burglary.3 4 Drug sentences are long in proportion to any
human life. They are very long in comparison to the settled pre-Guidelines
expectations of federal lawyers and judges. It can be fairly argued that they
are often longer than can be rationally justified to achieve deterrence 5s
There is some direct evidence that many judges and probation officers
view drug sentences as too severe. In addition to occasional public
complaints about the severity of drug sentences by individual judges, ' the
368. 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 83 fig.L (showing the mean sentence length for
crack offenders between 1995 and 1998 remained above 120 months); me aLso id. at 81 fig.J
(showing that the mean sentence for crack offenders in 1999 ims 120.3 months and the median
sentence for crack offenders was ninety-four months).
369. Id. at 81 fig.J (showing that the mean sentence for methamphetamine offenders in
1999 was 88.8 months, and the median sentence for methamphetamine offenders was seventy
months).
370. Id. (showing that the mean sentence for pouder cocaine offenders in 1999 was 79.1
months, and the median sentence for powder cocaine offenders -as sixty months).
371. IK at 12 thl.3 (stating that 23,082 cases were sentenced for drug violations in 1999).
372. Id. at 72 thl.37.
373. Comparel999 SouRcEBooK, supra note 5, at 31, thl.14, ulth iL at 81 fig.J.
374. Compare 1998 SOURCFBOOK, supra note 84, at 81 fig.J (showing that the median
sentence for methamphetamine in 1998 was 96.8 months), uith it. at 30 thl.14 (showing that
the median sentence in 1998 for sexual abuse was 75.7 months, arson was 65.5 months, assault
was 39.5 months, and burglary was 26.3 months).
375. See Frank 0. Bowman, MI, Playing "21" uith Narcotis Enforcor.ent: A Response to Pcfessr
Canington, 52 WASH. & LE L REv. 937,980-81 (1995) (discussing deterrence as a rationale for
narcotics sentences) [hereinafter Bowman, Plaing].
376. For example, in a speech given at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law in April 1993,
Senior U.S. District Court Judge Jack Weinstein declared that he %%as withdrawing his
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1996 Federal Judicial Center survey of federal judges and probation officers
reported that both groups viewed drug guidelines as "the most harsh.3 77
What federal prosecutors think about the length of drug sentences is not
subject to direct proof because line prosecutors are, to put it mildly,
discouraged from making public pronouncements about matters of policy.
The findings of this Article are, at the least, not inconsistent with the
conclusion that many judges, prosecutors, probation officers, and (naturally
378enough) defense lawyers share an unspoken consensus that federal
narcotics sentences generated by a scrupulous adherence to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the mandatory minimum sentencing statutes are
often, if not always, too high, or at the least are higher than necessary to
achieve the institutional objectives of the system's front-line actors. In saying
this, we do not suggest that the federal criminal justice system is in the
throes of a conscious insurrection against national drug policy. Nor do we
suggest that the majority of judges, probation officers, prosecutors, or even
defense attorneys necessarily view drug sentencing levels under existing
rules as immoral or unjust. We suspect that the reality, particularly in the
case of prosecutors and judges, is a good deal more complex.
There are doubtless a good number of judges, probation officers, and
lawyers who feel strongly that the Guidelines, strictly applied, produce drug
sentences so long as to be unjust, either generally or at least frequently.
However, criminal law decision-makers need not feel that strict application
of federal drug sentencing laws would be categorically unjust in order to
facilitate a prolonged downward trend in drug sentences. It is sufficient that
a large enough number of front-line actors, particularly judges and
prosecutors, believe that strict enforcement of the Guidelines in drug cases
is not necessary to achieve justice.
For example, a prosecutor may see no injustice whatsoever in imposing
a Guidelines-mandated fifteen-year sentence on a trafficker in crack cocaine,
but may be essentially indifferent to whether the trafficker receives fifteen
years or "only" ten. In either case, the defendant has been convicted and has
"'name ... [from] the wheel for drug cases... (because] I simply cannot sentence another
impoverished person whose destruction has no discernible effect on the drug trade.'" Ked A.
Gould, Turning Rat and Doing Time for Uncharged, Dismissed, or Acquitted Crimes: Do the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines Promote Respect for the Law?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 835, 846 n.40
(1993).
377. MOLLY TREADWAYJOHNSON & SCOTr A. GILBERT, FEDERALJUDICIAL CENTER, THE U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: RESULTS OF THE FEDERALJUDICIAL CENTER'S 1996 SURVEY 19 (1997)
("Drug guidelines-particularly those for drug manufacture and drug trafficking-were rated the
most harsh by both (judges and probation officers]. The view that these guidelines are
somewhat too harsh may reflect respondents' disapproval of the effect of mandatory minimums
on the guidelines, including their emphasis on quantity-based drug sentences.")
378. See Michael Katz & Caroline Durham, Department ofJustice Low-Level Drug Offender Study:
A Defense Perspective, 7 FED. SENT. REP. 28, 28 (1994) (drawing the "inescapable" conclusion that
the "drug guidelines and mandatory minimum sentencing laws are clogging federal prisons
with non-violent offenders who don't need to be there").
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received a lengthy term of imprisonment. If, to secure the fifteen-year
sentence, such a prosecutor must try the case and conduct a contested
sentencing hearing, but could guarantee imposition of the ten-year sentence
by entering a plea agreement not strictly in conformity ith Guidelines
rules, the temptation to take that shortcut will be strong. Most importantly,
the temptation will not be counteracted by the first and great
commandment of the prosecutor's creed- "thou shalt not get ara)' with it."
Ten years may not be the punishment that strict application of the law
prescribes, but few would view a decade in a prison cell as "getting aw-ay with
it." Although the numbers vary from case to case, the key point is that the
law, strictly applied, mandates substantial sentences of incarceration for
virtually all federally prosecuted drug cases. Therefore, prosecutors can
almost always acquiesce in less punishment than the law nominally requires
and still secure very substantial sentences.
In such a system, it is unsurprising that prosecutors may not feel the
need to enforce Guidelines and statutory rules in their full rigor. By cutting
corners on sentencing rules, prosecutors save their own time and resources
and nonetheless produce sentencing outcomes that remain quite
satisfactory, even by the standards of the toughest antidrug crusader.
Similarly, when a judge, even a very tough-minded judge, is routinely
confronted with plea bargains that shade the facts and bend the rules but
nonetheless consistently require the imposition of significant prison time,
there is very little incentive to stop the train. We think it fair to conclude
that prosecutors and judges who behave in this way are acting on the
unstated, and perhaps even unconscious, conviction that, while the
Guidelines may not generate sentences that are too long in the abstract,
such sentences are in practice often longer than necessary. Moreover, we
believe that our findings in this Article are consistent with this model of
prosecutorial andjudicial attitudes.
If we are right, there has indeed been a quiet rebellion against the
severity of federal drug sentences among the very people whose job it is to
seek and impose those sentences. But it is important to understand the
nature of the rebellion. Revolutionary movements rarely, if ever, succeed
due to the exertions of their most ardent supporters. Rather old regimes
succumb to revolutionary pressures only when their defenders lose the will
to fight to uphold them. Part of the explanation for the continued
downward drift of federal drug sentences is surely that some of the front-line
actors in the federal criminal system feel passionately that drug sentencing
rules are too harsh. But a far more important consideration may be that a
critical mass of those front-line actors are simply unconvinced of the
imperative to commit the time, institutional resources, and emotional
capital necessary to defend strict interpretation of drug sentencing rules. If
indeed the drug sentencing Bastille is falling, it is doing so just as the real
1133
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one did, not so much because of a heroic and bloody frontal assault, but
rather in consequence of a long, slow atrophy of the will of its defenders. 
7 9
VI. SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS AND A LOOK AHEAD
The ongoing decline in drug sentences and our findings about the
causes of that decline have a number of implications, and raise additional
questions for study.
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM
Whatever the motives of those who have effected the decline in federal
drug sentences, both the decline itself and the mechanisms by which it has
been accomplished run counter to much of the received opinion about the
Guidelines system and the roles of the actors in it. For example, our findings
call into question two of the three tenets of the common wisdom described
at the beginning of this Article. It turns out that the Guidelines system is, or
at least can be made to be, more flexible than its critics charge. Judges are
not powerless in the face of Guidelines rules. Federal drug prosecutors are
not without pity, or at least, their sense of mission does not appear to
require exacting the last pound of flesh the law permits. Nonetheless, our
findings hardly represent an unqualified validation of any view of the federal
sentencing system.
Even if one approves of the continuing trend toward lower drug
sentences, the methods employed to achieve it are troublesome. The system
we have described here is one in which lawyers and judges are actively
manipulating the Guidelines system to avoid sentencing consequences that
the rules, rigorously applied, would otherwise require. Some of the methods
employed are consistent with the letter and spirit of federal sentencing law,
but other methods routinely employed are not. This sort of behavior, when
it becomes common, is likely to have deleterious effects on the Sentencing
Guidelines system as a whole.
Because this study has considered national trends, the data we have
reported can yield the misimpression that an overall increase in the
incidence of, for example, non-substantial assistance downward departures,
is occurring uniformly in every district across the country. Although we have
not yet analyzed the data in detail, the reality is plainly to the contrary. It
turns out, for example, that rates of both substantial assistance and non-
substantial assistance departures vary significantly from district to district
and region to region. s0 Moreover, the available evidence suggests that
379. See WILL DURANT & ARIEL DURANT, THE AGE OF NAPOLEON 18-19 (1975) (describing
the surrender of the Bastille by the governor of the fort at the end of a series of negotiations
and skirmishes in which the attackers were receiving by far the worst of the exchange).
380. For example, in FY 1998 the non-substantial assistance rate in Arizona was 61.0%,
while in Arkansas the rate was 1.7%. 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 84, at app. B. Similarly, the
substantial assistance departure rate varied from a low of 11.3% in the Ninth Circuit to as high
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locally differing applications of rules regarding departures, role adjustments,
and the like may be producing measurable local and regional disparities in
sentencing outcomes. Several very credible studies have now found that the
Sentencing Guidelines have measurably reduced "interjudge" disparity
within judicial districts, that is differences between the sentences of similarly
situated defendants attributable to differences in sentencing approach
among judges in the same district.3 1 However, the most comprehensive of
these recent studies, authored by Paul Hofer, Kevin R. Blackwell, and R.
Barry Ruback, also finds that disparities among judges in different regions
and districts have markedly increased since the advent of the Guidelines in
1987.3 2 Moreover, the increase in inter-city disparity occurred almost
entirely in drug cases,3 lending support to the idea that drug sentences
under the Guidelines provide a particularly powerful stimulus to
manipulations of the system.s s
In the next installment of this study, we consider (among other things)
federal drug sentencing in light of local and regional data. We hypothesize
that, in place of a single uniform national sentencing system, the Guidelines
have created a network of separate local and regional systems. We consider
the possibility that each judicial district has tended to create a local
equilibrium in which the customary sentencing players-judges,
prosecutors, defense lawyers, law enforcement officers, and probation
officers-have reached accommodations regarding the commonly occurring
issues in Guidelines application. Such a local equilibrium might enhance
predictability and ensure that similarly situated defendants within the same
as 31.5% in the Third Circuit. 1998 U.S. SENTENCING COM.i'N, FY DATA FILE.
381. PaulJ. Hofer et al., The Effed of the Federal Sentencing Guiddines on Inter-Judge Sntencing
Dispariy, 90J. OF CRI. L & CRIMNOLOGY 239, 240 (1999) ("[Tlhe evidence is persuasive that
the pre-guideline era differences among judges in sentencing philosophies were the primary
sources of unw%-arranted disparity."); James M. Anderson et al., Measuring lntejudge ,untening
Dispari,: Before and AfiertheFederal SentenngGuiddine, 42J.L & EcoN. 271 (1999) (concluding
"the expected difference between two typical judges in the average sentence length was about
17 percent (or 4.9 months) in 1986-87 prior to the Guidelines and fell to about 11 percent (or
3.9 months) in 1988-93 during the early years of the Guidelines7); A. Abigail Payne, D-ke Inter-
Judge Disparity Really Matter? An Analysis of the Effects of Sentencing Refoer in Three Federal District
Courts, 17 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 337, 338, 357-58 (1997) (concluding from a study of three
judicial districts that the Guidelines did reduce interjudge disparity, but only by a small
amount). But seeJoel Waldfogel, Aggregate Inter-Judge Dispariy in Fderal SentenrdngEtidence fr
Three Districts, 4 FED. SENT. REP. 151, 153 (1991) (concluding that interjudge disparity before
and after the adoption of the Guidelines stayed the same in one district and increased in two
others). See also Hofer et al., supra, at 279 (questioning Waldfogel's results).
382. Hofer et al., supra note 381, at 304-05.
383. Id. at 293.
384. Hofer, Blackwell, and Ruback express the same point, albeit in the understated
language of the social scientist. They say that their results suggest "that the drug guidelines are
affecting different cities differently, both through development of distinct city-wide adaptations
and also in the degree to which the guidelines constrain individual judge discretion." Id. at 295-
96.
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district are sentenced reasonably uniformly, regardless of the identity of the
sentencing judge. However, the sentencing outcomes produced by the local
practices in one district may be markedly dissimilar to outcomes in similar
cases in courts just across the district line. If this model accurately describes
current federal drug sentencing practice, the Guidelines may be thought of
as the common framework on which each local system is built. The local
craftsmen in each district have made different choices-some sanctioned by
the official rules, and some sub rosa adjustments made despite the rules-
such that the final structure erected on the Guidelines framework in each
district is a little bit different.
B. IMPLICATIONSFORDRUG SENTENCING POLICY
One possible reaction to the findings of this Article, a reaction that
would be most likely among those most committed to fighting drug
trafficking and the undoubted evils of drug abuse through the mechanisms
of the criminal law, would be outrage that unelected judges and prosecutors
have quietly subverted the will of Congress expressed in statute after statute
raising the penalties for drug trafficking. This view is not without force.
Nonetheless, one can hope that those most disposed to such a reaction
would take a long look at our results before devising a response.
The men and women who have made the thousands of incremental
decisions that produced the long decline in federal drug sentences are not,
as a class, disposed to be "soft" on crime generally or drug crime in
particular. Rather, they are career prosecutors who measure their
professional success by convictions won and punishments inflicted, and
federal judges, most of whom are cautious and conservative by nature,
whatever their political leanings. Precious few of them would advocate
decriminalization of drugs or cessation of the effort to interdict and punish
the flow of narcotics into and through this country. It is entirely fair to
conclude that the view they are expressing through their conduct is not that
drug trafficking should not be punished, but that federal law punishes this
class of offenses somewhat more severely than is necessary to achieve the
law's legitimate goals. When the entire class of those who are on the front
lines of the fight against crime express, through their conduct over many
years, a settled judgment about some aspect of the criminal law, it behooves
policy makers with less personal experience to listen.
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